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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Satellites and other spacecraft have quietly become an essential 
part of the world’s infrastructure and now play an indispensable 
role in our everyday lives, empowering countless services ranging 
from communications to banking, weather reports, safety func-
tions, and navigation.1  Perhaps more ominously, however, space 
has also become a vital military domain as space systems represent 
invaluable national security assets for the United States and other 
countries.2  Space is in fact so fundamental to modern American 
military power that U.S. defense officials have suggested that 
without space systems, “many of our most important military ad-
vantages evaporate.”3 
The militarization of space has proceeded in spite of the peace-
ful purposes which were established for its exploration and use in 
the first legal instrument developed to govern space activities.4  
Even though states are committed to use space only for “peaceful 
purposes,” this ambiguous phrase has historically been subject to 
competing interpretations.5  The prevailing interpretation, which 
allows the use of space “for military purposes so long as they are 
not aggressive in character,” has left space open to diverse and ex-
                                                 
1  UCS Satellite Database, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Aug. 11, 2016), 
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-
database#.WBVBAfkrLIV [https://perma.cc/B3FX-62CS]; Space Debris: Orbiting 
Debris Threatens Sustainable Use of Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS (2008), 
http://www.un.org/en/events/tenstories/08/spacedebris.shtml [https://
perma.cc/U9GZ-NSCG]. 
2  William J. Lynn, III, [former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense], A Military 
Strategy for the New Space Environment, 34:3 WASH. Q. 7, 7 (Summer 2011) (“Space 
systems enable our modern way of war.  They allow our warfighters to strike with 
precision, to navigate with accuracy, to communicate with certainty, and to see 
the battlefield with clarity”). 
3 Id.  
4  See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 
Preamble, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Outer 
Space Treaty] (entered into force July 11, 1984) (“Recognizing the common interest 
of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peace-
ful purposes”). 
5  P.K. MENON, THE UNITED NATIONS’ EFFORTS TO OUTLAW THE ARMS RACE IN 
OUTER SPACE: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH KEY DOCUMENTS 29, 34 (1988) (noting that in-
terpretation of the phrase “peaceful purposes” has been a highly controversial 
problem since the beginning of the space age, with one principal school of 
thought holding that the phrase refers to “nonmilitary activity” and the other 
holding that it refers to “nonaggressive activity”). 
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panding military activities.6   
Rather than a hoped-for, peaceful utopia, space thus continues 
to evolve into a highly militarized, contested, and dangerously in-
secure domain in which many states view each other’s activities 
there with great suspicion and seek to counter growing, perceived 
threats.  As U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work recently 
observed in announcing the creation of a new U.S. space opera-
tions center, the threats posed by Russia and China have spurred 
the U.S. military “to develop the tactics, techniques, [and] proce-
dures” to recognize and take on threats in order “to prevail in con-
flicts that extend into space.”7  He suggested that although space 
had once been a “virtual sanctuary,” it must now “be considered a 
contested operational domain in ways that we haven’t had to think 
about in the past.”8 
Other countries, however, have voiced their own concerns 
about U.S. military activities in space.  On Oct. 17, 2014, a remote-
controlled X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (dubbed a “secret space 
plane”) completed a record-setting 674-day mission orbiting earth 
as it performed classified missions for the U.S. Air Force.9  In spite 
of the secrecy surrounding the project, Pentagon officials denied 
that the plane has “anything to do with space weapons.”10  Suspi-
cious foreign observers, especially in Russia and China, disagree.  
Many of them view the X-37B space plane as a prototype of a new 
space weapon which may be capable of disabling or destroying 
                                                 
6 Id. at 35 (noting that the Soviet Union and the United States ultimately 
chose to preserve discretion in the interpretation of the term “peaceful use” and 
agreed that space “can be used for military purposes so long as they are nonag-
gressive in character”). 
7 Marcus Weisgerber & Patrick Tucker, Pentagon Rushing to Open Space-War 
Center To Counter China, Russia, DEFENSE ONE, June 23, 2015, http://
www.defenseone.com/management/2015/06/pentagon-preparing-war-space-
russia-china/116101/ [https://perma.cc/C3UH-K2X9] (noting also that “[t]he ug-
ly reality that we must now all face is that if an adversary were able to take space 
away from us, our ability to project decisive power across transoceanic distances 
and overmatch adversaries in theaters once we get there . . . would be critical-
ly weakened”). 
8 Id. 
9 Alan Yuhas, X-37B Secret Space Plane's Mission Remains Mystery Outside US 
Military, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 27, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2014/oct/26/x37b-us-military-secret-space-plane-mission [https://
perma.cc/E5GG-6JT2]. 
10 William J. Broad, Surveillance Suspected as Spacecraft’s Main Role, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/science/space/
23secret.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2AL9-YWHL].  
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satellites and other targets in space or on earth.11   
For its part, the U.S. Government consistently reaffirms its 
support of the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, but also 
asserts its right to “prevent and deter aggression against space in-
frastructure that supports U.S. national security.”12  Unfortunately, 
fear often seems to dominate the views of potential U.S. adver-
saries as they assess new U.S. military projects in space like the X-
37B.13  Such fears predictably generate counter-measures by threat-
ened states (such as developing their own variant of the X-37B), 
leading in turn to the prospect of an arms race in space.14  
Fear, suspicion, perceived threats, and continuing allega-
tions of hostile acts continue to undermine the status of space 
as a secure and peaceful domain.  In 2012, Russian officials 
claimed that a Russian satellite had been disabled by a secret 
weapon, presumably operated by the United States.15  More 
recently, Russia has refused to respond to inquiries regarding 
                                                 
11  See, e.g., Air Force’s Top-Secret X-37B Spacecraft Lands After Nearly Two Years 
in Orbit, RT (Russian News), Oct. 17, 2014, http://rt.com/usa/196988-air-force-
space-plane-lands/ [https://perma.cc/V2G4-5HTF] (“Some postulate that [the X-
37B] could be used to attack and destroy adversaries’ satellites orbiting the 
Earth”). 
12  See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE STRATEGY: 
UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY at 5 (2011), available at http://www.defense.gov/home/ 
features/2011/0111nsss/docs/NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassified 
SummaryJan2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8CV-6QN3] [hereinafter NATIONAL 
SECURITY SPACE STRATEGY]. 
13  See, e.g., Fred Weir, Can Russia Rival the X-37B Space Plane with its Own Robotic 
Spacecraft?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 3, 2011, http://
www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2011/0203/Can-Russia-rival-the-X-37B-
space-plane-with-its-own-robotic-spacecraft [https://perma.cc/LM7B-U3WZ] 
(noting that “[m]ost Russian media coverage about the mini-shuttle [the X-37B] 
was dominated by fear”). 
14  See, e.g., Lewis Page, Russia has 'Secret Space Warplane’ to Match US X-37B, 
THE REGISTER, Feb. 4, 2011, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/02/04/x37b_ski/ 
[https://perma.cc/XX4D-3XJ2] (noting that Russia has claimed that it is working 
on an unmanned spaceplane similar to the U.S.’s X-37B). 
15  See, e.g., Andrew E. Kramer, Russia’s Failed Mars Probe Crashes Into Pacific, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
01/16/science/space/russias-phobos-grunt-mars-probe-crashes-into-pacific.html  
[https://perma.cc/QC6N-F5GM] (noting a Russian space official’s speculation 
that the Phobos-Grunt satellite might have been hit by an anti-satellite weapon); 
Andrew E. Kramer, Russian Official Suggests Weapon Caused Exploration Spacecraft’s 
Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/01/11/science/space/russian-official-suggests-weapon-caused-spacecraft-
failure.html [https://perma.cc/HG49-AT8C] (noting the Russian allegation that 
U.S. radar installations in Alaska might have damaged the Phobos-Grunt satel-
lite). 
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a “mysterious object” launched by the Russian military 
which has engaged in various sophisticated maneuvers and 
is described as “stoking fears over the revival of a defunct 
Kremlin project to destroy satellites.”16  Meanwhile, back on 
earth, several states continue to employ technologies that in-
terfere with satellite transmissions for various political pur-
poses.17 
It is in this insecure environment that the international com-
munity now confronts a serious and growing threat to all future 
uses of space: the problem of orbital space debris.18  Space debris 
consists of all manner of “junk” left in space, including defunct sat-
ellites, rocket stages used in previous launches, nose cones, pay-
load covers, shrouds, bolts, solid propellant slag, space activity 
cast-aways, deterioration fragments (peeled paint, etc.) and frag-
ments from exploding batteries, fuel tanks, and collisions.19  Even 
the smallest piece of debris, travelling at speeds of many thousands 
of kilometers per hour, has the potential to damage or destroy a 
spacecraft or harm an astronaut and can remain in orbit for hun-
dreds or even thousands of years (depending on its altitude and 
related orbital drag and decay).20  
In an ominous development in February 2009, the first major 
collision of two satellites in orbit occurred (a defunct Russian 
                                                 
16  Sam Jones, Object 2014-28E – Space Junk or Russian Satellite Killer?, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 17, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/cdd0bdb6-
6c27-11e4-990f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3MeMsL2Nr [https://perma.cc/7AZJ-
H8CU]. 
17  Lynn, supra note 2, at 7–16 (noting how satellite broadcasts by the BBC and 
other organizations have been disrupted by states such as Libya and Iran and that 
“even less technologically developed countries such as Ethiopia have employed 
jamming technologies for political purposes”).  
18  Press Statement, Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, International 
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (Jan. 17, 2012), 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/01/180969.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5TMF-HCDD] (“The long-term sustainability of our space en-
vironment is at serious risk from space debris and irresponsible actors.”) [herein-
after Press Statement, Sec’y of State Clinton].  
19  See Focus on Growing Threat of Space Debris, EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY, Apr. 
18, 2013, http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/ Operations/Space_Debris/Focus_
on_growing_threat_of_space_debris/ [https://perma.cc/98PF-ETGJ] (noting that 
space is clogged with the leftovers from the near-5000 launches by all spacefaring 
nations since the start of the space age); Space Debris: Orbiting Debris Threatens Sus-
tainable Use of Outer Space, supra note 1 (describing the peril posed to orbiting sat-
ellites by accumulating outer space debris). 
20  Space Debris: Orbiting Debris Threatens Sustainable Use of Outer Space, supra 
note 1. 
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communications satellite and an operational US satellite, each trav-
elling at 17,500 miles an hour), creating a huge cloud of space de-
bris that may threaten orbiting spacecraft for decades.21  The junk-
yard of space debris orbiting earth is now so extensive that many 
more collisions are expected, at an increasingly frequent rate.22 
 The precarious security situation in space has dramatically 
contributed to the threat posed by orbiting space debris.  In 2007, 
the People’s Republic of China demonstrated its military capabili-
ties and stunned the international community by conducting an 
anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test against one of its own aging 
weather satellites, generating a massive cloud of orbiting space de-
bris that now poses a collision risk to all spacecraft in, or passing 
through, low earth orbit.23  According to the Chief Scientist and 
Program Manager of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) Orbital Debris Program Office, 
Nicholas Johnson, “[t]his is by far the worst satellite fragmentation 
in the history of the space age, in the past 50 years . . . . Many of 
these debris will be in orbit for 100 years or more because the alti-
tude of the breakup was so high.”24   
                                                 
21  Id.; William J. Broad, Debris Spews into Space after Satellites Collide, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/12/
science/space/12satellite.html?_r=0  [https://perma.cc/9GKH-U6ZY] (noting 
that the Russian and American communications satellites “cracked up in silent 
destruction” and that the American Iridium satellite was part of a constellation of 
66 spacecraft). 
22 Christian Torres, Report Says Space Debris Past ‘Tipping Point,’ NASA Needs 
to Step Up Action, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/health-science/reports-says-space-debris-past-tipping-point-nasa-needs-
to-step-up-action/2011/08/31/gIQAo6WTuJ_story.html [https://perma.cc/
ZLX5-9B5Y] (noting the possibility that if debris reaches a critical mass, it could 
set off a chain reaction of more collisions, resulting in a cascading effect in which 
debris would continually collide with one another and create even more debris). 
23 William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Flexing Muscle, China Destroys Satellite 
in Test,  N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/19/world/
asia/19china.html? [https://perma.cc/W4U3-DRCZ]; NASA Orbital Debris Pro-
gram Office, Fengyun-1C Debris: Two Years Later, 13 ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS 2 (Jan. 
2009), available at https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/quarterly-news/pdfs/
odqnv13i1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YGH2-XF87] (noting that the Fengyun-1C de-
bris cloud accounted “for more than 25% of all cataloged objects” in low earth or-
bit in 2008, with 400 objects still to be catalogued). 
24  Frank Morring, Jr., China ASAT Test Called Worst Single Debris Event Ever, 
AVIATION WEEK, Feb 11, 2007, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/
1790313/posts [https://perma.cc/6TPG-UC28].  The orbit of a particular satellite 
is a function of its mission.  Most satellites in low earth orbit operate at altitudes of 
hundreds of kilometers up to around 1,000 km. The lower the altitude, the greater 
the atmospheric drag.  This drag slows a satellite and will eventually decay its or-
bit and force it to fall to earth (unless the satellite has maneuvering capabilities).  
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The debris-generating Chinese ASAT test in 2007 and the grow-
ing threat posed by orbital space debris prompted the international 
community to reexamine the existing international legal and ad-
ministrative framework that regulates military and civilian activi-
ties in outer space.  This framework is founded on two sets of au-
thorities: “hard law” and “soft law.”  The hard law space regime 
consists of legally binding rules, drawn principally from a small set 
of multilateral agreements (the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue 
Agreement, the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention 
and the Moon Treaty) and the body of customary international 
law.25   
Since the conclusion of the last of multilateral convention in 
1979, however, the international community has been unable to 
achieve any new, legally binding agreements to govern space activ-
ities (and the most recently concluded multilateral convention, the 
Moon Treaty, has been ratified by only sixteen countries).26  In 
place of legally binding agreements, a wide variety of non-binding 
“soft law” instruments have been developed for space activities, 
variously described as “non-binding principles, norms, standards 
or other statements of expected behavior in the form of recom-
mendations, charters, terms of reference, guidelines, codes of con-
duct, etc.”27   
In light of the obstacles that have prevented states from con-
cluding legally binding agreements to govern space activities, 
                                                                                                               
See David Wright, Laura Grego & Lisbeth Gronlund, THE PHYSICS OF SPACE 
SECURITY: A REFERENCE MANUAL 29, 39 –40 (2005) (describing the effects of the at-
mosphere on orbiting satellites).  
25  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, 
the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 
Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119; Convention on International Liabil-
ity for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 
U.N.T.S. 187; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 
Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T.695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15; Agreement Governing the Activities 
of States on the Moon & Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, 18 
I.L.M. 1434. 
26  Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Status of International 
Agreements relating to Activities in Outer Space as at 1 January 2015, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/C.2/2015/CRP.8 http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_
C2_2015_CRP08E.pdf [https://perma.cc/CS6R-DBYU]. 
27 Marco Ferrazzani, Soft Law in Space Activities – An Updated View, in SOFT 
LAW IN OUTER SPACE: THE FUNCTION OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
SPACE LAW 99, 100 (ed., 2012) [hereinafter SOFT LAW IN SPACE]; see also Dinah L. 
Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 319 (2006) 
(noting that the term "soft law" is often used to denote principles, standards, or 
arrangements of a non-legally binding nature). 
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some authors have suggested that soft law initiatives should be 
embraced as “the best hope for pragmatic progress in a highly po-
litically charged environment.”28  It has also been suggested that 
soft law has emerged as the “most appropriate tool” for ensuring 
the security of space objects and preventing an arms race in 
space.29   
The shocking, destructive Chinese ASAT test in 2007 inspired 
the European Union to develop a soft law instrument, a non-
binding code of conduct, to promote more responsible behavior in 
space.30  The European Code of Conduct for Activities in Outer 
Space was formally proposed on December 17, 2008.31  After three 
subsequent revisions, the latest draft (March 31, 2014) is now re-
ferred to as the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Ac-
tivities (the “ICOC” or the “Code”).32   
Invoking the benefits of soft law, many scholars, government 
officials and other commentators support the adoption of the Code 
and consider it (or similar codes) to be the right step forward in 
order to ensure more-responsible behavior in space.33  Toward this 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Ben Baseley-Walker, Analysing International Reactions to Soft Law 
Initiatives on Space Security, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 27, at 387, 394. 
29 See, e.g., Fabio Tronchetti, A Soft Law Approach to Prevent the Weaponisation 
of Outer Space, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 27, at 361, 372. 
30 Jana Robinson, Europe’s Space Diplomacy Initiative: The International Code of 
Conduct, in DECODING THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE 
ACTIVITIES 27 (Ajey Lele ed., 2012) [hereinafter DECODING THE CODE] (“The code 
was largely stimulated by the troubling display of non-transparency and insensi-
tivity to the space environment shown by China in its 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) 
test”). 
31 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions and Draft Code of Con-
duct for Outer Space Activities, Annex II, ST 17175 2008 INIT (Dec. 17, 2008), availa-
ble at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2017175%
202008%20INIT [https://perma.cc/5Y6Q-MVQV]. 
32 Council of the European Union, Version March 31, 2014, Draft International 
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, available at http://
www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/pdf/space_code_
conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL6S-FPCV] [here-
inafter Code].  Previous revised versions were proposed on October 11, 2010, and 
September 16, 2013.   
33 See, e.g., Press Statement, Sec’y of State Clinton, supra note 18 (“A Code of 
Conduct will help maintain the long-term sustainability, safety, stability, and se-
curity of space by establishing guidelines for the responsible use of space.”); Vic-
toria Samson, The ICoC: A Starting Point, in AWAITING LAUNCH: PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE DRAFT ICOC FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 69, 69–74 (Rajeswari Pillai Ra-
jagopalan & Daniel A. Porras eds., 2014) [hereinafter AWAITING LAUNCH] (“While 
the ICoC is not perfect, it is an excellent start to the conversation on what major 
space stakeholders believe to be responsible use of space . . . .”); Park Won-hwa, 
Space Code of Conduct: Right Step Forward Although not Perfect, in DECODING THE 
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end, the Code employs its own soft law approach to address nu-
merous issues, including those found in two related but very dif-
ferent subject matter areas: the critical problem of orbital space de-
bris and the challenge of preventing an arms race in space.  The 
Code unfortunately fails in its attempts to achieve progress in ei-
ther of these areas and instead undermines such efforts. 
 While various soft law instruments have made positive contri-
butions to different aspects of space law, this article argues that the 
Code does not hold such promise.  On the contrary, the Code is a 
case study in the limitations of soft law, particularly when em-
ployed as a mechanism to regulate military activities and weapons 
in a highly insecure environment.  Moreover, it is notably ill-suited 
in this context and in its design to successfully address the critical 
problem of orbital space debris.  As an instrument with soft law’s 
limitations and its own particular shortcomings, the Code is thus 
an ineffective and distracting measure that risks increasing ten-
sions in space while diminishing existing and future space regimes.  
The article is organized as follows.  Part 2 briefly discusses the 
ascendance of soft law as a design choice in building international 
regimes, and the important role that it has played in the formation 
of space law and regulatory frameworks related to space activities.  
Next, this part concisely reviews the Code framework, particularly 
as it relates to military and security concerns and the promotion of 
arms control objectives. 
Part 3 presents the argument that soft law is generally a prob-
lematic design choice for arms control initiatives and is ill-
equipped to address contentious security issues in an unstable ge-
opolitical environment.  The argument proceeds by analyzing the 
negative effects of soft law design choices that weaken instru-
ments, such as the Code, along the dimensions of precision and ob-
ligation.  The impact of these design choices on compliance may 
also vary with respect to the political systems that embrace them, 
raising questions about possible disadvantages for democratic 
states (and their open societies) when they undertake in good faith 
to implement politically significant but legally non-binding arms 
control commitments.    
Part 4 carries the analysis one step further, arguing that the 
Code is a particularly problematic soft law variant for addressing 
critical space problems, notably space debris.  In advancing this ar-
                                                                                                               
CODE,  supra note 30, at 101, 103 (describing the Code, in spite of its limitations, as 
a “positive milestone for humankind”).  
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gument, central features of the Code are assessed, including the 
manner in which this diplomatically-driven, or “top-down” soft 
law instrument is layered upon current, more effective “bottom-
up” soft law initiatives, creating a counterproductive and confus-
ing “soft-on-soft law” phenomenon.  Furthermore, as a practical 
matter, the Code has failed to attract the support of several key 
spacefaring states, raising the prospect of a fractional soft law vari-
ant that is unable to address key security issues and instead risks 
increasing tensions in space.   
The Code presents one last intriguing soft law predicament 
based on its promotion as a “non-binding” yet “norm-creating” in-
strument.  As a legally non-binding document, the Code skirts leg-
islative participation in subscribing democratic states where legis-
latures normally approve, authorize or otherwise participate in the 
conclusion of legally binding agreements.  To the extent that the 
Code, along with subsequent state practice, generates new legally 
binding norms of customary international law, it would thus en-
large a “democracy deficit” in the formation of those rules and 
could have far-reaching negative consequences.  The Code’s her-
alded non-binding yet norm-creating status has given rise to an 
unprecedented conflict between the executive and legislative 
branches in the United States.  This conflict threatens to undermine 
not only U.S. support for the Code, but also the leading role that 
the United States has played in the development of space law since 
the beginning of the space era.     
Part 5 offers some thoughts on principles to guide states as they 
take the next step in developing new instruments to better address 
the critical threat posed by space debris while also grappling with 
separate but closely related security and arms control issues in 
space.  Finally, Part VI concludes with reflections on the most seri-
ous problems confronting the international community in space 
and how the Code unfortunately represents more of an obstacle 
than a meaningful solution to these problems. 
 
2.  THE ASCENDANCE OF SOFT LAW AND ITS ROLE IN OUTER SPACE  
 
2.1.  Choosing Soft Law 
 
 In contrast to the protracted negotiations that are often re-
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quired to conclude legally binding agreements, the process associ-
ated with developing soft law has been described as a faster and 
easier alternative for states to address shared problems and over-
come political obstacles.34  One common explanation for the ease 
with which states are able to conclude soft law instruments is the 
flexibility afforded by soft law, an attribute that some authors also 
suggest is particularly useful for dealing with the challenges of 
space.35 
Soft law instruments may thus enjoy the benefits of great flexi-
bility and may be concluded quickly through a variety of methods, 
particularly by employing indeterminate terms that help avoid 
lengthy debates about controversial key phrases and definitions.36  
Vague, ambiguous, imprecise, or otherwise indeterminate lan-
guage used in international instruments is often categorized by 
scholars as a form of “soft law.”37  Soft law documents may thus 
take many forms as they are weakened along one or more dimen-
sions, including obligation and precision.38  
                                                 
34 Christian Olarean, Cyber Threats to Space Systems, in AWAITING LAUNCH, 
supra note 33, at 101, 104 (noting how non-legally binding tools and frameworks 
provide greater flexibility than binding treaties and permit timely movement to-
wards solutions on issues “where political obstacles can make the negotiation of 
legal instruments a protracted process.”); Ferrazzani, supra note 27, at 105 (argu-
ing that soft law instruments “foster international cooperation by offering simper, 
faster and more flexible terms”).  
35 Ferrazzani, supra note 27, at 117 (describing the practice of soft law as “[a] 
virtuous system that is flexible, corresponding to the needs of the space communi-
ty . . . ”). 
36 Wolfgang Rathgeber et al., Space security and the European Code of Conduct 
for Outer Space Activities, 4 UNIDIR DISARMAMENT F. 33, 34 (2009), available at 
http://www.unidir.org/files/ publications/pdfs/a-safer-space-environment-en-
325.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2LR-GBQS] (noting that “because it constitutes soft 
law, a code of conduct is easier to agree to and potentially avoids lengthy discus-
sions about definitions . . . ”). 
37  See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 27, at 319 (noting that “[t]he term ‘soft law’ is 
also sometimes employed to refer to the weak, vague, or poorly drafted content of 
a binding instrument”); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International 
Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 414–15 n.7 (1983) (stating that “[i]t would seem better 
to reserve the term 'soft law' for rules that are imprecise and not really compel-
ling”); Edith Brown Weiss, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH 
NONBINDING ACCORDS 1, 3 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997) (noting that soft law can 
also refer to hortatory language). 
38 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422 (Summer 2000) (emphasizing that ‘soft law’ be-
gins once legal arrangements are weakened along one or more of the dimensions 
of obligation, precision, and delegation.”); R. R. Baxter, International Law in “Her 
Infinite Variety," 29 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 549, 549–566 (Oct., 1980) (suggesting that 
"soft law" can manifest itself in an "infinite variety" of forms). 
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Although soft law instruments are often characterized by di-
minished obligations (since they are legally non-binding docu-
ments) and/or imprecise language, they may nonetheless be able 
to significantly influence the behavior and conduct of states.39  
Scholars who describe the benefits of soft law point, in particular, 
to the ability of soft law instruments to help states and internation-
al organizations build new international norms, including new 
norms of space law.40  Such capabilities are also invoked by com-
mentators who suggest that soft law initiatives should be em-
braced as “a key building block for norm-setting and regulation of 
the outer space environment.”41   
 Advocates of the Code thus argue that one of its greatest 
strengths is its status as a soft law instrument, suggesting that it 
“can help define responsible activities and set out agreed norms of 
behaviour when legally binding agreements cannot be reached.”42  
Proponents further predict that the Code will establish a solid 
foundation for such progress and be able to serve as “an essential 
normative instrument to harmonize the interests of space-faring 
and non-space-faring countries.”43  Similarly, senior U.S. officials 
                                                 
39 Christian Brünner & Georg Königsberger, ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment’ — 
A Tool to Strengthen Soft Law Regulations, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 27, at 90; 
Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1823, 1880 (2002) ("[M]any instruments that are not considered 'law' under the 
classical definition have a substantial impact on the behavior of states."); Nina-
Louisa Remuss, Space and Security, in OUTER SPACE IN SOCIETY, POLITICS AND LAW 
519, 539 (Christian Brünner & Alexander Soucek eds., 2011) (noting that even 
though a code of conduct is soft law, it “can still give significant impetus to both 
national and international political processes”). 
40 See, e.g., OGUNSOLA O. OGUNBANWO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE 
ACTIVITIES 17–21 (1975) (noting how in the early space era, some non-legally bind-
ing U.N. General Assembly resolutions were widely recognized as codifying ex-
isting key international law principles while others paved the way for important 
legally binding agreements or served as a source of customary international law 
based on the practice of states); Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International 
Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 259, 269 (Apr., 1992) (describing soft law solu-
tions as "useful steps on a longer journey" and the point where "international law 
and international politics combine to build new norms"); Anne-Marie Slaughter et 
al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdis-
ciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367 (1998) (emphasizing the advantages of 
nonbinding soft law in the context of international governance and the generation 
of norms by supranational institutions and their dissemination by nongovernmen-
tal organizations). 
41 See, e.g., Baseley-Walker, supra note 28, at 394. 
42 See, e.g., Beatrice Fihn & Gabriella Irsten, Addressing Challenges in Space 
through New Multilateral Processes, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 119, 121. 
43 Jessica Los Banos, EU Code of Conduct on Activities in Outer Space: Issues that 
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now posit that “[t]he development and negotiation of a code could 
play an important role in building international political consensus 
and understanding around key concepts of responsible behav-
ior.”44 
 
2.2.  The Legal Significance of Soft Law   
 
So-called norms and standards of responsible behavior set forth 
in soft law instruments are, by definition, not legally binding.45  Yet 
soft law principles may nonetheless ultimately have legal signifi-
cance through a variety of processes.    
First, soft law principles may assist in the interpretation and 
application of existing space law treaties and other obligations.46  
For example, Article XII of the 1972 Liability Convention provides 
that compensation be paid, by a launching state, for damages 
caused by space objects, including damages caused by space ob-
jects “carrying a nuclear power source on board,” shall be “deter-
mined in accordance with international law and principles of jus-
tice and equity . . . .”47  The text of the Liability Convention, 
however, is unclear whether such compensation includes reim-
bursement of expenses incurred for search, recovery and cleanup 
operations.48  
                                                                                                               
Matter, in DECODING THE CODE, supra note 30, at 97, 100; see also Olarean, supra note 
34, at 104 (noting that “non-binding tools can be used as a mechanism for harmo-
nising national laws and practices, allowing states to move towards adherence, 
while keeping within their economic and technological capacities”).  
44 Gregory L. Schulte [U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 
Policy] & Audrey M. Schaffer [U.S. Space Policy Advisor in the Office of the Un-
der Secretary of Defense for Space Policy], Enhancing Security by Promoting Respon-
sible Behavior in Space, 6 STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 9, 14 (Spring 2012). 
45 Ferrazzani, supra note 27, at 116 (referring to these non-binding principles 
as “light norms”). 
46 Id.; David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 914 (2003) (noting the impact of soft law on the inter-
pretation of treaties and on the establishment of customary international law in 
areas such as human rights). 
47 G.A. Res. 47/68, Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources In 
Outer Space, Principle 9 (Dec. 14, 1992) http://www.un.org/documents/
ga/res/47/a47r068.htm [https://perma.cc/8BA4-RJXW]; Convention on Interna-
tional Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 
2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187. 
48 Faustino Pocar, The Normative Role of UNCOPUOS, in OUTLOOK ON SPACE 
LAW OVER THE NEXT 30 YEARS: ESSAYS PUBLISHED FOR THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 
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In order to assist in the interpretation of language in legally 
binding agreements, including Article XII of the Liability Conven-
tion, states may make recourse under Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties to “any subsequent practice in 
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation.”49  In the case of the Liability 
Convention, such subsequent practice can be found in Principle 9.3 
of the non-legally binding 1992 Declaration of Principles Relevant 
to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, which pro-
vides that compensation for damage caused by space objects or 
their component parts “shall include reimbursement of the duly 
substantiated expenses for search, recovery and clean-up opera-
tions . . . .”50  Although this specification of reimbursable expenses 
is contained in a soft law instrument, the fact that the instrument 
had been adopted by all the states parties to the Liability Conven-
tion “can be regarded as an expression of subsequent practice in 
the application of the Convention,” making it an authoritative ba-
sis for interpreting the Convention.51    
Second, soft law instruments setting forth various technical 
standards, guidelines or regulations may create obligations of a 
procedural nature.52  Although these technical standards, guide-
lines and regulations lack legally binding force, they nonetheless 
may have “factual effects.”53  For example, with respect to the 
regulation of satellite networks, the International Telecommunica-
tions Union (ITU) issues numerous recommendations and other 
decisions which are non-binding, but states may find themselves 
forced to comply with these recommendations and decisions “due 
                                                                                                               
OUTER SPACE TREATY 415, 420 (Daphné Crowther & Gabriel Lafferranderie eds., 
1997). 
49 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31.3.b, entered into force Jan. 
27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
50 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, supra 
note 47, Principle 9.3. 
51 Pocar, supra note 48, at 420 (noting that declarations of principles on outer 
space “adopted by the General Assembly play a significant role within treaty law, 
despite their non-binding nature, as far as they contribute to clarify the scope of 
rights and obligations expressed in treaties and conventions”).     
52 Ferrazzani, supra note 27, at 116. 
53 Christian Brünner & Georg Kőnigsberger, ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment’—
A Tool to Strengthen Soft Law Regulations, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 27, at 87, 
89 (further noting that “the decisive factor is not the form of regulation, but the 
‘substance’ and the intention to regulate and influence behavior and conduct”). 
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to pure necessity of compliance.”54  Non-compliance could in fact 
“lead to severe consequences up to complete isolation from the 
‘telecommunication-world’ due to non-matching standards or out-
dated equipment.”55  (ITU recommendations and regulations also 
help to illustrate the first point noted above, since they have en-
joyed legal significance when employed as supplementary means 
of interpretation by arbitral tribunals and other adjudicating bod-
ies, including World Trade Organization adjudicating bodies.)56  
Third, soft law instruments setting forth various technical 
standards, guidelines or regulations can lead to harmonized inter-
national procedural standards that in turn may generate legally 
binding domestic legislation and regulations (including domestic 
licensing requirements and other administrative procedures).57  In 
the area of space law, such soft law procedural initiatives have 
clearly served as an incentive for states to create coordinated na-
tional space legislation and regulations.58  For example, the 1986 
U.N. General Assembly Resolution on “Principles Relating to Re-
mote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space” has played such a 
role.59  Although this resolution is non-binding, its principles are 
widely accepted and have been incorporated in the legally binding 
domestic licensing regulations of numerous states.60  They are thus 
                                                 
54 Jens Hinricher, The Law-Making of the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) – Providing a New Source of International Law?, 64 HEIDELBERG J. OF INT’L L. 
489, 499, 500 (2004) (further noting that because of the complicated underlying 
technical issues and the ITU’s general reputation for expertise and accuracy, the 
“non-binding decisions of the ITU are commonly accepted by its members as if 
they were binding”). 
55 Id. at 499. 
56 Yusuf Aksar, International Economic Law, in IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW: THROUGH DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 1, 41–42 (Yusuf Aksar 
ed., 2011) (“[R]egulations and recommendations of ITU . . . can be treated as the 
best fitting soft law instruments in international law”). 
57 Setsuko Aoki, The Function of ‘Soft Law’ in the Development of International 
Space Law, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 27, at 57, 63 (noting that the “subcate-
gory” of “soft law for the harmonization of national laws” includes “the tacit un-
derstanding . . . that soft law should remain as a standard for the elaboration of 
national law”).  
58 Ferrazzani, supra note 27, at 117.   
59 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, U.N 
Doc. A/RES/41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986). 
60 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, A Brief Overview of 
Norms Development in Outer Space, 3 (2012), http://www.unidir.org/
files/publications/pdfs/a-brief-overview-of-norms-development-in-outer-space-
en-462.pdf [https://perma.cc/37YL-G229] (“The Remote Sensing Principles have 
also been incorporated into numerous national, regional, and multilateral laws 
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recognized, for the most part, as international obligations in the 
U.S. space regulatory regime, which requires those persons li-
censed to operate any private remote-sensing space system to 
comply with key principles set forth in the resolution.61 
Fourth, soft law instruments seeking to frame new norms of 
cooperation may later form the basis of legally binding interna-
tional agreements.62  This phenomenon was notably demonstrated 
in the early era of space exploration when several key principles 
set forth in non-binding U.N. General Assembly Resolutions were 
subsequently codified in legally binding multilateral agreements 
governing activities in space.63  For example, the foundational 
“non-appropriation principle,” barring states from claiming sover-
eignty over outer space and celestial bodies, was first expressed in 
a U.N. General Assembly Resolution in 1961 and subsequently 
formed the basis of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.64    
Fifth, specific provisions in a soft law instrument may eventual-
ly crystallize into rules of customary international law.65  Several 
U.N. General Assembly resolutions conspicuously served this pur-
pose early in the space era.66  Widely accepted non-binding tech-
                                                                                                               
and policies, including those of France, Japan, India, Thailand, and the United 
States of America”). 
61 Michael Hoversten, U.S. National Security and Government Regulation of 
Commercial Remote Sensing from Outer Space, 50 A.F. L. Rev. 253, 263–64 (2001).  
Under U.S. law, no person subject to U.S. jurisdiction may directly or indirectly 
operate any private remote-sensing space system without first obtaining the ap-
propriate license from the Department of Commerce.  15 U.S.C. § 5601 (1992); see 
also, JULIAN HERMIDA, LEGAL BASIS FOR A NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION 96 (2004) 
(noting that the requirements to obtain a license to operate private remote sensing 
space systems include “observ[ing] the international obligations of the United 
States”). 
62 Ferrazzani, supra note 27, at 116–117 (noting how soft law may help in “the 
process of early elaboration of detailed obligations to be subsequently formalised 
under the law of international agreements”).  
63 OGUNBANWO, supra note 40, at 17–21. 
64  G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI) A, International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (Dec. 20, 1961); Steven Freeland, The Role of ‘Soft Law’ in Public Inter-
national Law and its Relevance to the International Legal Regulation of Outer Space, in 
SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 27, at 9, 26 (further noting that the non-
appropriation principle may have achieved the status of a rule of customary in-
ternational law even before the adoption of the General Assembly Resolution 1721 
and the conclusion of the Outer Space Treaty).  
65 Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in 
International Law, 38 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 850, 857 (Oct., 1989); see also Freeland, su-
pra note 64, at 26 (also noting that soft law provisions “may even be declaratory of 
customary international law in certain circumstances”). 
66 Vereshchetin & Danilenko, infra note 286, at 25 (noting that “[t]he accelera-
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nical standards, guidelines and other regulations, such as ITU deci-
sions and recommendations, may also be cited as evidence of gen-
eral state practice, helping to potentially shape and form rules of 
customary international law.67  Soft law’s role in sometimes con-
tributing to the formation of customary international law has thus 
been an important factor in the development of space law, and 
proponents of the Code point to the likelihood (in their view) of 
provisions in the Code eventually becoming binding rules of cus-
tomary international law.68  
 Each legally significant process and aspect of soft law has 
been reflected in important ways in the development of the legal 
framework that now governs activities in space.  Soft law is thus a 
long established, vital component of the space law regime and 
there is an increasing tendency of the international community to 
rely on soft law instruments to assist in numerous areas of space 
activity.69  It should be noted, however, that not all soft law in-
                                                                                                               
tion of the formation of customary principles relating to outer space was brought 
about not only by the fact that all actions of states in the field of exploration and 
use of outer space were immediately known all over the world, but also by the 
adoption of a number of United Nations General Assembly resolutions”).  It 
should be noted, however, that the U.N. General Assembly has the power only to 
make “recommendations to the . . . Members of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter 
art. 63, ¶ 2.  In order to form the basis of customary international law, such resolu-
tions must purport to state legal principles, enjoy a very high degree of consensus, 
and be reflected in the subsequent general practice of states acting out of a sense 
of legal obligation.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §103 cmt. 
c (1987) (observing that resolutions of universal organizations, “if not controver-
sial and if adopted by consensus or virtual unanimity, are given substantial 
weight” in the identification of international law); Id. at §103 Reporters Note 2 
(observing that “[e]ven a unanimous resolution may be questioned when the rec-
ord shows that those voting for it considered it merely a recommendation or a po-
litical expression, or that serious consideration was not given to its legal basis.  A 
resolution is entitled to little weight if it is contradicted by state practice . . . ”). 
67  Hinricher, supra note 54, at 499–501 (noting that the ITU is involved “in 
reshaping and supplementing international law” and that “the overall compliance 
of states with non-binding recommendations issued by international organisa-
tions such as the ITU can . . . slowly evolve into binding customary rules and 
practices”). 
68  Remuss, supra note 39, at 539; Los Banos, supra note 43, at 100 (arguing 
that the Code “will lay the groundwork to transform commitments into legally 
binding obligations either through the enactment of a treaty or their crystalliza-
tion into customary international law in the future”). 
69 Ferrazzani, supra note 27, at 117 (“Whatever the history of space law may 
tell, soft law is already there, non-legally binding but vital, helping significantly in 
the establishment and development of international space relations.”); Freeland, 
supra note 64, at 25–26 (“There is a clear trend towards the use of such [soft law] 
instruments, continuing the long-established understanding that soft law is a 
well-accepted methodology for furthering . . . endeavors in outer space”).   
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struments lead to the formation of new rules of customary interna-
tional law or serve as the basis for new legal regimes.  In some cas-
es, these instruments may be illusory achievements, presenting 
“only the appearance of genuine agreement and shared under-
standing when in fact there is none.”70  In addressing arms control 
and security issues, these instruments may also create their own 
problems, thus causing more harm than good (as discussed below 
in Part 3).  
 
2.3.  Soft Law as the Proposed Solution for Space: The Code    
 
In recent years, several diplomatically-driven soft law initia-
tives related to space activities have received considerable atten-
tion at the United Nations.  For example, since 2005, the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly has promoted the development and adoption of so-
called “Outer Space Transparency and Confidence-Building 
Measures” (TCBMs).71  As part of these efforts, a Governmental 
Group of Experts (GGE) was formed in 2011 with the mandate “to 
conduct a study . . . on outer space transparency and confidence-
building measures” and submit a final report to the General As-
sembly.72  In late 2013, the General Assembly received and en-
dorsed the final GGE report and encouraged U.N. Member States 
to review and implement the proposed soft law measures through 
relevant national mechanisms on a voluntary basis.73  
The EU’s development of an international code of conduct for 
                                                 
70 RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, 38 
(1981) (noting how commentators have observed that some soft law techniques, 
such as the employment of equivocal or ambiguous language, may result in 
agreements that are “wholly illusory and not useful”). 
71  Since 2005, the U.N. General Assembly has annually adopted resolutions 
promoting TCBMs.  These efforts have enjoyed the strong support of many gov-
ernments, particularly the Russian Federation.  See Department of Security Affairs 
and Disarmament & Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Rus-
sian Approaches towards Ensuring Security in Space, in DECODING THE CODE, supra 
note 30, at 117. 
72  G.A. Res. A/65/68, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/68, Transparency and Confi-
dence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (Jan. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/ view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/65/68 
[https://perma.cc/8E4X-D2AZ]. 
73 G.A. Res. 68/50, U.N. Doc A/RES/68/50, Transparency and Confidence-
Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (Dec. 10, 2013), available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp? symbol=A/RES/68/50 
[https://perma.cc/2KVG-SHVM]. 
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outer space is not directly related to GGE activities,74 although the 
Code does contain several voluntary TCBMs similar to those rec-
ommended by the GGE in its final report.  These include provi-
sions encouraging states to endeavor to organize the following ac-
tivities on a voluntary basis: familiarization visits to improve 
understanding of a state's policies and procedures for outer space 
activities; expert visits to space launch sites, flight control centers, 
and other outer space infrastructure facilities; observations of 
launches of space objects; demonstrations of rocket and other 
space-related technologies; dialogues to clarify information on out-
er space activities; and thematic workshops and conferences on the 
exploration and use of outer space.75   
The Code, however, contains more than just traditional TCBMs 
like those recommended by the U.N. General Assembly.  The latest 
draft of the Code is subdivided into four sections (Core Principles 
and Objectives, General Measures, Cooperation Mechanisms, and 
Organizational Aspects) and its stated purpose is “to enhance the 
safety, security, and sustainability of all outer space activities per-
taining to space objects, as well as the space environment.”76  To 
achieve these goals, states subscribing to the Code resolve to per-
form a variety of actions, including notifying other subscribing 
states of designated space activities (without distinction as to their 
military or civilian nature), including pre-notification of the launch 
of space objects and scheduled maneuvers that could pose a risk to 
the safety of flight of the space objects of other States.77   
States further resolve, pursuant to the Code, to annually share 
information with the other subscribing states related to their 
“space strategies and policies, including those which are security-
related, in all aspects which could affect the safety, security, and 
sustainability in outer space” as well as their “major outer space 
research and space applications programmes.”78  Good faith efforts 
                                                 
74 Although the General Assembly resolution endorsing the final GGE report 
explicitly recognized “the presentation by the European Union of a draft of a non-
legally binding international code of conduct for outer space activities,” the Code 
has proceeded on a sometimes parallel—but separate—track.  Id. 
75  Code, supra note 32, art. 6.4. 
76 Id., art. 1.1.  Art. 1.3 further provides that “[t]his Code establishes trans-
parency and confidence-building measures, with the aim of enhancing mutual 
understanding and trust, helping both to prevent confrontation and foster nation-
al, regional and global security and stability . . . .” 
77 Id., art. 5.1. 
78 Id., art. 6.1. 
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to fully implement such provisions on notification and sharing of 
information may raise serious issues for the military agencies of 
some spacefaring countries, particularly with respect to divulging 
information relating to their sensitive technology and national se-
curity.79   
Other provisions in the Code, which could be interpreted to re-
strict specific military activities and programs, raise additional na-
tional security concerns for some states.  For example, the Code 
contains five different provisions related to a subscribing state’s re-
sponsibility to prevent “harmful interference” to another state’s 
space activities and objects, including section 4.1 in which subscrib-
ing states “resolve to establish and implement policies and proce-
dures to minimize . . . any form of harmful interference with an-
other State’s peaceful exploration, and use, of outer space.”80  
The Code, however, does not define the broad term “harmful 
interference,” (which could encompass diverse types of actions 
causing direct, indirect, or temporary effects), nor does it make any 
distinction between military and civilian activities that might cause 
such harmful interference.  While the elusive, undefined term 
harmful interference is found in several agreements relating to 
space, it is used in those agreements in much more limited contexts 
than as a comprehensive prohibition of all forms of harmful inter-
ference with space objects.81  
                                                 
79 Ajey Lele, Deliberating the Space Code of Conduct, in DECODING THE CODE, 
supra note 30, at 13, 20 (“No state would like to share technical information which 
could be used to understand, and probe more deeply into, its scientific and tech-
nological capabilities”). 
80 Code, supra note 32, § 2. (¶¶ 25 and 27), 4.1, 6.1 and 7.1. 
81  See, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX (authorizing a state party 
to request consultation when there is reason to believe that the activity of another 
state party or its nationals would cause potentially harmful interference with ac-
tivities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space); see also David A. 
Koplow, An Inference About Interference: A Surprising Application of Existing Interna-
tional Law to Inhibit Anti-Satellite Weapons, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 737, 781–793, 815 
(2014) (cataloguing agreements that contain references to interference and noting 
in particular how various defunct and extant U.S.-Russia bilateral arms control 
treaties contain provisions that prohibit interference with “National Technical 
Means” or “NTM” spy satellites which are used to verify compliance with treaty 
commitments).  Although Professor Koplow propounds a thesis that a test or use 
in space of a debris-creating ASAT would be illegal under existing international 
law because it would result in a dangerous, persistent debris stream that would, 
at some point, “impermissibly interfere with the operation of treaty-protected 
NTM satellites,” he notes that at this time “there are simply not enough treaties 
containing the explicit NTM provisions to create [on that basis alone] a truly com-
prehensive, global restriction on ASAT activities.” 
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The absence of any definitions of key terms in the Code (in-
cluding the term harmful interference) is recognized even by pro-
ponents of the Code as a significant failure.82  Critics of the Code 
(including numerous members of the U.S. Congress) argue that 
good faith efforts to fully implement its broad terms could have 
far-reaching negative consequences for U.S. military and intelli-
gence activities and programs in space.83       
Several countries have questioned whether the Code is an ap-
propriate mechanism to address the military aspects of outer space, 
an area that has traditionally been reserved for deliberations by the 
U.N. Conference on Disarmament (the CD) and its Prevention of 
an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) process.84  Russia in par-
ticular has sought to distance the proposed Code from the PAROS 
process and has refrained from supporting the Code, preferring in-
stead its own proposed legally-binding international agreement 
(submitted jointly with the government People’s Republic of China 
to the CD), entitled the “Draft Treaty on the Prevention on the 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” (the PPWT).85   
                                                 
82 See Tronchetti, supra note 29, at 361, 377 (while viewing the Code as a step 
in the right direction, the author notes that the absence of any definition of key 
terms is a “negative aspect” of the Code, one which “may lead to uncertainties in 
the interpretation and application of its provisions”).  
83 Letter from Thirty-Seven Senators to Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State 
(Feb. 2, 2011) (on file with author) (describing the Code as a “multilateral com-
mitment with a multitude of potential highly damaging implications for sensitive 
military and intelligence programs (current, planned or otherwise,) . . . ”). 
84 Mohamed Hatem Elatawy, ICoC: Recommendations for Further Elaboration, 
in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 45, 49 (“[A] number of countries question 
the prerogative of this Code to deal with the military aspects of outer space, an 
area that has traditionally been reserved to the CD [Conference on Disarma-
ment]”).  Since the CD established the Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS (now de-
funct) in 1985, arms control initiatives have been a regular feature of CD discus-
sions, although a common approach regarding a legally binding PAROS 
instrument has been not been achieved.  See Paul Meyer, The Conference on Dis-
armament and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, 6, 
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-conference-on-
disarmament-and-the-prevention-of-an-arms-race-in-outer-space-370.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N3QC-YE7L] (“The consideration of outer space from an arms 
control and disarmament perspective has a long pedigree at the CD”).  
85 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, supra note 71, at 
118 (noting how Russia has insisted on differentiating between the subject matter 
and legal basis of the PPWT and Code, and has argued that the drafting of the 
Code “must not undermine our efforts aimed at elaborating the PPWT”).  The first 
draft of the PPWT was proposed on Feb. 29, 2008.  See Draft Treaty on the Preven-
tion of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against 
Outer Space Objects, Conference on Disarmament, CD 1839, Feb. 29, 2008, 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/PPWT.pdf 
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The relevance of the Code to military activities in space is none-
theless clear, having been originally developed, as noted, in re-
sponse to the 2007 Chinese ASAT test.86  Although the Code is not 
stylized as an arms control initiative and does not explicitly pro-
hibit any military technologies in space, it nonetheless is designed 
to be a “comprehensive” proposal which is intended “to establish 
norms of behaviour for all space activities, both in the civilian and 
military domains of outer space.”87  The text of the Code notes “the 
importance of preventing an arms race in outer space” and “the re-
sponsibility of States, in the conduct of scientific, civil, commercial 
and military activities, to promote the peaceful exploration and use 
of outer space for the benefit, and in the interest, of humankind 
and to take all appropriate measures to prevent outer space from 
becoming an arena of conflict.”88   
In spite of the limitations of soft law, numerous commentators 
argue that the Code, as a soft law initiative, is the “first step to-
wards addressing the global security concerns caused by our in-
creased presence in outer space.”89  A similar, favorable view of a 
non-binding code of conduct for outer space activities is also gen-
erally reflected in current U.S. Department of Defense policies.  For 
example, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs not-
ed in 2012 that the European Union’s draft plan was “a promising 
                                                                                                               
[https://perma.cc/6G4T-RZ6X].  The latest draft PPWT was proposed on Sept. 3, 
2015.  See Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space 
and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, Conference on Dis-
armament, CD 1985, June 12, 2014, Art. I.b, available at http://
reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2014/
documents/PPWT2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7W3-9T78]. 
86 Kazuto Suzuki, ICoC and the Right of Self Defense, in AWAITING LAUNCH, su-
pra note 33, at 87, 90 (“[T]he ICoC was developed as a response to the Chinese 
ASAT test in 2007. The ASAT test created a large cloud of space debris that would 
increase the risk of collision with their space assets. This sort of intentional crea-
tion of debris for any purpose was unacceptable for many countries”).   
87  Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan & Daniel A. Porras, Preface to AWAITING 
LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 1 (“The ICoC is a comprehensive proposal, trying to es-
tablish norms of behaviour for all space activities, both in the civilian and military 
domains of outer space.”); Code, supra note 32, Preamble, ¶ 13 (“[r]ecognizing the 
necessity of a comprehensive approach to safety, security, and sustainability in 
outer space . . . ”). 
88 Code, supra note 32, Preamble ¶ 6 and art. 2 (emphasis added). 
89 Beatrice Fihn & Gabriella Irsten, Addressing Challenges in Space through New 
Multilateral Processes, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 119, 120 (further not-
ing that the ICoC is “an example of a recent trend in security policies, to move be-
yond deadlocked forums and traditional framing of problems, to encouraging 
creative thinking and alternative methods of moving forward”).  
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basis for an international code,” and that “[a]n international code 
of conduct can enhance U.S. national security by encouraging re-
sponsible space behavior by reducing the risk of mishaps, misper-
ceptions and mistrust.”90  
Soft law is not, however, a panacea for the problems of space, 
particularly those related to security.  As discussed below, soft law 
instruments have fundamental limitations in addressing security 
matters, particularly in unstable geopolitical environments.  Fur-
ther, they risk increasing tensions and undermining meaningful le-
gal constraints.   
 
3.  SOFT LAW: A PROBLEMATIC DESIGN CHOICE FOR ARMS CONTROL 
INITIATIVES   
 
3.1.  The Challenges of Arms Control  
 
The concept of arms control encompasses a wide variety of 
measures that rival states may undertake to achieve diverse objec-
tives, including: mutually reducing levels of armaments; eliminat-
ing entire classes of weapon systems; restricting or regulating mili-
tary activities which increase the risk of accidents or conflict; 
increasing predictability in relations between hostile states; reduc-
ing fears about the intentions of potential adversaries; and, pre-
empting the development or deployment of new types of weap-
ons.91  
Varied bilateral and multilateral instruments that are intended 
to serve as arms control measures between adversary states must, 
however, overcome many hurdles to be established and face severe 
challenges in functioning effectively.  This is particularly true in 
the domain of space, where conditions encouraging an arms race 
                                                 
90 Lisa Daniel, Defense, State Agree to Pursue Conduct Code for Outer Space, 
DOD NEWS (Jan. 18, 2012), http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?
id=66833 [https://perma.cc/SGH3-K9MW]; see also DOD Fact Sheet: International 
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, 2011, DEFENSE.GOV, http://
archive.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/FINAL_DoD_Fact_
Sheet_International_Code-2012_1-17-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6NR-4NGR] 
(last visited July 13, 2015) (stating that “[a]n international Code of Conduct can 
enhance U.S. national security”).   
91 JOZEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL: THE NEW GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND 
AGREEMENTS 10–11 (2002). 
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abound.  Fears, suspicions and accusations about new space weap-
on systems and military space projects continue to multiply, as ev-
idenced particularly by the growing concerns expressed by Russia 
and China on the one hand, and by America on the other, about 
each other’s space programs. 
Such fears and suspicions can contribute to the classic “security 
dilemma,” in which actions taken by a state intended to be defen-
sive in nature are instead perceived by other states as aggressive or 
threatening, producing unintended and undesired consequences.92  
Arms races are “only the most obvious manifestation” of the re-
sulting downward spiral of these misperceptions.93  Predictable 
and yet unnecessary counter-measures may thus be taken by 
“threatened” states (for example, as U.S. rivals are developing their 
own responses to a spaceplane like the X-37B), causing further in-
security and fueling more dangerous and expensive arms races in 
space.94  
The classic security dilemma is made even more acute in space 
because a state may feel threatened by an adversary’s development 
and deployment of technologies that are dual-use in nature, mean-
ing that they can be readily employed for both civilian and military 
uses.95  The abundance of dual-use technologies in space may thus 
further obscure an adversary's real intentions and make it even 
more difficult to distinguish between defensive and offensive pos-
tures (and the possibility that new, devastating military ad-
vantages have been achieved).   
In this extremely challenging space environment, one which is 
characterized by high risk and great insecurity, states struggle to 
achieve arms control agreements and other collaborative security 
measures.  Because the stakes in international politics are typically 
so high (implicating a state’s survival or extinction), the fear of ex-
ploitation is likely to motivate a state to follow its “dominant strat-
egy,” i.e., cheating or defecting, in the absence of any genuine col-
                                                 
92 ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
66 (1976) (further quoting Herbert Butterfield as positing that the security dilem-
ma is an “absolute predicament” that “lies in the very geometry of human con-
flict”). 
93 Id.  
94 Id.; US X-37B Spurs China to Seek Countermeasures: Russian Expert, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-
cnt.aspx?id...cid=1101. 
95  JAMES CLAY MOLTZ, CROWDED ORBITS: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SPACE 
12 (2014) (noting that an “essential fact” of space technology is “its dual-use na-
ture”). 
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laborative agreement.96  It is thus not surprising that arms control 
agreements are “highly institutionalized,” with implementing re-
gimes that “are continually concerned with compliance and polic-
ing,” and “specify verification and monitoring procedures.”97  
For example, the START I Treaty98 established an elaborate and 
effective verification regime that allowed the parties to remain con-
fident in each other’s compliance with obligations related to the 
reduction of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles.99  The regime 
provided numerous methods (including mandatory on-site inspec-
tions) for the parties to gather and confirm needed information 
about the other party’s treaty-limited forces.100  It also prohibited 
each party from interfering with the other party’s treaty-related 
surveillance and monitoring capabilities, so-called “National Tech-
nical Means” (principally spy satellites), and established the Joint 
Compliance and Inspection Commission for the discussion of trea-
ty implementation issues and compliance questions.101 
While verification, monitoring, compliance and policing activi-
ties are routinely associated with effective arms control regimes, all 
these features depend on an even more fundamental, underlying 
attribute: the nature of the commitment.  The nature of commit-
ments in international instruments may, however, be dramatically 
altered by soft law design choices.  
A common virtue often attributed to soft law instruments is the 
ease with which states are able to conclude them (compared with 
the lengthier and more difficult process associated with hard law 
agreements).  In negotiating the design of international instru-
                                                 
96  ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 40 (1993) (further describing arms control agreements 
as “notoriously problematic”). 
97 Id.  
98  Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 
U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. III, ¶¶ 9, 6, 4, July 31, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102–20 (1991). 
99  GOLDBLAT, supra note 91, at 91 (“[The START I Treaty] provided each side 
with transparency and predictability with regard to the strategic nuclear pro-
grammes of the other side . . . .”); see also Allan S. Krass, The People, the Debt, and 
Mikhail, 47 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 12, 13 (November 1991) (noting that the verifi-
cation provisions in START I treaty “were elaborate, comprehensive, and intru-
sive beyond the dreams of even the most idealistic disarmer of the 1950s”). 
100 AMY F. WOOLF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40084, STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AFTER 
START: ISSUES AND OPINIONS 6–9 (March 4, 2010); Goldbatt, supra note 100, at 91 
(noting that the START I Treaty was credited with “institutionaliz[ing] unprece-
dentedly extensive and intrusive measures of verification”). 
101  Id.  
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ments, states may consider numerous “systemic trade-offs” in sub-
stance, structure and obligation.102  The results of these trade-offs 
are different types of instruments which display varying degrees of 
effectiveness and display different levels of difficulty to achieve.   
States may choose to employ soft law design elements (such as 
weakening precision and/or obligation) for many reasons.103  In 
making this choice, however, states may also delay, sacrifice or 
even impede meaningful progress on the issues of mutual concern 
which are addressed in soft law instruments. 
 
3.2.  Soft Law Design Choice: Weakening Precision 
 
One important soft law design choice in constructing many in-
ternational instruments is the decision to employ vague, imprecise, 
ambiguous or otherwise indeterminate language.  Indeterminate 
language may be a satisfactory design feature for some areas of in-
ternational cooperation, but it is a dangerous choice for arms con-
trol regimes.  The requirements typically associated with arms con-
trol regimes are well known, and one is that they “must define 
cheating quite explicitly.”104  There are fundamental reasons for 
this requirement. 
A state contemplating foregoing the development and deploy-
ment of new weapon systems in favor of pursuing international 
cooperation will be reluctant to do so if adversary states are not 
part of a collaborative regime with a degree of formalization.  Such 
a collaborative regime “must specify what constitutes cooperation 
and what constitutes cheating, and each actor must be assured of 
its ability to spot immediately others’ cheating.”105  The dilemma of 
                                                 
102 See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, AM. J. 
INT’L L 581, 582 (2005) (suggesting that legality, substance, and structure can be 
viewed as “distinct design elements” that should be viewed as a whole in evaluat-
ing the effectiveness of international agreements).  
103 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 423 (suggesting that a number of 
variables, including “transactions costs, uncertainty, implications for national 
sovereignty, divergence of preferences, and power differentials” influence which 
forms of soft law are likely to be selected by states in the particular circumstances 
that confront them). 
104 STEIN, supra note 96, at 40. 
105 Id; see also BILDER, supra note 70, at 117–118 (noting the importance of 
prompt detection and clear determination of breach in order for effective risk-
management systems. Professor Bilder further suggests that if a nation is consid-
ering violating its own obligations under an agreement, “[i]t will be less likely to 
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common interests in this scenario, against the backdrop of per-
ceived security threats, is often modeled in game theory as a pris-
oners’ dilemma in which each state actor’s dominant strategy is to 
cheat (even if all actors would actually prefer arms control or dis-
armament over a spiraling arms race).106   
It is in this context that game theorists and other writers argue 
that the obligations in an arms control regime must be sufficiently 
precise to ensure that actors can recognize defection.107  Elaborate 
monitoring, policing and compliance verification structures in such 
a regime have little value without clear obligations and the ability 
to recognize cheating.  Precision in individual commitments, as 
well as coherence between those commitments and broader legal 
principles, framed by “accepted modes of legal discourse and ar-
gument,” also assist by discouraging states from engaging in “au-
to-interpretation” and other opportunistic behavior regarding their 
obligations.108    
The lack of precision in individual commitments, which gives 
rise to indeterminate normative standards, thus makes it harder for 
states to know what conformity is expected and also makes it easi-
er for states to justify noncompliance.109  Conversely, the lack of 
precision may also result in uncertainty and tension as some states 
attempt to assert highly restrictive interpretations of ambiguous 
terms.  To avoid these problems, especially in the area of arms con-
trol, a nation is likely to “seek to describe the performance ex-
pected of the other nation as clearly and precisely as possible in the 
agreement.”110  Thus, in pursuing major arms control agreements 
                                                                                                               
do so if it realizes that its nonperformance will be readily apparent and clearly la-
beled as a violation . . . .”  Conversely, Bilder argues that “if the other nation be-
lieves that its obligation is ambiguous or uncertain, it will see itself as in a better 
position to justify or excuse nonperformance or inadequate performance . . . ”). 
106 STEIN, supra note 96, at 40. 
107 See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 140 (1984) 
(suggesting that recognizing defection is an important requirement in promoting 
cooperation and that the “scope of sustainable cooperation can be expanded by 
any improvements in the players' ability to recognize each other from the past, 
and to be confident about the prior actions that have actually been taken”). 
108 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 427. 
109 Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 
705, 714 (1988) (“Put conversely, the more determinate the standard, the more dif-
ficult it is to resist the pull of the rule to compliance and to justify noncompli-
ance”). 
110  BILDER, supra note 70, at 118 (noting that the proposed 1979 SALT II Trea-
ty between the United States and Soviet Union contains elaborate provisions at-
tempting to define the obligations of each party in the most careful and precise 
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2017] CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 363 
with the Soviet Union, the United States “opted for increasingly 
detailed agreements, on the ground that they reduce interpretative 
leeway.”111 
Key undefined terms in the Code, particularly the critical pro-
hibition on harmful interference, serve as examples of the difficul-
ties associated with using imprecise language to regulate military, 
intelligence and security activities.  Similarly, provisions requiring 
the exchange of information related to a state’s “major outer space 
research and space applications programmes” are undefined and 
problematic when broadly applied to these activities.112   
With respect to efforts to discern the meaning of ambiguous 
language in instruments like the Code, it is also important to note 
that non-legally binding, political commitments do not benefit 
from the recognized legal modes of discourse that govern the in-
terpretation of terms in legally binding international agreements 
(particularly through the application of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties).113  The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties provides a comprehensive framework of rules for the ob-
servance, operation, application and interpretation of legally bind-
ing agreements, as well as rules governing their conclusion, entry in-
to force, amendment, invalidity, termination and suspension.  
Specific provisions in the Vienna Convention address all aspects of 
the interpretation of legally binding agreements, including rules 
for determining the meaning of language which remains ambigu-
ous after the application of other provisions specifying the context, 
materials and subsequent practice of the parties to be examined.114  
No such rules exist under international law for resolving disputes 
regarding the interpretation of ambiguous language in soft law in-
struments.  
The impact of broad and ambiguous terms, particularly on re-
gime compliance by states, should not be underemphasized.115  The 
                                                                                                               
terms”). 
111 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 11 (1995) (noting in 
this regard that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed in 1989 “is the size of 
a telephone book”). 
112 CODE, supra note 32, § 6.1 (requiring Subscribing States to share this in-
formation on an annual basis with other Subscribing States “where available and 
appropriate”). 
113  Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International Agreements: A Rational 
Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT’L L.113, 129 (2003). 
114 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 49, articles 31–32. 
115 See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 111, at 10 (stating that “ambiguity and 
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uncertainties that indeterminate language generates in the field of 
arms control presents its own dangerous risks since (as discussed 
above), states rely on precise language in arms control agreements 
for specific purposes and fundamental reasons.  The broad and 
vague language found in the Code, which will be subject to varied 
interpretations by states, may thus “generate more, rather than 
less, tension in space.”116  
In contrast to the uncertainty and non-compliance associated 
with imprecise rules, it is argued that “greater clarity conduces to 
compliance.”117  For example, in reviewing numerous agreements 
with a high degree of specificity, Thomas Franck observed that 
“the high degree of textual determinacy goes together with a high 
degree of rule-conforming state behavior.”118  Determinacy in such 
agreements appears to have its own “compliance pull,” while the 
absence of determinacy in other agreements makes it unlikely that 
states will have compunctions about non-compliance.119  Rule-
conforming state behavior is thus enhanced by a rule’s determina-
cy, which in turn “depends upon the clarity with which it is able to 
communicate its intent and to shape that intent into a specific situ-
ational command.”120   
Clear and determinate rules, accompanied by rule-conforming 
state practice, may ultimately give rise to legally binding rules in 
customary international law and may also lay the foundation for 
legally binding conventions.121  However, the indeterminate lan-
                                                                                                               
indeterminacy of treaty language” is one of the key circumstances “that lie at the 
root of much of the behavior that may seem to violate treaty requirements”). 
116 Jeff Kueter, Do We Need a Code of Conduct for Space?, GEORGE C. MARSHALL 
INST., 3–4 (Feb. 21, 2012), http://marshall.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/1060.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D4W-V4GP]. 
117 Franck, supra note 109, at 721. 
118  Id., at 719 (citing numerous examples of agreements that have a “high de-
gree of specificity” and which are “almost invariably obeyed.” These agreements 
include those establishing rules related to: protecting diplomats; the making, in-
terpreting and obligation of treaties; jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas, and 
in territorial waters and ports; jurisdiction over aircraft; copyright and trade-
marks; international usage of posts; telegraphs, telephones and radio waves; rules 
governing embassy property; rights of passage of naval vessels in peacetime, and; 
treatment of war prisoners). 
119  Id., at 713–14 (further noting that “the more determinate the standard, the 
more difficult it is to resist the pull of the rule to compliance and to justify non-
compliance”). 
120 Id., at 725. 
121 See, e.g., N. Sea Cont'l Shelf Case (F.R.G./Den., F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 
71 (noting that it is possible for an article in a convention to be viewed as 
“norm-creating,” thus constituting the foundation of, or generating, a rule 
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guage used in the Code provides neither clear rules nor a sound 
basis for developing a legally binding regime.122  Instead, such lan-
guage appears to merely mask a failure by states to agree on key 
terms and definitions.  It reflects their decision, one that is often 
made by diplomats in contentious negotiations, to paper over their 
differences in order to achieve what is sometimes referred to as 
“constructive ambiguity.”123  Rather than representing a meaning-
ful meeting of the minds, some scholars suggest that such language 
merely represents a type of “deferred confrontation.”124  In the con-
text of arms control, instruments that largely reflect the results of 
deferred confrontation are neither reliable documents on which to 
build legal regimes, nor do they provide assurances of any state’s 
compliance with regime objectives. 
In an insecure environment in which states confront evolving 
threats from complex military technologies and seek to establish 
arms control regimes, scholars applying game theory suggest that 
defensive defections from regimes by states may be avoided by re-
lying on both verification measures and on a “strategy of assur-
ance.”125  Assurance devices help a state give other states confi-
dence in its own cooperation and compliance, with the aim of 
permitting each state party to adhere to the mutually preferred co-
                                                                                                               
“ which, while only conventional or contractual in its origin,” later passes “into 
the general corpus of international law, and is accepted as such by the opinio 
juris, so as to have become binding even for countries which have never, and do 
not, become parties to the Convention.”) 
122  Id. at ¶ 72 (observing in the case of a disputed term in an international 
convention that the “still unresolved controversies as to the exact meaning and 
scope” of the term “must raise further doubts as to the potentially norm-creating 
character of the rule”).  
123 Orde F. Kittrie, Intellectual Relations: More Process Than Peace: Legitimacy, 
Compliance, and the Oslo Accords, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1661, 1670–71 (2003) (describing 
constructive ambiguity as “the deliberate use of vague, equivocal, or ambiguous 
language capable of being interpreted by each party as protecting its own inter-
ests” and how the reliance on this particular methodology as a key element in the 
Oslo process peace process was counterproductive.). 
124  AHARON KLIEMAN, CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE-
MAKING 54–55, 117 (1999). Professor Klieman further argues that “by leaving core 
values, issues or interests vague and unsettled,” the use of ambiguous language 
with respect to key issues “is guaranteed to be the source for later difficulties.” In 
discussing the impact of such language on the international community, he also 
questions how “intentional ambiguity” can be “reconciled with calls for transpar-
ency, candor and commitment in international relations.” Id.  
125  Kenneth W. Abbott, Trust But Verify: The Production of Information in Arms 
Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 23 (1993).  
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operative course of action.126  A state may thus provide other states 
with various types of information about its own compliance as an 
assurance device in arms control scenarios where the benefits of 
cooperation are great, but the potential for cheating is also great 
and the costs of opportunism and misplaced trust are high.  In this 
situation, “hard legal commitments” can serve as critical assurance 
devices.127  
The type of commitment that states communicate or signal to 
each other in an arms control regime is fundamentally important.  
Commitments made by states and intended as assurance devices 
can only be effective if they are made in a credible fashion.128  Such 
“credible commitments” are crucial in many aspects of contracting 
theory, game theory and in high-stakes arms control scenarios 
when one party relies on the future performance by others while it 
complies with its own side of the bargain.129  
Efforts by states to make credible commitments to other states 
are fundamentally undermined when the legitimacy of those 
commitments is diminished by textual indeterminacy.130  A rule 
cannot be legitimate if it cannot communicate “what conduct is 
permitted and what conduct is out of bounds.”131  Although states 
may choose to not employ precise terms, opting instead for an eas-
ier, more flexible soft law approach by adopting an instrument 
containing indeterminate language (as in the case of the proposed 
                                                 
126 Id. 
127 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 429 (noting that “[S]tates should use 
hard legal commitments as assurance devices when the benefits of cooperation are 
great but the potential for opportunism and its costs are high”). 
128 Abbott, supra note 125, at 23 (“[w]hat is needed to ensure continued coop-
eration is a way for each player to communicate its ongoing commitment to the 
cooperative result in a credible fashion”).  
129 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 426, 429 (further noting that “states 
should use hard legalization to increase the credibility of commitments when 
noncompliance is difficult to detect, as in most arms control situations”). In the 
event that noncompliance is alleged, legally binding agreements (unlike soft law 
instruments) are also governed by near-universally accepted rules of international 
law which assist the parties in determining what constitutes a material breach and 
allow any or all of them to suspend or terminate the agreement in accordance 
with specified conditions. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 
49, arts. 60, 65.      
130  Franck, supra note 109, at 713, 716 (noting that “[p]erhaps the most self-
evident of all characteristics making for legitimacy is textual determinacy . . . [t]he 
degree of determinacy of a rule directly affects the degree of its perceived legiti-
macy.”) (emphasis added). 
131  Id. at 716 (“To be legitimate, a rule must communicate what conduct is 
permitted and what conduct is out of bounds.”) 
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Code), such indeterminacy has costs which are “paid for in the 
coin of legitimacy.”132 
Even when legally binding agreements are employed for arms 
control and disarmament initiatives (as opposed to soft, voluntary, 
non-binding arrangements), key indeterminate language in those 
agreements can undermine their ability to communicate credible 
commitments or provide security assurances.133  Each state may 
possess strong incentives for surprise defection from an arms con-
trol agreement while at the same time risking great damage to its 
own national security if a defection by another state occurs.  In 
such situations, a state may seek to maintain its own flexibility 
while attempting to ensure that other states are bound by arms 
limits.134    
While soft law may lay the foundation for the development of 
hard law regimes in other fields, in the context of arms control it 
may instead merely generate new sources of uncertainty and con-
flict.  When indeterminate language is used to establish key rules 
in arms control agreements, no credible commitments are signaled 
by states.  Concurrently, offensive defections may be hard to iden-
tify, little assurance is signaled to prevent states from engaging in 
defensive defections, and some states may become “defensive qua-
si-defectors” as they unilaterally interpret (in a self-serving man-
ner) ambiguous key rules.135  
3.3.  Soft Law Design Choice: Weakening Obligation 
 
Credible commitments in arms control regimes can be commu-
nicated or signaled along several “hard” dimensions.  Precision is 
only one of these dimensions, one that can be diminished (as dis-
cussed above) by indeterminate language.  The realm of soft law 
                                                 
132 THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 53 (1990). 
133 Jack M. Beard, The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: 
the Case of the Biological Weapons Convention, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 271, 275, 287–291, 
294–295, 300–302 (2007). 
134 Abram Chayes & Dinah Shelton, Multilateral Arms Control: Commentary, in 
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 521 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) [hereinafter 
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE]. 
135 Beard, supra note 133, at 289 (noting that states with the most advanced 
technology can become “quasi-defectors” by exploiting the soft limits of indeter-
minate restrictions “through sophisticated auto-interpretation of a regime's scien-
tific and technical requirements . . . ”). 
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also includes international arrangements in which the obligation 
itself is weakened by an instrument’s reduction to a legally non-
binding status.  This dimension of soft law relates to the ability of a 
legitimate rule in an agreement to communicate not only content, 
but also authority.136  Legally binding norms thus stimulate a sense 
of obligation, create a compliance pull, and derive legitimacy not 
only from their form but also from the process whereby these 
norms are created.137   
By entering into legally binding agreements, states can raise the 
credibility of their commitments by staking their “national reputa-
tion on adherence” and signaling their intentions “with special in-
tensity and gravity.”138  Such commitments serve key functions in 
arms control regimes, making it possible for states to provide as-
surances to each other to restrain defensive defections.  As an “ex 
ante sorting device,” such hard legal commitments allow genuinely 
committed states to identify themselves as being willing to bear the 
greater costs imposed on violators of binding legal agreements, 
thus demonstrating a low propensity to defect.139    
One aspect of many types of legally binding agreements that 
has special significance for signaling a credible commitment and 
communicating authority is the formal ratification or other ap-
proval of such agreements by the legislative body of a state.  Each 
country determines its own internal procedures for expressing its 
consent to be legally bound by international agreements, including 
what role (if any) is assigned to the national legislative body of that 
country.  While the words “treaty” and “international agreement” 
are synonymous terms for legally binding agreements as a matter 
of international law,140 in the United States the word “treaty” has a 
                                                 
136  Franck, supra note 109, at 725 (noting that “the legitimacy of the rule—its 
ability to exert pull to compliance and to command voluntary obedience—is to be 
examined in the light of its ability to communicate. In this instance, however [re-
lating to the symbolic validation, ritual and pedigree of the rule], what is to be 
communicated is not so much content as authority”). 
137 Chayes & Shelton, supra note 134, at 526–27 (further arguing that “some 
evidence in arms control cases supports this view, suggesting that a norm in a 
treaty may induce more conforming state behavior than one that is purely non-
binding”). 
138  Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal? 45 INT’L 
ORG. 495, 508, 511 (1991) (further noting that states use treaties to “underscore the 
durability and significance of the underlying promises”). 
139  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 429. 
140  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 49, art.2, entered into 
force Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.  Although the United States is not a party to 
the Vienna Convention, it recognizes its substantive provisions as generally repre-
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narrower meaning which usually refers to only those legally bind-
ing international agreements which require the advice and consent 
of the U.S. Senate.141   
The process of legislative approval in the United States can also 
be accomplished by “congressional-executive agreements,” i.e., 
agreements authorized in advance or subsequently approved by a 
majority vote of each house of Congress.142  The president may also 
enter into “sole executive agreements,” i.e., agreements made pur-
suant to the President’s constitutional authority without further 
congressional authorization.143  The U.S. Supreme Court has con-
sistently recognized the validity of properly concluded, legally 
binding “executive agreements.”144  In practice, however, such 
findings may be aided or supported by the implied approval of 
Congress.145 
Whether a treaty or executive agreement is employed, both 
types of agreements result in binding obligations for the United 
States under international law, with concurrent credibility and as-
                                                                                                               
senting customary international law. See, e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 247 
F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2001) (relying upon the Vienna Convention as an authoritative 
guide to the customary international law of treaties).    
141 U.S. CONST. art. II, §2 (providing that the President “shall have Power, by 
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-
thirds of the Senators present concur”). 
142  MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33539, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 4–5 (2015), available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdf [https://perma.cc/U92G-DGPC], 
(noting also that “the great majority of international agreements that the United 
States enters into are not treaties but executive agreements . . . ”). 
143 Id. 
144 See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (“an international 
compact . . . is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate”); 
see also, Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (“our cases have rec-
ognized that the President has authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with oth-
er countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate . . . this power having been ex-
ercised since the early years of the Republic”); see also, LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 175 (1996)  (“Whatever their theoretical mer-
its, it is now widely accepted that the Congressional-Executive agreement is avail-
able for wide use, even general use, and is a complete alternative to a treaty.”) 
145 See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 227–4228 (1942) (while uphold-
ing the validity of the executive agreement at issue (the “Litvinov Assignment”) 
and noting that it was “part and parcel” of the President’s new policy of recogniz-
ing the Soviet Union under his constitutionally enumerated powers to “receive 
ambassadors,” the Court also noted that it was part of his efforts to alleviate the 
effects of Soviet nationalization of U.S. assets and that “Congress tacitly recog-
nized that policy” through the authorization of the appointment of a Commis-
sioner to determine the claims of American nationals against the Soviet govern-
ment.).  
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surance benefits for purposes of arms control regimes.  Both ap-
proaches should be distinguished, however, from the proposed 
Code, which will not constitute a legally binding agreement.  
While non-binding arrangements are often closely associated only 
with the government in power at the time such arrangements are 
signed, legally binding agreements ensure that states remain 
bound by the principle of pacta sunt servanda so that even if new 
governments come to power, they “must perform the obligations 
entered into by a previous regime.”146   
In assessing the types of instruments that states may employ to 
make international commitments, it is widely acknowledged that 
“the treaty regime makes the government’s commitment more 
credible.”147  Similarly, other types of legally binding agreements 
which involve legislative approval, such as Congressional-
Executive Agreements found in the U.S. legal system, involve cred-
ible commitments similar to those signaled in the treaty-making 
process.  In general, countries with more difficult treaty-making 
processes tend to employ those processes less frequently (and thus 
conclude fewer treaties), but the commitments in those treaties are 
more credible because “the cost of legislative involvement itself 
communicates information about the probabilities of compli-
ance.”148  Furthermore, in light of the power that legislatures have 
in democracies to frustrate the implementation of international 
agreements, the structures and processes of treaty-making (involv-
ing institutionalized legislative participation) have often been used 
as a signal to communicate and reinforce the credibility of com-
mitments to foreign countries.149   
The executive leader of a state may also choose to utilize the 
legislative consent process in making an international commitment 
in order to send a more credible signal about that leader’s degree 
                                                 
146  Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and Inter-
national Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 707, 736 (2006) (further noting that “the 
relevant unit of analysis in international law is the state, not the government”). 
147 Id. at 725.  
148  Id. at 743, 749 (further noting that “[i]f treaty commitments are too easy to 
enter into, they may not . . . facilitate credible signals on the international plane”). 
149 Jeffrey Frieden & Lisa L. Martin, International Political Economy: Global and 
Domestic Interactions, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 118, 124 (Ira 
Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002) (noting that “agreements negotiated 
without legislative participation may lack credibility . . . .  Evidence drawn from 
the United States and the EU demonstrates that the credibility of commitments 
rises with institutionalized legislative participation”).  
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of commitment to the treaty.150  Because legislatures have the abil-
ity to prevent the implementation of agreements through the dem-
ocratic process, other states may have doubts about the ability of 
the executive branch to actually fulfill a commitment without legis-
lative approval or acquiescence.151  Just as indeterminacy under-
mines credible commitments with costs paid in legitimacy, the ad-
vantages of non-legal arrangements (easier and quicker 
negotiation, etc.) come with costs paid in “a reduction of the in-
formation and commitment benefits that flow from legislative par-
ticipation . . . .”152  
For their part, the legislatures of liberal democracies may view 
some matters as so serious and involving such high stakes that 
they see legislative participation as necessary to convey the most 
formal, legally binding and credible commitment to foreign states 
(with the expectation of receiving a similar, formal, reciprocal 
commitment from that foreign state).  Arms control matters clearly 
raise such concerns in the United States.  For example, Congress 
enacted a law in 1961 which continues to provide that “[n]o action 
shall be taken pursuant to this chapter or any other Act that would 
obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or 
armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner, 
except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President set 
forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution or unless 
authorized by the enactment of further affirmative legislation by 
                                                 
150  Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 113, at 126–127 (further noting that “an 
executive wishing to foster successful international cooperation wil1, all things 
being equal, choose a treaty with a domestic ratification process that includes leg-
islative participation . . . .  Legislative participation sends a credible signal about 
the seriousness with which the president views the treaty”). 
151  Ginsburg, supra note 146, at 743 (further noting that “[l]egislative in-
volvement in treaty making communicates information to other states as to which 
type of agreements will be enforced by the state and which will not. They are thus 
commitment-enhancing”).  Furthermore, states may be concerned about the valid-
ity of agreements which are concluded in the face of internal legislative opposi-
tion since an agreement may be invalid if the state’s consent is expressed in viola-
tion of a provision of its internal law (provided that the violation was manifest 
and concerned a rule of its internal law that was of fundamental importance relat-
ing to its competence to conclude the agreement.) Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, supra note 49, art. 46. 
152 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
94 (2005) (further noting that non-legal instruments are generally less costly, less 
public, and can be negotiated and concluded more quickly than legal agreements, 
but that these advantages “all come at the price of a reduction in the information 
and commitment benefits that flow from legislative participation . . . ”). 
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the Congress of the United States.”153    
Regardless of the manner in which they are approved or rati-
fied, legally binding international agreements possess various ben-
efits of legalization that further contribute to signaling a credible 
commitment.154  In spite of the perceived advantages of non-legally 
binding political instruments, they lack these benefits of legaliza-
tion. 
Unlike the political content of non-binding documents, legali-
zation in international agreements can perform a “channeling func-
tion” by conveying the seriousness of a state’s intent to be bound, 
signaling at the outset a lower probability of future violations (than 
would be present without legalization).155  As discussed above, le-
gal rules are also perceived as having their own compliance pull, 
are less inclined to be diminished by auto-interpretation, and bene-
fit from “a special set of expectations about how the agreement will 
be interpreted, understood, and enforced” by virtue of the exist-
ence of a formal law of treaties as codified in the Vienna Conven-
tion.156   
In the case of arms control agreements, “hard legalization,” i.e., 
the strengthening of such instruments across the dimensions of 
both precision and obligation, increases the credibility of commit-
ments and serves a particularly key function when detection of 
non-compliance in some arms control regimes is hard to detect.157  
                                                 
153 22 U.S.C. § 2573(b).  This section was amended in 1994 by Public Law No. 
103-236. (This statute now complicates the signing of the ICoC by the United 
States, as discussed below in Part IV.C. below.)  The specific requirement in this 
statute for a treaty or an authorization “by the enactment of further affirmative 
legislation” appears to eliminate any actions, instruments or processes involving 
only the implied approval of Congress. 
154 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 428 (noting that, at the outset, “[l]egal 
obligations are widely perceived as having particular legitimacy”). 
155 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 152, at 98. 
156 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 113, at 129 (observing that an important 
difference between treaties and non-legal instruments is the role of the formal law 
of treaties in the Vienna Convention, and that by becoming a party to a treaty, a 
state “provokes a special set of expectations about how the agreement will be in-
terpreted, understood, and enforced.  A non-legal agreement does not create the 
same expectations, because technically the Vienna Convention does not govern 
such agreements”);  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 429 (“Legalization entails a 
special form of discourse, requiring justification and persuasion in terms of appli-
cable rules and pertinent facts, and emphasizing factors such as text, precedents, 
analogies, and practice.”) 
157 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 429 (further noting that even when legal 
arrangements that include centralized or decentralized monitoring provisions are 
absent, “legal commitments compensate in part for the reduced likelihood of de-
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The Code possesses none of these hard law attributes or ad-
vantages.  The vague provisions of the Code also do not provide a 
basis for successfully generating new, legally binding rules of cus-
tomary international law that would be useful for an arms control 
regime (or any other regime).158  
Legalization plays an important and beneficial role in many ar-
eas of international cooperation and serves a particularly crucial 
function in the insecure environment of military competition and 
arms control.  It is thus not surprising that even commentators who 
support the Code nonetheless admit that a hard law approach is 
the “first and best choice” for regulating the subject matter to be 
addressed by the Code.159  Along similar lines, a debate continues 
among space law experts over the question of whether the Code is 
a distraction from more meaningful international efforts to con-
clude legally binding agreements to govern critical space activi-
ties.160   
Many proponents of the Code suggest that even if the negotia-
tion and conclusion of a legally binding agreement would clearly 
be preferable to a soft law approach, in the interim a soft law in-
strument would positively contribute to the management of the 
outer space environment.161  Yet, as discussed above, soft law in-
struments such as the proposed Code are particularly ineffective 
mechanisms in the high-stakes arena of arms control and may in-
stead burden states with a new set of uncertainties, thus risking 
greater insecurity and more tension in the volatile domain of 
space—while also making the development of new hard law rules 
for space activities less, not more, likely.162 
                                                                                                               
tection by increasing the costs of detected violations”).  
158 See, e.g., N. Sea Cont'l Shelf Case, supra note 121, at 44 (While a clear rule in 
an international a document may serve as the basis for the formation of a binding 
obligation or norm under customary international law, the court found that “the 
very considerable, still unresolved controversies as to the exact meaning and 
scope” of the rule at issue raised doubts as to “the potentially norm-creating char-
acter of the rule.”) 
159 See, e.g., L.I. Juqian, Mission Completed and Mission Ahead: ICoC to the Fu-
ture, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 37, 43 (“[T]o cope with the challenge 
of space activities, a well-recognised and concluded treaty, the ‘hard law,’ is the 
best and first choice.”);  see also, Arvind Gupta, Forward to DECODING THE CODE, 
supra note 30, at ix, x (arguing that since a legally binding agreement is difficult to 
achieve, a voluntary code of conduct is “the next best option”). 
160 See, e.g., Elatawy, supra note 84, at 49. 
161 Id. at 46. 
162 Instruments employing ambiguous language may significantly reduce the 
chance of states reaching a binding agreement since they may “relax the pressure 
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3.4.  Soft Law, Arms Control, and the Democracy Disadvantage 
 
Although proponents of soft law point to the benefits and ad-
vantages of soft law, these benefits and advantages may not fall 
evenly on all states undertaking arms control commitments in soft 
law instruments.  Soft law instruments do not contain legally bind-
ing obligations, but they can and often do convey political com-
mitments by states.  As voluntary, political undertakings, such 
documents permit all participating states the same opportunity to 
follow or not follow established principles without violating any 
legal obligations.  The practical and political impact, however, on 
liberal democracies that stray (or appear to stray) from such prin-
ciples may be much different than the consequences for non-liberal 
or authoritarian regimes that engage in similar behavior.  
The term “liberal democracy” can be defined in many ways, 
denoting among other things a state with a representative govern-
ment, constitutional guarantees of civil and political rights, and a 
functioning judicial system dedicated to the rule of law.163  Of par-
ticular importance for purposes here is the guarantee of civil and 
political rights that assures individuals, the media and private in-
terest groups the opportunity to interact in “civil society” free of 
undue interference from State organs.164 
Even scholars from states with an authoritarian history and 
non-liberal traditions candidly observe that a commitment to a 
non-binding space code of conduct (that expresses nothing more 
than a joint declaration of intent) can carry more weight in demo-
cratic nations, “where military programs and financing are trans-
parent, and where military agencies and the military-industrial 
complex are monitored by independent parliaments and civilian 
                                                                                                               
on the parties to reach an agreement capable of really dealing with the problem 
involved, induce false public expectations, and, when these expectations are dis-
appointed, lead to increased conflict and more difficulty in reaching real agree-
ment.”  BILDER, supra note 70, at 1703–1704. 
163 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 
EURO. J. INT’L L. 503, 511 (1995), available at http://www.ejil.org/
pdfs/6/1/1310.pdf [https://perma.cc/TT3P-8KCU]; Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Lib-
eral Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AF. 205, 206–09 (1986), available at 
http://www.ir.rochelleterman.com/sites/default/files/doyle%201986.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6JS4-RA4A] (defining liberal democracies as having four major 
characteristics: (1) protection of private property; (2) a market economy; (3) equal-
ity under the law and respect for human rights; and (4) a representative govern-
ment deriving its authority from the consent of individuals).  
164 Slaughter, supra note 163, at 511. 
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groups.”165   
Without similar societal conditions and monitoring by demo-
cratic institutions and independent media organizations, authori-
tarian leaders may thus feel free to breach any code they might 
sign, “as long as their violations remain hidden from the world 
community.”166  Even in the case of legally binding agreements, 
any form of “societal verification” of disarmament and arms con-
trol treaties is possible “only in democracies tolerating transparen-
cy in military affairs, open discussion of security issues and un-
hampered activities of the mass media.”167  Since soft law 
instruments like the Code do not benefit from verification regimes, 
enforcement mechanisms, legally binding dispute resolution pro-
cedures or even agreed standards of interpretation, they depend 
entirely on self-enforcement by subscribing states and whatever 
societal verification is present in those states.    
The argument here is not that liberal and non-liberal states 
clearly display different levels of compliance with respect to their 
international legal obligations, although some scholars have sug-
gested (somewhat controversially) that such distinctions can be 
made.168  Rather, the argument is that non-binding international in-
struments may be scrutinized very differently in liberal democra-
cies than they are in authoritarian states, particularly in states 
where a hospitable environment is provided for private interest 
groups to freely investigate, evaluate and criticize government mil-
                                                 
165 See, e.g., Alexi Arbatov & Vladimir Dvorkin, Conclusion, in OUTER SPACE: 
WEAPONS, DIPLOMACY, AND SECURITY 103, 108 (Alexei Arbatov & Vladimir Dvorkin 
eds., 2010).  It should be noted, however, that in spite of any relative advantages 
Russia might gain over the United States in subscribing to the non-binding Code, 
the Russian government has refused to support the Code if it interferes with its 
higher-priority: securing the adoption of its proposed PPWT agreement (jointly 
proposed with China).  See Draft Treaty supra note 85, and accompanying text.   
166  Id. 
167 Goldblat, supra note 91, at 133.  
168 See, e.g., Charles A. Kupchan & Clifford A. Kupchan, Concerts, Collective 
Security, and the Future of Europe, 16 INT’L SEC. 114, 115–16 (1991) ("[Sltates willing 
to submit to the rule of law and civil society domestically are more likely to sub-
mit to their analogues internationally."); Slaughter, supra note 163, at 503, 511 
(“[B]ehavioural distinctions between liberal democracies and other kinds of 
States, or more generally between liberal and non-liberal States, cannot be ac-
commodated within the framework of classical international law”). But see Jose 
Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter’s Liberal Theory, 12 
EURO. J. INT’L L, 183, 210 (2001), http://ejil.org/pdfs/12/2/1516.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/94FW-74VD] (“[W]e still have little reason to confident that 
the level of compliance across the range of subjects of covered by international ob-
ligations falls along ‘liberal/non-liberal’ lines”).  
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itary programs and assess whether they are consistent with the 
spirit of international commitments.169  
The preference of authoritarian states for non-binding instru-
ments is not, however, an absolute one.  For example, in some cas-
es, authoritarian regimes may prefer a more advantageous legally 
binding agreement that clearly restricts their adversaries’ more so-
phisticated technology while permitting the continuing deploy-
ment of their own less sophisticated but still effective weapon sys-
tems (as seen in the case of China and Russia’s current support of 
the proposed PPWT over the Code.)170   
 In other cases, military activities which are able to be observed 
by the entire international community (particularly in space) may 
result in unwanted attention and pressure from the international 
community, leading authoritarian states to eschew soft law ar-
rangements, legally binding agreements or any other instruments 
that have the potential to restrict their military activities in space.171  
However, in areas such as weapons research and development—
where authoritarian societies can ensure that secrecy will be more 
effectively maintained and that criticism by independent actors in 
their societies will be far less likely—soft law arms control ar-
rangements may present clearer advantages over rival democratic 
states.  
While authoritarian states may be able to pursue space-related 
                                                 
169 Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 369 (1997), http://
scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2659&context=faculty_
scholarship [https://perma.cc/2EL8-SHLD] (“[L]iberal democracies are likely to 
provide a more hospitable environment for courts and private actors whose inter-
ests align with the promotion of a supranational rule of law and who have the 
freedom to pursue those interests”). 
170 See Draft Treaty supra note 85, and accompanying text.  
171 See, e.g., Samson, infra note 229, at 138 (noting that several major space 
powers, including the United States, have generally resisted any potential re-
straints on their space capabilities and that some countries “have not even devel-
oped official national space policies because they do not want limits placed on 
how they utilize space in the future”).  Regarding current U.S. policy, however, 
the Obama Administration has indicated a willingness to consider arms control 
treaties or other arrangements that would limit the development of space weap-
ons while promoting space operations that are “conducted in ways that empha-
size openness and transparency.”  See William Broad & Kenneth Chang, Obama 
Reverses Bush’s Space Policy, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2010, A19.  On the other hand, 
China has been described by space experts as being “allergic to transparency 
measures.”  Michael Krepon, Norm Setting for Outer Space, SPACE NEWS, Sept. 8, 
2014, http://spacenews.com/41789norm-setting-for-outer-space/ [https://
perma.cc/7NCF-34TB]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/2
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military activities, especially space weapons research and devel-
opment (R&D) programs, with a relative lack of scrutiny under a 
non-binding code, liberal democracies may face serious obstacles 
in pursuing similar activities that relate to military programs in-
volving potentially restricted offensive capabilities.  For this rea-
son, some commentators argue that an instrument like the Code, 
even though it is a non-binding instrument, could “exert de facto 
influence on U.S. space programs.”172   
R&D activities with ambiguous or multiple goals related to fu-
ture military activities in space may be viewed with considerable 
suspicion by interested observers in legislatures and among mem-
bers of a state’s civil society, particularly if those activities are seen 
as being inconsistent with the spirit or terms of international com-
mitments.  Arms control regimes that affect the future military ca-
pabilities of the most powerful states generally entail predictions 
by those states about future technological developments.173  Acting 
on these predictions may be complicated in democracies where 
governments face public scrutiny in their selection and funding of 
technological alternatives related to future military missions.174   
Classified U.S military space R&D programs, including current 
projects like the X-37B, continue to be the subject of media atten-
tion, analysis and speculation in the United States, but they do not 
face restrictions or broad public opposition based on their violation 
of U.S. laws or international obligations.  Thus, within the frame-
work of existing laws and international obligations, U.S. military 
planners and researchers have considerable flexibility to pursue 
diverse military projects associated with current and future securi-
ty requirements and goals in space.  
Predicting future military missions and associated technologi-
cal requirements are perilous undertakings for governments in any 
area of national security, and none may be more challenging as 
                                                 
172 See, e.g., Jeff Kueter, Rules of the Road in Space: Does a Code of Conduct Im-
prove U.S. Security?, GEORGE C. MARSHALL INST.,  5 (Apr. 1, 2011), 
http://marshall.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/939.pdf [https://perma.cc/
97PM-DK3Y] (arguing that it “would be difficult to foresee” the United States ini-
tiating a specific military program associated with conduct prohibited by the ICoC 
“and avoiding being criticized sharply for failing to live up to the spirit of the 
Code, even though those actions are allowed”).    
173 Colin S. Gray, HOUSE OF CARDS: WHY ARMS CONTROL MUST FAIL 43 (1992). 
174 Id. (“[A]rms Control, which entails a greater or lesser measure of technol-
ogy prediction, typically has the effect for democracies of constraining the range 
of choice among possible solutions to problems that are left unaddressed or un-
deraddressed”). 
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predicting future threats and programs in the vast and complex 
realm of outer space.175  For this reason it is not surprising that 
some members of the U.S. Congress have sharply criticized the 
Code based on the “unknown consequences” that indefinite limita-
tions under that document could have on “future military or intel-
ligence programs.”176   
A soft law instrument with broad and vague objectives that re-
stricts future military activities may thus serve to effectively limit 
some technological options available to participating democratic 
states (if those states make good faith efforts to fully comply and 
respect the spirit and letter of the commitments made in those in-
struments).  Such concerns are reflected in the views of some critics 
who argue that the Code would disadvantage the United States by 
impeding advances in space technology because those advances 
are also likely to be labeled as “military” in nature and inconsistent 
with the goal of preventing an “arms race” in space.177  
Successful military operations in outer space remain highly de-
pendent on advanced technology.  For this reason, U.S. space poli-
cies have long emphasized that “to achieve national security objec-
tives and compete successfully internationally, the U.S. must 
maintain technological leadership in space.”178  Recent U.S. space 
policy statements reaffirm that the United States must continue to 
“pursue, adapt, and evolve the unique technologies, innovative 
exploitation techniques, and diverse applications that give the 
United States its strategic advantage in space.”179 
Since a state’s judgment of its military strength and security is 
inherently relativistic, international competition in national securi-
ty matters is more like a race than an effort to achieve any specific 
                                                 
175  Letter from Rep. Michael Turner, Chairman, Subcomm. on Strategic Forc-
es, H. Armed Services Comm. et al., to President Barack Obama (Jan. 18, 2012) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Letter from Rep. Michael Turner et al.] (“[N]o one 
can know today what programs the United States may need to undertake in outer 
space in the future for its military and intelligence national security require-
ments”). 
176 Id. 
177 See, e.g., John R. Bolton & John C. Yoo, Opinion, Hands Off the Heavens, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/opinion/hands-
off-the-heavens.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/B49D-ZCYK]; see also CODE, supra 
note 32, Preamble, ¶6 (noting “the importance of preventing an arms race in outer 
space”). 
178 COMM’N TO ASSESS U.S. NAT’L SEC. SPACE MGMT. AND ORG. REP. (Jan. 11, 
2011), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/spaceintro.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A9BJ-4AWS]. 
179 National Security Space Strategy, supra note 12, at 7. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/2
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standard or goal.180  Important technological innovations funda-
mentally change the nature of this race as they may allow a state 
“to get a competitive jump on its rivals.”181  Technological innova-
tions with military implications by one state may thus inspire great 
insecurity in other states, particularly as they relate to activities in 
outer space.182   
For a liberal democracy involved in national security-related 
“competition” in space, efforts to achieve and maintain technologi-
cal superiority may present special challenges.  Broad R&D initia-
tives related to new space technologies with military applications 
are likely to be scrutinized by legislatures, the media and domestic 
interest groups and may raise suspicions that new offensive space 
capabilities are under development.  Currently, such suspicions are 
not invoked in support of campaigns or significant protests against 
the U.S. government for violating any international commitments 
in space.  If, however, the United States subscribes to the Code, this 
scrutiny would have a new focus. 
The continuing revision of official drafts of the Code indicates 
that new U.S. space military capabilities, even if they are described 
as being “defensive” in nature, are likely to be heavily scrutinized 
and criticized if the United States adopts the Code.  For example, 
although an earlier 2010 draft of the Code explicitly provided that 
“a comprehensive approach to safety and security in outer space 
should be guided by . . . due consideration for the legitimate de-
fence interests of States,” that clause was omitted in the 2013 re-
vised draft because it “was seen as particularly troublesome by 
many states given that it could be interpreted subjectively, favor-
ing certain states to potentially weaponize their space capabili-
ties.”183  
Even the basic reference to the inherent right of states to indi-
vidual and collective self-defense in the current draft of the Code is 
problematic for some states since they view such a provision as a 
                                                 
180  STEIN, supra note 96, at 115, 126 (further noting that a nation’s situation in 
this area is ultimately “addressed in relative terms, in an assessment of relative 
numbers, relative capabilities, and potential consequences”).  
181 Id. at 115. 
182  Id. (noting how the Soviets’ ability to launch Sputnik in 1957 illuminated 
numerous dangers, “symbolized an apparent American failure to keep up with 
the Russians scientifically,” and that in turn “suggested that the United States 
would fall behind militarily”).   
183 Pillai Rajagopalan, EU’s New Space Code: A Significant Improvement, SPACE 
NEWS, Nov. 11, 2013, http://spacenews.com/38115eus-new-space-code-a-
significant-improvement/ [https://perma.cc/Z3JJ-XQHD]. 
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“back door” to “legitimising weaponisation of outer space.”184  
While a clause explicitly ensuring the fundamental right of self-
defense is an essential requirement for the United States in any 
code of conduct for space activities, countries that view U.S. space 
programs with suspicion continue to fear that such a provision 
“opens the possibilities to increase the use of force, weapons and 
the militarisation of the outer space arena.”185 
The fears that states clearly harbor regarding the militarization 
and weaponization of space (and related suspicions regarding U.S. 
space programs) seem likely to generate controversy over the in-
terpretation by the United States of key terms in any future version 
of the Code to which the United States subscribes.  Similar inter-
pretations and related new military space programs and research 
activities may be pursued without difficulty in authoritarian states, 
but would be subject to great scrutiny by private interest groups, 
the media and the Congress in the United States.   
The potential public scrutiny of U.S. compliance with Code 
provisions has led some conservative critics in the United States to 
argue that, even though it is a non-binding instrument, the Code 
could effectively impede a variety of U.S. military space programs 
and a host of technology improvements that may have military or 
intelligence applications to space.186  While some of these fears may 
be overstated, they nonetheless represent concerns that are present 
only in a liberal democracy or a state in which military programs 
and financing are relatively transparent, and where military agen-
cies and defense industries are monitored by independent legisla-
tures, media, and civil society groups. 
                                                 
184 Elatawy, supra note 84, at 45, 49.  
185 Roberto Becerra & Romina Acevedo, ICoC: Perspectives from Latin America 
and the Caribbean, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 169, 173 (noting further 
that “[d]eveloping countries, particularly those in Latin America and the Caribbe-
an, have expressed that consensus will be difficult to reach if the text of ICoC re-
fers to the concept of right to self-defence.”); Micah Zenko, A Code of Conduct for 
Outer Space, Council on Foreign Relations (2011), available at 
http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Policy_Innovation_Memo10_
Zenko.pdf [https://perma.cc/F67J-UCKV] (“Officials from Brazil and many other 
South American countries have said that the explicit reference to Article 51 un-
dermines several important aspects of the code. They fear that Article 4.2 of the 
code will be used to justify weaponizing space and create an arms race in space 
under the veiled claims of defense”). 
186 Bolton & Yoo, supra note 177, (“Taken literally, the European Union code 
would interfere with our ability to develop antiballistic missile systems in space, 
test antisatellite weapons and gather intelligence.”); see also Letter from Thirty-
Seven Senators to Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, supra note 83. 
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  4.  THE CODE AS A PROBLEMATIC SOFT LAW VARIANT 
      
4.1.  The Problem of “Soft Law on Soft Law”                                 
 
Since the subject matter of the proposed Code clearly involves 
issues of common concern to all states, it might appear at first 
glance to be a document that could be easily embraced by the in-
ternational community.  States have not, however, acted with any 
sense of urgency in approving the proposed Code, which has been 
under consideration since 2008.  This lack of enthusiasm may be 
attributed in part to the fact that the proposed Code is not the first 
soft law instrument to address the subject matter at issue.  In fact, 
efforts to promote the Code raise serious questions about the effec-
tiveness of duplicative soft law approaches to key problems in 
space and about the wisdom of imposing one type of soft law 
framework on top of another, different, existing type of soft law.  
This is particularly true as it relates to addressing the most press-
ing issue now confronting the international community in space:  
the problem of orbital space debris.     
The proposed Code represents a particular type of soft law, one 
that is developed at a high level by the diplomats of states and in-
ternational organizations.  While such “top-down diplomatic ap-
proaches” can make significant contributions to collaborative activ-
ities in space, another approach to soft law focuses on the technical 
work of specialized governmental agencies and on “bottom-up 
best practices developed and demonstrated by commercial opera-
tors, academic institutions, and other technical experts.”187   
Bottom-up, non-binding best practices and similar initiatives 
are typified by approaching space topics “from an applied tech-
nical perspective focusing on solving problems facing those work-
ing and operating in the space field.”188  In contrast to what is 
sometimes referred to as the “top-down diplomatic approach,” this 
bottom-up approach allows specific technical issues to be ad-
                                                 
187 Schulte & Schaffer, supra note 44, at 9. 
188 Ben Baseley-Walker, Current International Space Security Initiatives, in THE 
FAIR AND RESPONSIBLE USE OF SPACE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 109 (Wolf-
gang Rathgeber, Kai-Uwe Schrogl & Ray A. Williamson eds., 2010); see also 
Schulte & Schaffer, supra note 44, at 14 (noting that bottom-up best practice guide-
lines “develop over time and grow out of successful experience and operator re-
quirements”). 
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dressed in detail by individuals drawn from the community of 
technical experts who are “best qualified to address the specifics” 
and who represent industry, non-governmental organizations, and 
the specialized governmental agencies of the interested parties.189   
The most successful and widely recognized example of the bot-
tom-up, non-binding, best practices approach in space is the col-
laborative development of international space debris mitigation 
guidelines by the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee 
(“IADC”).190  The IADC consists of the representatives of the Euro-
pean Space Agency and the space agencies of the twelve most ac-
tive space nations who exchange information on space debris re-
search activities, cooperate on space debris research, and identify 
debris mitigation options.191  Drawing on NASA’s 1995 Orbital De-
bris Mitigation Standard Practices (the world’s first such guide-
lines), the IADC developed a set of technical guidelines for mini-
mizing the creation of space debris, the IADC Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines (the “IADC Guidelines”), and submitted them to the 
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“UN 
COPUOS”) in 2002.192  The IADC Guidelines served as the basis for 
                                                 
189 Kueter, supra note 116, at 3 (describing the bottom-up approach as one in 
which “specific issues are addressed in detail by government and non-
government technical experts drawn from interested parties . . . ”).  This approach 
is presented in contrast to discussion and activity stimulated by the “top-down 
imprimatur provided by high-ranking diplomatic officials.”  See also Kueter, supra 
note 172, at 4. 
190 Kueter, supra note 172, at 5 (noting that “[d]ebris mitigation offers the best 
example of a bottom-up effort to address a space management issue.”); Baseley-
Walker, supra note 188, at 115 (“The IADC’s development of the Space Debris Mit-
igation Guidelines over the course of more than a decade was a success.”); Jana 
Robinson, Advancing an International Space Code of Conduct, EU Non-Proliferation 
Consortium, July 13 2012, http://www.nonproliferation.eu/thematics/
index.php?codename=space [https://perma.cc/HSM7-5K7K] (noting that the 
“practical approach” of the Inter-Agency Debris Mitigation Guidelines “repre-
sents an example of a successful bottom-up approach that has significantly con-
tributed to preserving the outer space environment”). 
191 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, http://www.iadc-
online.org/ [https://perma.cc/R8M7-UKDH].  In addition to NASA, the eleven 
other members of the IADC currently include the space agencies of: Canada, Chi-
na, France, Germany, Japan, India, Italy, Korea, Russia, the United Kingdom, and 
Ukraine.  Id. 
192 Schulte & Schaffer, supra note 44, at 14–15; NASA, WINGS IN ORBIT:  
SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING LEGACIES OF THE SPACE SHUTTLES 445 (2010), available at 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20110011792.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/32GW-UMMS].  The latest version of the guidelines was 
adopted in 2007.  Inter-Agency Debris Mitigation Guidelines, Sept. 2007, IADC-02-01, 
available at http://iadc-online.org/Documents/IADC-2002-01,%20IADC%20Space
%20Debris%20Guidelines,%20Revision%201.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WEQ-
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the UN COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (“UN 
COPUOS Guidelines”), which were adopted in 2007 and later en-
dorsed by the U.N. General Assembly.193   
Although the IADC and subsequent UN COPUOS Guidelines 
are non-binding, they have had an important and legally signifi-
cant impact on the national regulatory frameworks of many coun-
tries.194  In the United States, these debris mitigation practices have 
been implemented for government-sponsored space missions 
through directives and instructions of NASA and DoD and for 
commercial space operations through the regulations and proce-
dures of the Federal Communications Commission, and the De-
partments of Commerce and Transportation.195  The cumulative ef-
fect of numerous countries and their national agencies 
implementing such regulations is an increasingly more harmo-
nized approach in national legal frameworks regarding the critical 
issue of space debris generation.  Although these practical, bottom-
up, technical-based debris mitigation standards originated in a soft 
law instrument, there is nonetheless a reasonable chance that they 
will evolve into “a generally accepted state of art which no actual 
or potential actor in space can afford to ignore.”196  
 
While each country’s debris mitigation standards and regula-
tions vary, their fundamental principles and objectives—as estab-
lished in the IADC Guidelines—are the same: “(1) Preventing on-
                                                                                                               
2QF6]; see also Lotta Viikari, Environmental Aspects of Space Activities, in HANDBOOK 
OF SPACE LAW 717, 742 (Frans von der Dunk ed., 2015). 
193  Viikari, supra note 192, at 742; REP. OF THE COMM. ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF 
OUTER SPACE, U.N. Doc. A/62/20, ¶127, Supp. No. 20 (2007), available at 
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gadocs/A_62_20E.pdf [https://perma.cc/76S4-
DJKH]; International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Space, U.N. G.A. Res. 
62/217 (2008), available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_62_
217E.pdf [https://perma.cc/8R3J-ZZMW]. 
194  Viikari, supra note 192, at 743 (“The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of 
UN COPUOS are 'the leading international arrangement to mitigate space de-
bris.’”). 
195  Nicholas Johnson, Orbital Debris: The Growing Threat to Space Operations, 
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100004498.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q65A-EP5W].  Johnson is the Chief Scientist and Program Manager for 
NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office.   
196  I. Marboe & F. Hafner, Brief Overview over National Authorization Mecha-
nisms in Implementation of the UN International Space Treaties, in NATIONAL SPACE 
LEGISLATION IN EUROPE: ISSUES OF AUTHORISATION OF PRIVATE SPACE ACTIVITIES IN 
THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN SPACE COOPERATION 29, 70–71 (Frans G. 
von der Dunk, ed., 2011). 
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orbit break-ups; (2) Removing spacecraft and orbital stages that 
have reached the end of their mission operations from the useful 
densely populated orbit regions, and (3) limiting the objects re-
leased during normal operations.”197  These objectives are achieved 
through requirements and standards, which address: objects re-
leased intentionally and unintentionally during mission opera-
tions; fragments caused by on-obit breakups (including on-orbit 
collisions, accidental break-ups, and intentional destruction of ob-
jects); and break-ups after mission termination.198 
The IADC Guidelines, and the UN COPUOS Guidelines that 
they inspired, have made a widely recognized, significant contri-
bution to preserving the outer space environment and numerous 
states have codified debris mitigation standards into their national 
regulatory frameworks.199  Citing the success of collaborative, 
technical, bottom-up debris mitigation efforts, critics of the pro-
posed Code suggest that a top-down, diplomatically-driven multi-
lateral code is “not needed to spur international dialogue on issues 
important to space operations.”200  In addition, unlike the defined 
technical objectives and agreed processes that have served as a sol-
id foundation for IADC efforts, critics note that states subscribing 
to the Code are guided only by statements of principles with no ac-
companying indication of how those principles are to be recog-
nized or practically implemented.201 
 
A diplomatically driven, top-down form of soft law being im-
                                                 
197  Inter-Agency Space Debris Mitigation Committee, Support to the IADC 
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, IADC-04-06, Rev 5.5 (May 2014), 
http://www.iadc-online.org/Documents/IADC-04-06%20Support%20to%
20IADC%20Guidelines%20rev5.5.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8M7-UKDH].  The 
Guidelines comprehensively apply to operations from the launch phase, through 
mission phase, to the end-of-mission disposal phase (in which spacecraft or orbital 
stages are maneuvered into positions or situations so as to not to cause interfer-
ence with active spacecraft or orbital stages).  Id.  
198 Id. 
199 See Compendium, Space Debris Mitigation Standards Adopted by States and 
International Organizations, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFF. (6 June 2014), availa-
ble at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/l/AC105_2014_CRP13E.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TC74-ZVF9] 
200 See, e.g., Kueter, supra note 172, at 5 (further posing the question that if the 
IADC Guidelines and similar efforts “are judged insufficient by Code proponents, 
what additional steps do they favor?”). 
201 Id. at 3–4 (arguing that without defined objectives, processes or a tech-
nical framework to rely on, states subscribing to the Code essentially “buy into a 
process whose outcomes remain undefined”).  
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posed on a technical, bottom-up version also raises the prospect of 
confusion and potential conflict between different frameworks at-
tempting to regulate the same subject matter.  With multiple 
frameworks seeking to establish the same type of operational space 
guidelines, some experts question whether any clarity that has or 
can be achieved in this area “will soon become over-complicated 
by a plethora of ‘how-to’ efforts . . . .”202   
Differences in the nature of the entities responsible for top-
down and bottom-up initiatives in space may further complicate 
the practical application of technical rules and standards in space.  
In contrast to technical guidelines developed first at the working 
level, top-down, diplomatically driven initiatives are generally 
sponsored by international organizations (such as various U.N. in-
stitutions) with high-level officials representing many states and 
operating by consensus—thus giving rise to fears voiced by some 
experts that there is a “substantial risk that politics may overtake 
practical substance” in this area.203    
Conflicting interpretations of different guidelines that are ap-
plied to the same subject matter in space, yet are generated by con-
trasting soft law approaches, may have highly negative conse-
quences.  If the statements of principles in the proposed Code are 
nothing more than a reaffirmation of existing principles and an en-
dorsement of the standards already developed by the IADC, it is 
hard to see much value in the great effort expended to date on their 
adoption.  If, on the other hand, the proposed Code is intended to 
create new norms (as its proponents suggest), there is a risk of dis-
putes arising from conflicting interpretations of these different soft 
law frameworks, resulting in an even less stable security environ-
                                                 
202 See, e.g., Baseley-Walker, supra note 188, at 115 (noting also that it is a mat-
ter of “some concern” how various sets of best practices established by different 
groups, including the IADC and a COPUOS Working Group of Experts, relate to 
other initiatives currently being discussed, particularly the ICoC.).  Such concerns 
are reflected in a new clause in the latest draft of the Code, which attempts to af-
firm that subscribing states are acting “without prejudice to ongoing and future 
work in other appropriate international fora relevant to the peaceful exploration 
and use of outer space . . . .”  CODE, supra note 32, Preamble, ¶15.  Yet, it is unclear 
how such language will prevent conflicting approaches and interpretations of the 
Code and other instruments from arising or in what manner it will clearly define 
how the work of different groups will relate to each other.  Id.  
203 Id. at 115–116 (observing that while the IADC submits its proposals to the 
UN for approval and is thus “dual track, with one foot inside the UN and one 
outside,” some other groups, such as the COPUOS Working Group of Experts, are 
more engaged in the UN system from the outset, thus elevating the risk of politics 
overtaking practical substance.). 
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ment in space.204 
If any soft law mechanism is to be employed in improving the 
security of space objects (particularly to address the problem of or-
bital debris), there is a strong argument to be made for bottom-up, 
technically-based guidelines as a means of developing at least 
some types of significant rules-based behavior.205  Such technical 
guidelines enhancing the security of space operations are histori-
cally not the results of top-down diplomatic efforts, but instead are 
drawn from the “existing operational experience of the principal 
actors, commercial operators and government agencies.”206  It is 
this community of actors, and not the “space diplomatic corps in 
Vienna,” that some commentators argue is the “proper source for 
the emergence of a normative, behavior-oriented regime.”207 
Two other major goals of the proposed Code—improving space 
safety and space traffic management (“STM”)—are fundamentally 
linked to the problem of space debris and appear to also be best 
addressed, and to some extent are already being addressed, by bot-
tom-up, technical collaboration instead of top-down, diplomatic 
initiatives.208  International air traffic controls may perhaps be cited 
as a precedent or analogy for this approach, since those controls 
emerged only after many years of working-level efforts involving 
private airlines and various governmental agencies responsible for 
aviation matters.209   
                                                 
204 Kueter, supra note 172, at 4 (“The ICoC is just a shell . . . conflicting inter-
pretations will lead to confusion when disputes inevitably arise and could result 
in an even less transparent and less stable security environment in space”). 
205  Gerard Brachet, Peace in Space: Building on the Outer Space Treaty, in 
CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE: 50 YEARS OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 40 YEARS OF THE 
OUTER SPACE TREATY.  CONFERENCE REPORT 2–3 APR. 2007, 67, 69–70 (United Na-
tions 2007), available at http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/celebrating-
the-space-age-50-years-of-space-technology-40-years-of-the-outer-space-treaty-
conference-report-2-3-april-2007-331.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFK8-X327] [herein-
after CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE]  (“[T]here is within COPUOS a shared feeling 
that bottom-up, technically-based guidelines and recommendations are powerful 
means to develop rules-based behaviour and keep outer space as safe as possi-
ble”). 
206 Id. 
207 E.g., Kueter, supra note 116, at 3. 
208 STM and space safety are subjects are subjects dominated by the problem 
of space debris. See 
Marshall H. Kaplan, An Integrated Approach to Orbital Debris Research and Manage-
ment, SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE 6 (Nov. 6, 2014), available at 
http://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=stm 
[https://perma.cc/GY97-2GYC] (“It appears reasonable to assume that a first step 
in developing a space traffic management system is to address the issue of manag-
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With respect to initial, inter-agency efforts to address space 
traffic management issues, the U.S. Strategic Command has in re-
cent years entered into “Space Situational Awareness” (“SSA”) 
sharing agreements with forty-one commercial firms and five na-
tions in order to develop routine operational space partnerships 
and improved international data sharing.210  These SSA Agree-
ments are described as laying the foundation for increased interna-
tional cooperation, and are further aided by efforts to integrate 
partner nation sensors into the U.S. Space Surveillance Network.211  
Expanded operational working relationships in this area continue 
to be encouraged by the U.S. Government, particularly by the U.S. 
Defense Department, in order to “improve the quantity and quality 
of the SSA information it obtains and expand provision of safety of 
flight services to U.S. Government agencies, other nations, and 
commercial firms.”212  
There are also private efforts involving operational data ex-
changes aimed at ensuring the “safety and integrity of satellite op-
erations” through “controlled, reliable and efficient sharing of da-
ta.”213  The Space Data Association, a private limited liability non-
profit, has developed the Space Data Center (“SDC”), which is de-
                                                                                                               
ing the large number of passive derelict objects that could eventually jam the traf-
fic lanes”). 
209 Jeff Kueter, supra note 189, at 4 (noting how “[T]he emergence of the air 
traffic control regime supports the ‘bottom-up’ approach”). 
210 Space Traffic Management: How to Prevent a Real Life “Gravity”: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Space of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech., 105th Cong. 1 
(statement of Lt. Gen. John “Jay” Raymond), available at http://
democrats.science.house.gov/sites/democrats.science.house.gov/files/
documents/Raymond%20JFCC%20HSST%20Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8PUR-96ZY] (noting that in 2014 “seven additional commer-
cial/intergovernmental and five more national agreements are in work”). 
211 Id. (noting further that the first such sensor—the Canadian Sapphire satel-
lite—was recently incorporated and that work is underway to place a US Space 
surveillance telescope and radar in Australia.). 
212 National Security Space Strategy, supra note 12, at 6 (further stating that 
“[s]hared awareness of spaceflight activity must improve in order to foster global 
spaceflight safety and help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. DoD 
will . . . seek to establish agreements with other nations and commercial firms to 
maintain and improve space object databases, pursue common international data 
standards and data integrity measures, and provide services and disseminate or-
bital tracking information, including predictions of space object conjunction, to 
enhance spaceflight safety for all parties”). 
213 SDA Overview, SPACE DATA ASSOC., http://www.space-data.org/sda/
wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/03/20120312_SDA_Users_Mtg_4_
General_Session.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9NS-7VTD] (last accessed Aug. 25, 
2015). 
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scribed as a “secure, reliable completely automated analytical in-
formation system,” in order to address “conjunction analysis and 
[radio-frequency interference.]”214  The SDC has been programmed 
so as to allow members of the Space Data Association to share “re-
al-time critical operational data essential to the better protection of 
their respective satellite fleets and management of the overall earth 
orbit environment.”215  This private initiative at reducing satellite 
collisions is recognized as “the way forward” alongside the IADC 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines.216 
Unlike fledgling public and private efforts to advance STM and 
space safety issues, debris mitigation measures have achieved a 
significant level of development and sophistication over many 
years under the auspices of the IADC.  While the impact of the 
IADC Guidelines is significant, major issues related to orbital space 
debris remain to be addressed by the international community, in-
cluding remediation problems and certain critical activities (nota-
bly the intentional destruction of objects in space as part of hit-to-
kill ASAT weapons testing) that produce unusually large and dan-
gerous amounts of debris.217  Because these problems are linked to 
important and sensitive arms control and security issues in space, 
they lie beyond the competence of a set of voluntary, technical best 
practices or the competence of any other soft law instrument.218  
The intentional destruction of a space object by China (in its debris-
generating ASAT test in January, 2007) clearly demonstrates this 
point, since the non-binding IADC Guidelines then in effect (which 
China had subscribed to) called upon states to avoid the “inten-
                                                 
214 Richard DalBellow & Michael Mendelson, Private Risk Management in Or-
bital Operations: Inter-operator Liability and the Space Data Association 8, available at 
www.intelsatgeneral.com/wp-
content/uploads/files/DalBello%20Mendelson%20Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H6C8-VU5Z] (last accessed Sept. 2, 2015).   
215 Id. at 8–9. 
216  Joseph N. Pelton, SPACE DEBRIS AND OTHER THREATS FROM OUTER SPACE 34 
(2013). 
217 See David Wright, Orbital Debris Produced by Kinetic-Energy Anti-Satellite 
Weapons, in CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE, supra note 205, at 155 (noting that 
“[s]pace debris can pose a long-term threat to the future use of outer space.  One 
of the biggest sources of such debris would be the intentional destruction of satel-
lites by anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons . . . since there is currently no effective way 
to remove large amounts of debris from orbit, controlling its production is essen-
tial for preserving the long-term use of space”). 
 218 See Viikari, supra note 192, at 744 (noting how the IADC Guidelines, and 
the COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines that they inspired, fail to ad-
dress the problem of ASAT testing).  
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tional destruction of a space system (self-destruction, intentional 
collision, etc.) and other harmful activities that may significantly 
increase collision risks to other systems . . . .”219   
It is thus not surprising that although the IADC Guidelines 
(and the national laws and regulations implementing those guide-
lines) have contributed to improving the regulation of space debris, 
some commentators suggest that non-binding mechanisms like the 
Guidelines might not represent “the optimal solution in the long 
run,” especially if the goal is to effectively regulate all actors in 
space.220  Instead, they correctly argue that the time has come for 
states to instead agree on legally binding measures for regulating 
the prevention and management of space debris.221   
To the extent that soft law can play a valuable role in mitigat-
ing space debris, it appears to be best employed in bottom-up initi-
atives based on the successful model of the IADC Guidelines.  A 
new type of soft law placed on top of these existing efforts cannot 
accomplish what a new legally binding agreement can achieve, 
particularly in the context of volatile space arms control and securi-
ty issues.  On the contrary, such a top-down, diplomatically-driven 
soft law approach risks causing confusion, conflict and greater in-
security in space while at the same time diminishing the existing 
legal and administrative framework governing activities in space. 
 
4.2.  The Problem of “Fractional Soft Law”   
  
Even though the first draft of the proposed Code was intro-
duced over seven years ago, widespread acceptance of the docu-
ment by states has been understandably difficult to achieve; as of 
the most recent meeting of 109 states discussing the adoption of the 
Code (in September 2015), there is still no timetable for its finaliza-
                                                 
219 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Scientific and Tech-
nical Subcommittee, A/AC.105/C.1/L.260, Nov. 29, 2002, § 5.2.3 available at 
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_space_49E.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PB63-8EA6].  
220  FABIO TRONCHETTI, FUNDAMENTAL OF SPACE LAW AND POLICY 82 (2013) 
(suggesting that such new, legally binding measures should apply “during all 
phases of space activity”, and noting that “no international binding rules regulat-
ing the prevention, disposal and removal of space debris exist”).  
221 Id.  
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tion.222  The proposed Code continues to enjoy support from only a 
fraction of the international community.  Although some signifi-
cant space-faring countries, including members of the European 
Union, Japan, Canada, and Australia, have expressed varying de-
grees of support for the proposed Code, opposition continues to be 
expected from other major space powers, particularly Russia and 
China.223   
Opposition to the proposed Code from the Russian and Chi-
nese governments appears to be motivated primarily by the con-
tinuing concern of these major space powers that efforts to pro-
mote the Code could undermine the adoption of their preferred, 
jointly proposed and legally binding PPWT agreement.224  While 
the PPWT requires states “not to place any weapons in outer 
space,” it controversially excludes any restrictions on terrestrially-
based ASAT weapons (which the United States describes as “the 
most pressing, existing threat to outer space systems”).225  For this 
and other reasons, including the lack of any verification regime, 
the United States has rejected the PPWT for failing to meet its 
standards for consideration of space arms control proposals, name-
ly that they “must be equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance 
the national security of the United States and its allies.”226  To this 
point in time, however, the benefits and relative advantages that 
Russia and China perceive in continuing to promote the legally 
binding PPWT (which the United States does not hesitate to de-
scribe as an inequitable and flawed agreement) appear to outweigh 
                                                 
222 Timothy Farnsworth, No End in Sight for Space Code, ARMS CONTROL 
TODAY, 1 (2015), http://www.armscontrol.org/print/7174 [https://perma.cc/
NE5Y-DDWY] (“After eight years of drafting and negotiating the text of a code of 
conduct for activities in outer space, officials from several key countries indicated 
last month that they have no timetable for finalizing the agreement and opening it 
for signature”). 
223 Lele, supra note 79, at 15. 
224 Id. at 15–16; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, supra 
note 71, at 118 (expressing concern that the drafting of the ICoC “must not un-
dermine our efforts aimed at elaborating the PPWT.”); Xavier Pasco, ICoC: An Im-
perfect but Necessary Step?, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 95, 98 (noting 
that Chinese and Russian representatives “have constantly defended the merits of 
PPWT” by “sometimes directly challenging the EU-supported approach”).  
225 Draft PPWT, June 12, 2014, supra note 85, Art. II; Note Verbale Dated 2 Sep-
tember 2014 from the Delegation of the United States of America to the Conference On 
Disarmament Addressed to the Acting Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting 
the United States of America Analysis of the 2014 Russian-Chinese Draft PPWT [here-
inafter Note Verbale]. 
226 Note Verbale, supra note 226. 
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any interest in subscribing to the Code.  
The Russian and Chinese governments are currently joined by 
other states (e.g., Brazil, India, and South Africa) in expressing a 
preference for some form of legally binding agreement over the 
Code.227  Numerous states, including significant space stakeholders 
such as India and Brazil, have also frequently expressed serious 
concerns about the Euro-centric process adopted by the European 
Union to advance the Code.228  Indeed, the failure of the European 
Union to include non-EU states (other than the United States) in 
the early stages of developing the Code has been strongly criticized 
and continues to cast doubts on prospects for the instrument’s 
wider acceptance.229  (This concern recently led many states to re-
quest that future discussions of Code be moved to a truly multilat-
eral forum, preferably the U.N. General Assembly.230)  Several 
emerging space powers have also expressed concern about signing 
the proposed Code because of “possible constraints applied to nas-
cent space programmes,” a concern which forms part of a larger 
criticism that international opinion on activities in space is too 
much a by-product of the strategies of the main space powers.231   
                                                 
227 Paul Meyer, Star-Crossed: An International Code of Conduct for Outer Space?, 
CANADA INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL, Aug. 31, 2015, http://opencanada.org/
features/star-crossed-an-international-code-of-conduct-for-outer-space/ [https://
perma.cc/7X5A-WCJ5]. 
228 Jana Robinson, Europe’s Space Diplomacy Initiative: The International Code of 
Conduct, in DECODING THE CODE (2012), supra note 30, at 27, 28.  
229  Victoria Samson, ICOC: NEED OF THE HOUR, IN DECODING THE CODE, supra 
note 30, at 136–137 (“[T]he fact of the matter is that other major space-faring na-
tions should have been brought into the process earlier than they were.”); Peter 
Garretson, WHAT'S IN A CODE?: PUTTING SPACE DEVELOPMENT FIRST, IN AWAITING 
LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 27, 28 (noting that space-capable Asian states are unlike-
ly to feel that they have materially shaped the Code to reflect their interests be-
cause they have a problem with “the manner in which it [the Code] came to 
them”). 
230 Chair’s Summary, Multilateral Negotiations on an International Code of Con-
duct for Outer Space Activities, New York, 27–31 July 2015, ¶ 17, https://
papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/7650931/chairs-summary-corrected-1-.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C8E6-VSZH] (“It was the assessment of the Chair that the 
most supported way forward would be the pursuit of negotiations within the 
framework of the United Nations through a mandate of the General Assembly”). 
231 Xavier Pasco, ICOC: AN IMPERFECT BUT NECESSARY STEP?, IN AWAITING 
LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 95, 98; see also Akshan de Alwis, New Tensions on How to 
Regulate Outer Space, DIPLOMATIC COURIER, Aug. 10, 2015, http://
www.diplomaticourier.com/new-tensions-on-how-to-regulate-outer-space/ 
[https://perma.cc/MJH9-ATVJ] (noting that many developing nations “ex-
pressed a suspicion that the ICoC could be used to bottleneck their expansion into 
space” and that “[m]any nations in Africa and Latin America are yet to fully de-
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Although the United States had originally expressed tentative 
support for the proposed code, on January 17, 2012, the U.S. State 
Department issued a statement announcing that “[t]he European 
Union’s draft Code of Conduct is a good foundation for the devel-
opment of a non-legally binding International Code of Conduct.”232  
While emphasizing that the United States would join with the Eu-
ropean Union and other states to develop a code of conduct for 
outer space activities, Secretary of State Clinton declared that “we 
will not enter into a code of conduct that in any way constrains our 
national security-related activities in space or our ability to protect 
the United States and our allies.”233  To this point, however, the 
United States has not offered any proposed alternative to the 
Code.234   
Notwithstanding the U.S. government’s reluctance to sign the 
current draft of the proposed Code, senior U.S. officials argue that 
a code of conduct for space could enhance US national security by 
“serving as one of the most visible and political ways in which na-
tions commit to acting responsibly in space” and that “[n]ations 
willfully acting contrary to a code could expect to be isolated as 
rogue actors.”235  Yet these same officials also concede that it is only 
by “establishing widely accepted guidelines for responsible behavior 
in space” that the national security of the United States and its al-
lies will be enhanced.236   
A similar official position found in a U.S. Department of De-
fense press release notes that “[a] widely-subscribed Code can en-
                                                                                                               
velop their space capabilities, so some perceive any regulatory instrument by the 
West as an effort to limit their future capabilities”). 
232  An International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities: Strengthening 
Long-Term Sustainability, Stability, Safety, and Security in Space, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 
Jan. 17, 2012, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/181208.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7TDT-ZFST] (emphasis added). 
233 Press Statement, Sec’y of State Clinton, supra note 18. 
234 Senior U.S. officials instead continue to express conceptual support for 
the Code and similar proposals.  For example, in August 2015 at a multilateral 
conference at the U.N., the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Ver-
ification, and Compliance said “[w]e must look closely at the proposed Code and 
appreciate the effort that the European Union and others in the international 
community have put into crafting a document that provide us with an opportuni-
ty to reach agreement in the near term on a series of voluntary, non-legally bind-
ing, pragmatic, and timely measures that are essential to the long-term sustaina-
bility, safety, stability, and security of the outer space environment.”  de Alwis, 
supra note 231.  
235 Schulte, supra note 44, at 14. 
236 Id. at 11, 14 (emphasis added). 
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courage responsible space behavior and single out those who act 
otherwise, while reducing risk of misunderstanding and miscon-
duct.”237  Another DoD fact sheet notes that it is a “broadly-accepted 
set of international norms of responsible behavior” that can be ex-
pected to have “a positive effect on deterrence” and “help the in-
ternational community identify and isolate aggressors.”238   
Thus, according to U.S. Department of Defense policy, only a 
“widely-subscribed” and “broadly-accepted” code (that presuma-
bly includes major space-faring powers like Russia and China) 
could hope to identify and isolate states that act contrary to its 
rules (notwithstanding the need for such rules to also be part of a 
clear, legally binding and credible commitment by the states in-
volved, as discussed above).  Although the Russian and Chinese 
governments could view the non-binding Code as providing some 
relative compliance advantages over the United States (as dis-
cussed in Part 3.4., supra), they are unlikely to subscribe to the 
Code if doing so in any way interferes with their continuing efforts 
to promote their higher priority—and to them, more advanta-
geous—legally binding PPWT agreement.239   
Russia and China thus continue to lie beyond the reach of the 
Code, defeating efforts by proponents to make the Code a widely 
subscribed and broadly accepted instrument and greatly diminish-
ing its purported “norm-setting” capabilities.  Whatever benefits 
soft law instruments are asserted to have in addressing security 
matters, participation by only a fraction of states in the Code, par-
ticularly a fraction that fails to include all the major space-faring 
countries, will not provide a sound basis for establishing new 
norms or help to identify or isolate aggressors and other non-
participating, misbehaving states.  Furthermore, states facing per-
ceived security threats in space are not likely to be assured by a 
fractional version of the Code in which their potential adversaries 
do not even participate.  
In some areas of international cooperation, such as the protec-
tion of human rights, persuading only a fraction of states to initial-
ly sign multilateral instruments may be viewed as a positive, pro-
                                                 
237  Fact Sheet: International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, U.S. DEPT. 
OF DEFENSE, (emphasis added) http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/
2011/0111_nsss/docs/FINAL_DoD_Fact_Sheet_International_Code-2012_1-17-
12.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEU3-UE5J]. 
238  Id. 
239  See Draft Treaty supra note 85, and Lele supra note 79 and accompanying 
text.   
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gressive step of achievement (particularly since human rights 
agreements are not focused on reciprocal obligations).240  As an 
arms control initiative for space, however, the Code’s failure to in-
clude Russia and China and other major space stakeholders is a 
fundamental flaw.  The absence of powerful, potential adversaries 
makes multilateral conventions addressing arms control or dis-
armament issues highly problematic for those states contemplating 
joining such regimes and making potentially dangerous, non-
reciprocal commitments.241  To the extent that soft law arrange-
ments such as the proposed Code seek to promote arms control 
measures in the face of severe security dilemmas and the threat of 
arms races, the non-participation of powerful adversaries clearly 
undermines such efforts.  
If the proposed Code is adopted by states in its current state of 
limited acceptance, a fractional soft law product will emerge which 
will present its own particular disadvantages and problems (be-
yond those associated with soft law arrangements generally).  Not 
only would a fractionalized Code fail to identify aggressors and 
isolate rogue states, it could instead lead to de facto competing legal 
regimes in space, as subscribing states respect their own “rules of 
the road” while other non-participating states—especially major, 
non-participating space powers—seek to advance their own inter-
ests through different or less restrictive approaches.  Attempts to 
later successfully persuade non-participating states to accede to the 
Code will be challenging, if not impossible, and could risk further 
weakening rather than improving the Code.242    
Still another casualty of a fractionalized Code would be any at-
tempt to establish new and meaningful transparency and confi-
dence building measures through the sharing of information.  In-
                                                 
240 Dinah Shelton, LAW, NON-LAW AND THE PROBLEM OF ‘SOFT LAW’, IN 
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 134, at 1, 3 (“Human rights law has de-
veloped over the past fifty years into a broad code of behavior for states and state 
agents, not only in their relations with other states, but primarily as non-
reciprocal, unilateral commitments towards all those within the jurisdiction of the 
state”). 
241 Richard L. Williamson Jr., Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral 
Arms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L 59, 61–62 (2003) (“Other 
matters can affect a treaty’s effectiveness, such as the degree to which essential 
nations become parties to the treaty.  If key parties remain outside the treaty, it 
increases pressure on the other states to withdraw or cheat”). 
242  See Kueter, supra note 172, at 7–8 (noting that if non-participating states 
are dissatisfied with the ICoC, they “can be expected to demand concessions, both 
formal and informal . . . to secure their signature on the Code”). 
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formation serves a central function in the Code since subscribing 
states resolve to share information on a wide variety of topics, no-
tably regarding “their space strategies and policies, including those 
which are security-related, in all aspects which could affect the 
safety, security, and sustainability of current and planned activities 
in outer space” as well as “their major outer space research and 
space applications programmes.”243       
Space law generally seeks to maintain a focus on the free and 
open sharing of information for the benefit and safety of all na-
tions.244  The Code, however, contains restrictive information-
sharing provisions requiring subscribing states to share infor-
mation only with other subscribing states.245  This restrictive infor-
mation sharing arrangement, which was not part of the first draft 
of the Code in 2008, appears to reflect the insecurity of would-be 
subscribing states as they now contemplate the likelihood of frac-
tional state participation in the Code and the possibility of sharing 
potentially sensitive information with numerous non-subscribing 
states on a non-reciprocal basis.  This restrictive information ar-
rangement defeats the larger purposes of the Code (“enhancing the 
safety, security, and sustainability of outer space activities”)246 
since even information relating to potentially dangerous activities 
which threaten all space-faring states are not required under the 
Code to be distributed to the international community as a whole.   
The absence of key state actors in the information sharing pro-
cess significantly undermines the ability of the Code to bring genu-
ine transparency to space activities.  Furthermore, the voluntary 
nature of the process does nothing to ensure the accuracy or com-
pleteness of the information that is submitted, especially since sub-
scribing states are unlikely to voluntarily submit many types of 
sensitive space data related to important scientific and technologi-
cal capabilities.247  The obvious failings of this mechanism have 
                                                 
243 Code, supra note 32, § 6.1.  
244 See Space Law, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/informationfor/faqs.html [https://perma.cc/
FW63-C2BB] (noting that in order to achieve its primary goals, space law address-
es a variety of diverse matters, including “sharing of information about potential 
dangers in outer space”). 
245  Code, supra note 32, § 6.1 (“The Subscribing States resolve to share, on an 
annual basis, where available and appropriate, information with the other Sub-
scribing States”).  
246 Id. at Preamble, ¶10. 
247 Lele, supra note 79, at 20 (“No state would like to share technical infor-
mation which could be used to understand, and probe more deeply into, its scien-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
  
396 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:2 
prompted harsh criticism, with one commentator noting that “[t]he 
basic purpose behind the CoC gets defeated if insufficient, inaccu-
rate and irregular information is provided by states.”248  The in-
complete and voluntary information disclosure process also fun-
damentally undercuts the hoped-for ability of the proposed Code 
to help identify “bad sheep.”249   
There are few, if any, examples of non-binding, multilateral 
codes being used to address significant arms control issues.  This 
lack of state practice is itself a compelling indication of the unsuit-
ability of soft law instruments in this area.  However, in defending 
the President’s authority to sign non-binding documents related to 
security matters, the U.S. State Department has cited the 2002 
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (the 
“HCoC”)250 as a good example of a “similarly non-binding 
code.”251  Upon closer inspection, however, not only is the HCoC 
unlike the Code in important respects (and unlike other instru-
ments addressing problems posed by weapons of mass destruc-
tion), it is better cited as an example of the failure of non-binding 
instruments to successfully address security matters—particularly 
when those instruments exclude numerous significant state ac-
tors.252 
                                                                                                               
tific and technological capabilities”). 
248 Id. at 19. 
249  Id. at 20 (“Undertaking confidence-building measures through a series of 
voluntary disclosures is likely to have limited utility and would not help identify 
the ‘bad sheep’ . . . ”). 
250 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (the 
HCoC), U.N. Doc. A/57/724, 3.c., (Nov. 25, 2002), available at http://
www.hcoc.at/?tab=what_is_hcoc&page=text_of_the_hcoc [https://perma.cc/
6TM3-2DPJ] [hereinafter HCoC]. 
251 Hearing on Nat’l Def. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 and Oversight of 
Previously Authorized Programs Before the Subcomm. on Strategic Forces of the H. 
Comm. on Armed Services, 112th Cong. 87 (2013), app., letter from Hon. David S. 
Adams, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to 
Chairman Turner (March 8, 2012), available at https://fas.org/irp/congress/
2012_hr/space.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7N6-HTNY] [hereinafter HEARING ON 
2013 NDAA]. 
252 See Camille Grand, The Hague Code of Conduct: 10 Years of Combating Ballis-
tic Proliferation, 74 NON-PROLIFERATION MONTHLY 1 (Special Issue 2013), available at 
http://www.cesim.fr/documents/onp/eng/74.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LUS-
2QVN] (noting that “[the HCoC’s] limits are well publicized; as a non-legally 
binding instrument, it forbids neither the possession, production, nor the devel-
opment of ballistic missiles and does not impose any onerous constraints on pos-
sessor States.  As such, it is not comparable with the major international conven-
tions that deal with weapons of mass destruction.”); A Brief Overview of Norms 
Development in Outer Space, supra note 60, at 6 (noting that the utility of the HCoC 
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At the outset, it should be noted that the HCoC constitutes a 
much more limited attempt than the Code to address international 
security matters and does not present states like the United States 
with any new arms control-type constraints.253  As noted by one 
congressman during hearings related to the funding of national se-
curity space activities, the HCoC imposed no restraints on U.S. mil-
itary operations while, in contrast, an Executive Summary of the 
Joint Staff Operations assessment of the proposed Code stated that 
“[i]f the United States were to make a good-faith effort at imple-
menting the requirements of the draft code, there could be opera-
tion[al] impacts on U.S. military space operations in several are-
as.”254 
Furthermore, unlike the broad scope and objectives of the 
Code, the HCoC attempts only to make modest inroads in restrict-
ing the proliferation of one specific weapon system (ballistic mis-
siles).  In addition, the very limited commitments that states under-
take when they subscribe to the HCoC are phrased in even weaker 
and more ambiguous terms than those contained in the Code.255   
Notwithstanding the limited scope and other shortcomings of 
the HCoC, its ability to have any meaningful impact has been fur-
ther diminished by its fractional subscription.  It is particularly 
                                                                                                               
framework has been criticized “because of . . . the absence of several key states 
from the list of signatories”). 
253 The different nature and purposes of the HCoC and the Code were high-
lighted during hearings in the U.S. Congress.  In sharply criticizing Administra-
tion efforts to compare the HCoC with the Code, the Chairman of the Strategic 
Forces Subcommittee of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee asked 
“[W]hat was it that the U.S. was doing in 2002 that it no longer did as a result of 
subscription to The Hague Code? Were we proliferating ballistic missiles before 
the code?” HEARING ON 2013 NDAA, supra note 251, at 18. 
254 Congressman Michael Turner, HEARING ON 2013 NDAA, supra note 251, at 
18 (In further contrasting the impact of the HCoC with the Code, Congressman 
Turner asked, “What impact on U.S. military and intelligence operations was 
there from The Hague Code of Conduct? What binding regulations were issued 
on the Department of Defense and IC as a result of U.S. subscription to The Hague 
Code . . . ?”). 
255 For example, cf. HCoC, supra note 250, at 3.c (which requires the subscrib-
ing states “to exercise maximum possible restraint in the development, testing and 
deployment of Ballistic Missiles . . . including, where possible to reduce national 
holdings of such missiles . . . ”) (emphasis added) to Code, supra note 32, at 1.2, 
4.2, 4.3 (ICoC provisions which address “outer space activities involving all space 
objects launched into Earth orbit or beyond” and requires subscribing states to “re-
frain from any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, damage, or destruc-
tion, of space objects unless such action is justified” and “to limit, to the greatest 
extent practicable, any activities in the conduct of the routine space operations”) 
(emphasis added).   
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handicapped since “the majority of Asian countries that contribute 
to the challenge of missile proliferation remain outside the mecha-
nism.”256  The lack of many significant actors in the HCoC regime, 
or in any other fractional soft law regime that attempts to address 
security matters, fundamentally undermines any credibility it may 
have as an international security tool.257  Thus, in the absence of 
some mechanism to ensure the inclusion of the key actors in the 
Code, it has been argued that the Code “is likely to see a repeat of 
the experience with the HCoC in which most Asian countries of 
proliferation concern have chosen to remain outside the mecha-
nism.”258 
The HCoC is thus an instructive example regarding soft law in-
struments, but not a positive one.  As noted by one commentator, 
its limitations as a fractionalized soft law instrument are self-
evident, as it appears to have done very little to limit the spread of 
ballistic missile technology.259  With many key states refusing to 
subscribe to the HCoC and many signatory states failing to imple-
ment it, the HCoC underlines the limited value of so-called 
“norms” in non-legally binding documents in which “there is no 
                                                 
256 Grand, supra note 252, at 1 (noting how “[in] Asia and the Middle East, 
adherence to the Code is more the exception than the rule.  Brazil, China, India, 
Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and Syria are all yet to sign . . . ”). 
257 Lucia Marta, The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Prolifera-
tion: “Lessons Learned” for the European Union Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space 
Activities, EUR. SPACE POL’Y INST. (2010), http://www.nonproliferation.eu/
web/documents/nonproliferationpapers/integrating-without-quite-breaking-
the-rules-the-e-44.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW6G-89DU] (noting that the lack of 
participation by significant countries in the HCoC ,including North Korea, Iran, 
China , emerging actors in the space sector like Brazil, Mexico and Saudi Arabia, 
and most other middle eastern and south Asian countries “undermines the credi-
bility of the Code not only in terms of its universalization and the potential to cre-
ate an international customary law, but also in terms of its credibility as an inter-
national security tool”). 
258 Timothy Farnsworth, U.S. Backs Efforts to Draft Space Code, ARMS CONTROL 
ASS’N, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_03/US_Backs_Efforts_to_Draft_
Space_Code [https://perma.cc/RZY7-96JZ]; Micah Zenko, A Code of Conduct for 
Outer Space, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (2011), http://i.cfr.org/content/
publications/attachments/Policy_Innovation_Memo10_Zenko.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F67J-UCKV] (“Along current trend lines, the EU code will likely suffer 
the same fate as the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 
which was endorsed by 132 states, but not Brazil, China, or India, much less Iran 
and North Korea). 
259 Kueter, supra note 116, at 4 (noting that the HCoC has “done little to slow 
the spread of ballistic missile technology.  The utility of the ballistic missile as a 
warfighting instrument is such that nations either have elected to stay outside the 
regime or ignore it”). 
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obligation created and thus there is potentially a higher chance for 
weak adherence.”260  
In light of the issues discussed above, it is not surprising that 
many advocates of the Code stress the crucial need for all interest-
ed nations, particularly all major space stakeholders, to sign the Code 
in order for it to have any chance of success.261  Without the partic-
ipation of these states, the proposed Code is doomed to become 
part of an unusual class of particularly ineffective soft law instru-
ments.  Furthermore, in the case of arms control measures, poten-
tial dangers lurk for states like the United States that choose to 
subscribe to such fractionalized soft law instruments and attempt 
to comply in good faith with their restrictions.  
 
   4.3.  “Non-Binding Norm-Creating” and the Democracy Deficit 
  
One suggested advantage of soft law instruments over hard 
law is that they are easier for states to negotiate and conclude 
while retaining the ability to later serve as the possible basis for le-
gally binding obligations.  This advantage flows from the capacity 
of soft law instruments to be both “non-binding” and “norm-
creating.”  Yet soft law’s non-binding and norm-creating qualities 
may pose a dilemma for the legislatures of democratic states, as il-
lustrated by the unfolding controversy in the United States over 
the possible adoption of the proposed Code.  At first glance it may 
seem surprising that a state’s legislative body would be concerned 
about a legally non-binding instrument, but such a document takes 
                                                 
260 A Brief Overview of Norms Development in Outer Space, supra note 60, at 7 
(noting how the failure of signatory states to implement the HCoC “underlines 
the extent of the reach of such types of norms as, in that they are non-legally bind-
ing documents, there is no obligation created and thus there is potentially a higher 
chance for weak adherence.”); Lele, supra note 79, at 5, 6 (“In reality, mechanisms 
like HCoC or the proposed space CoC have extremely limited relevance and actu-
ally serve no purpose beyond offering a ‘feel good’ notion.  It would be naïve to 
think that states actually care for such non-binding mechanisms”). 
261 See, e.g., Stefan A. Kaiser, Why States Should Sign the Code of Conduct for 
Outer Space Activities?, in DECODING THE CODE, supra note 30, at 88, 90 (“there is 
one crucial prerequisite for the success of the code of conduct.  It needs to reflect a 
broad consensus among the space-faring nations.  All major space-faring nations 
need to sign”); Elatawy, supra note 84, at 50 (noting in order for a code such as the 
ICoC to beneficial, it must, among other things, be “negotiated widely among all 
states in a proper multilateral venue”); Samson, supra note 229, at 139 (arguing 
that, at a minimum, “What is needed is the agreement of key space stakeholders 
that the guidelines set down in a code of conduct are for the best”). 
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on new significance when a state’s executive unilaterally (without 
involving the legislature) proclaims that the adopted instrument 
will be promoted by that state as a basis for creating new binding 
rules of customary international law. 
    
4.4.  The Code Controversy Within the U.S. Government 
 
In contrast to the space policies of previous administrations, the 
Obama Administration has expressed a desire to promote new 
types of collaborative activities in space and a willingness to con-
sider proposals for space-related arms control agreements (albeit 
with significant caveats.)262  It has also indicated a willingness to 
consider a variety of new soft law mechanisms for outer space, in-
cluding those which contribute to the development of what it de-
scribed as “norms of behavior for responsible space operations.”263 
Consistent with its new space policies, the U.S. government ex-
pressed tentative support in 2009 for the proposed Code, subject to 
its formulation as a legally non-binding instrument.264  Stressing 
the power of soft, non-binding instruments to build norms, a fact 
sheet released by DoD in 2011 noted that “[t]he United States is 
working closely with the European Union on a draft international 
Code of Conduct, which could serve as an important first set of 
norms of responsible behavior.”265   
On February 2, 2011, thirty-seven members of the U.S. Senate 
expressed significant concerns about the proposed Code in a letter 
                                                 
262  Broad & Chang, supra note 171, at A19 (noting that the new National Se-
curity Space Strategy states that Washington will “consider proposals and con-
cepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable and en-
hance the national security of the United States and its allies”). 
263  National Security Space Strategy, supra note 12, at 5; National Space Law 
Policy of the United States, at 2, 7 (June 28, 2010), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-
10.pdf [https://perma.cc/TA72-4BZM] (stating that “[t]he United States will sup-
port development of data standards, best practices, transparency and confidence-
building measures, and norms of behavior for responsible space operations”). 
264  Bill Gertz, New Space-Arms Control Initiative Draws Concern, WASH. TIMES, 
Jan. 16, 2012, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/
jan/16/new-space-arms-control-initiative-draws-concern/ [https://perma.cc/
VZ8R-GV8U] (quoting a Dec. 9, 2009, State Department cable expressing concern 
about the use of legally binding language in the draft EU Code). 
265 Fact Sheet: International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, supra note 
237.  
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to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.266  On January 17, 2012, the 
State Department announced that the United States would not sign 
the EU’s current draft of a proposed Code, but that it would none-
theless “join with the European Union and other space-faring 
countries to develop an international code of conduct for outer 
space activities.”267  
While several ranking members of U.S. Congress indicated in a 
letter to President Obama of January 18, 2012, that they applauded 
the decision to not sign the current version of the draft Code be-
cause it presented “significant policy and operational concerns,” 
they also expressed grave reservations about the proposed use by 
the Executive Branch of a non-binding soft law mechanism to 
promote possible restrictions on US military and intelligence capa-
bilities and space.268  Of particular importance for purposes of this 
article, the congressmen questioned the appropriateness of the 
Code’s non-binding, norm-creating approach as applied to arms 
control in space.  They argued that the Code, if adopted, could be 
used “as a starting point” for the negotiation of an international 
arms control agreement, and further suggested that it could “es-
tablish the foundation for a future arms control regime that 
binds the United States without the approval of Congress.”269  
Such a legally binding impact on the United States could presuma-
bly take place through the codification of Code provisions in future 
international conventions (although this would require congres-
sional involvement in order to be internally binding on the United 
States), and/or their transformation through state practice into 
rules of customary international law which would be binding on 
all states.  
Furthermore, the perceived advantage of non-binding instru-
ments to harmonize international standards by generating uniform 
domestic legal requirements was directly criticized by the con-
gressmen, who noted that although the Administration argued that 
the draft Code would be “non-binding and voluntary, the imple-
menting regulations surely would be binding.”270 
                                                 
266 Letter from Senators to Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State (Feb. 2, 2011), 
supra note 83. 
267 Farnsworth, supra note 258. 
268 Letter from Rep. Michael Turner et al, supra note 175. 
269 Id. (arguing that this approach “would bypass the established constitu-
tional processes by which the United States becomes bound by international 
law”). 
270 Id. (further arguing that “[b]ecoming a signatory on this type of a Code 
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Writing in response to the congressman on behalf of the 
President, a senior State Department official noted that the Code 
“would not be a treaty or international agreement that would im-
pose legal obligations on the United States” and that it was not “a 
legally-binding arms control agreement.”271  While this is an accu-
rate statement, it is also a narrow one that does not speak to the 
possibility that the Code could generate legally binding domestic 
regulations, serve as the basis for future legally binding agree-
ments, or give rise to new legally binding norms of customary in-
ternational law.  
In response to concerns expressed by some members of Con-
gress that the proposed Code represented “arms control by the 
back door,” administration officials did not dispute that the sub-
stance of the draft Code related to arms control issues, only that it 
was not “arms control” because the Code itself is “not legally bind-
ing.”272  Nevertheless, some members of Congress argued that this 
process could result in legally binding obligations and related poli-
cies being approved without their input and outside the normal 
process for considering and approving congressional-executive 
agreements or ratifying treaties.273   
While the Obama Administration has correctly emphasized 
that the proposed Code is not a proposed international agreement 
and is thus not subject to the procedural and substantive rules 
governing the consideration, authorization and conclusion of in-
ternational agreements, the potentially legally binding impact of 
the Code through its contribution to the formation of customary 
international law is another matter. 274  In that regard, the execu-
tive’s unilateral adoption of such a soft law instrument would 
leave the legislative branch in a poor position to affect what it 
                                                                                                               
of Conduct without Congressional approval appears intended to implement 
international policy with which the Congress has not expressed concurrence or 
approval.  It appears that the Department of Defense and possibly the Intelli-
gence Community would have to issue departmental implementation regula-
tions that would impact both our national and economic security”). 
271 HEARING ON 2013 NDAA, supra note 251 (Letter from David S. Adams, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, to Michael Turner, Chairman). 
272 Schulte & Schaffer, supra note 44, at 14 (“One concern [that we have heard 
about the code] is this arms control by the back door? This is not arms control. I 
mean, this is a voluntary code. It is not legally binding”). 
273 Letter from Rep. Michael Turner et al., supra note 175. 
274 See 1 U.S. Code § 112b (the “Case-Zablocki Act”), which imposes regula-
tions only on those documents that are legally binding international agreements 
(including the requirement that the document be transmitted to Congress). 
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views as an objectionable step by the United States in leading the 
way in the potential development of new rules of customary inter-
national law that could restrict U.S. military capabilities and opera-
tions in space.   
As noted above, arms control measures (defined by the U.S. 
Congress as any action that “would obligate the United States to 
reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United 
States in a militarily significant manner”) are the subject of a spe-
cial statutory regime (requiring such obligations to be made pursu-
ant to the treaty-making power or with affirmative legislation by 
the Congress).275  Questions regarding the applicability of this stat-
utory regime have escalated the conflict between the U.S. legisla-
tive and executive branches over the proposed Code.276  The result 
was the enactment in 2014 of an unprecedented piece of legislation 
entitled “Limitation on International Agreements Concerning Out-
er Space Activities,” found in Section 913 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (“Section 913”).277   
Not surprisingly, Section 913 reaffirmed the requirement that 
any obligation to reduce or limit the armed forces or armaments of 
the United States in outer space in a militarily significant manner 
be accomplished only pursuant to a treaty or specific statutory au-
thorization.278  However, Section 913 also broke new ground by es-
                                                 
275  22 U.S. Code § 2573(b). 
276 See Jack M. Beard, Soft Law as an Impediment to the Regulation of Space Activ-
ities with Military Implications: A View from the United States Congress, PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE 2014, 699–717 (2015).  
277 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-
239, 126 Stat. 1632 (2013), codified at 51 U.S.C. § 30701, Note (2013), available at 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr4310enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr4310
enr.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2S2-C4XV] [hereinafter the 2013 NDAA].  The Presi-
dent had previously threatened to veto the Act based on the unacceptable way 
Section 913 and other provisions in the bill impeded the President’s ability to exe-
cute new defense strategies and allocate resources and the manner in which Sec-
tion 913 specifically could “encroach on the Executive's exclusive authority to 
conduct foreign relations and could severely hamper U.S. ability to conduct bilat-
eral space cooperation activities with key allies”).  See Statement of Administra-
tion Policy, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. 4310 
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/
saphr4310r_20120515.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ9J-79DC].  
278 The first certification provision in Section 913 requires the Secretary of 
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of National 
Intelligence to jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a certi-
fication that such agreement “will be equitable, enhance national security, and 
have no militarily significant impact on the ability of the United States to conduct 
military or intelligence activities.”  2013 NDAA, supra note 277, § 913(a)(2).  
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tablishing several onerous certification requirements, one of which 
may cast a long shadow over America’s ability to continue to play 
a leading role in helping to form rules of customary international 
law for outer space.  In particular, Section 913(a)(1) contains unu-
sual criteria, which appear to prevent soft law instruments like the 
Code from serving as a basis for both future international agree-
ments and rules of customary international law.   
Among other things, Section 913(a)(1) requires the President to 
submit to appropriate congressional committees a certification that 
“such agreement has no legally-binding effect or basis for limiting 
the activities of the United States in outer space.”279  In reluctantly 
signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2013, President Obama issued a statement indicating that certain 
provisions in this Act, including Section 913, “could interfere with 
my constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the 
United States.”280   
The legal significance, if any, of presidential signing statements 
in this context is hotly contested.281  A full examination, however, 
of the constitutional status of presidential signing statements, re-
lated separation of powers issues, and the capacity of the President 
to lawfully engage in a wide spectrum of executive acts related to 
international affairs is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, 
other issues arising from the divided and conflicted participation 
of the American democracy (or any other democracy) in the for-
mation of customary international law deserve special attention 
here, particularly as they relate to the adoption of a soft law in-
strument on the basis of its non-binding yet norm-creating charac-
ter. 
 
                                                 
279 Id., at § 913(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
280 Statement by the President on H.R. 4310, THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE 
PRESS SEC’Y, Jan. 3, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/01/03/statement-president-hr-4310 [https://perma.cc/YG5F-QHPJ] 
(further declaring that “[i]n these instances, my Administration will interpret and 
implement these provisions in a manner that does not interfere with my constitu-
tional authority to conduct diplomacy”). 
281 For a discussion of related issues, see Beard, supra note 276, at 10581–
10582. 
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4.5.  The Code, “Norm-Creating,”, and the Formation of Customary 
International Law 
 
Repeated statements by U.S. officials that the proposed Code 
entails no legal obligations because it is not a legally binding 
agreement, unfortunately, speak to only one dimension of the pos-
sible legal significance of this soft law instrument.  As Senator Ben 
Nelson remarked to administration officials in Congressional hear-
ings on the proposed Code, “[i]t may not be a treaty, but as you 
well know, it will establish international norms amongst na-
tions.”282  In fact, lines separating the promotion of new “norms” 
found in legally non-binding instruments (that the United States 
expects other countries to follow), and efforts to establish new 
binding rules of customary international law are easily blurred, es-
pecially as U.S. Executive Branch officials continue to promote the 
Code as an instrument for setting “norms for which responsible 
space-faring nations would conform their conduct.”283                                   
For purposes of legal analysis, non-binding “norms” or guide-
lines found in soft law instruments must be distinguished from le-
gally binding rules of customary international law (which are 
sometimes also referred to as “norms”).  Customary international 
law consists of a set of legal obligations arising from the practice of 
states and is recognized as a “leading, well-respected source of in-
ternational law, fully on par with treaties.”284  In the words of the 
American Law Institute's Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States, customary international law emanates “from a 
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a 
sense of legal obligation.”285  
 
                                                 
282  Hearing to Receive Testimony on Military Space Programs in Review of the De-
fense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2013 and the Future Years Defense Program, 
Before the Subcomm. on Strat. Forces of the Comm. on Armed Services, 112th Cong. 3 
(March 21, 2012) available at http://www.smdc.army.mil/CG/2012/FY13SA
SCSFSpaceTranscript.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2EZ-QY3L]. 
283  See, e.g.,id. at 19, (testimony of Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Sec’y of De-
fense for Global Strat. Aff.)  (stating that “[t]here are a number of responsible be-
haviors that we hope this code will identify and then set what would be the 
norms for which responsible space-faring nations would conform their conduct”).  
284 David A. Koplow, ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Reg-
ulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1187, 1222 (2009) [hereinafter 
Koplow]. 
285 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102.2 
(1987). 
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Customary international law has played a key role in space.  
For example, many of the most important and fundamental princi-
ples of space law found in the Outer Space Treaty, have been de-
scribed as essentially codifying existing customary international 
law.286  Significantly, the customary international law version of 
these rules has achieved wider, “more comprehensive geographic 
coverage” than the treaty versions.287  As discussed in Part 2 above, 
customary international law rules governing space activities have 
often emerged from soft law instruments, including, in some cir-
cumstances, from U.N. General Assembly Resolutions.288 
A non-binding principle contained in a soft law instrument 
may thus become a binding “rule of customary international law,” 
but only if it enjoys sufficient conforming general practice by states 
and is ultimately accepted as law.289  It should be noted that even if 
a document like the proposed Code is initially declared by all sub-
scribing states to be a legally non-binding instrument, this may not 
prevent it from later contributing to the formation of a rule of cus-
                                                 
286 Vladlen S. Vereshchetin & Gennady M. Danilenko, Custom as a Source of 
International Law of Outer Space, 13 J. SPACE L. 22, 25 (1985) (noting further that “the 
analysis of the practice of states before the conclusion of the 1967 Outer Space 
Treaty shows that historically custom was the first source of the international law 
of outer space”); NANDASIRI JASENTULIYANA, SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 
46 (1992) (describing the Outer Space Treaty as “the Magna Carta of international 
space law” and noting that it was “built on several principles already enunciated 
in [the] 1963 . . . Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space”). 
287  Koplow, supra note 284, at 1234.  The International Court of Justice main-
tains that customary international law rules underlying an international “conven-
tion continue to exist erga omnes for both parties and non-parties.”  See MARK 
EUGEN VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 151–52 (1997) (noting also 
two alternative views when pre-existing customary international law rules are 
codified in a convention: that these rules may be “crowd[ed] out” by the conven-
tion, or that they may simply parallel the convention, “at least as regards non-
parties”). 
288 Frans von der Dunk, Contradiction in Terminis or Realpolitik?  A Qualified 
Plea for a Role of ‘Soft Law’ in the Context of Space Activities, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, 
supra note 27, at 31, 32 (noting that the origins of space law can be traced to “a 
handful of internal administrative and/or non-legally binding United Nations 
General Assembly resolutions between 1958 and 1963 . . . .”); see supra notes 57–61 
and accompanying text (discussing the limited circumstances in which U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions form the basis for binding rules of customary interna-
tional law).  
289  Continental Shelf case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment, 
ICJ Reports 1985, pp. 29–30, § 27 (3 June 1985) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=68&code=lm&p3=4 
[https://perma.cc/J9FH-9LSD]. 
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tomary international law.  For example, during the consideration 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at a 1948 session of 
the U.N. General Assembly, the U.S. Representative, Mrs. Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, emphasized that, “It is not a treaty; it is not an inter-
national agreement.  It is not and does not purport to be a state-
ment of law or of legal obligation.”290  However, after years of con-
forming state practice and reaffirmation of the norms in the 
Declaration by the United States, it was not difficult for a U.S. fed-
eral court to later declare that one of those norms, the prohibition 
of torture, had become a binding rule on all countries under cus-
tomary international law.291   
The process by which customary international law (“CIL”) is 
formed is not, however, without its critics.  For example, Professor 
J. Patrick Kelly has strongly criticized the lack of democratic legit-
imacy in this process on several levels, arguing that “the majority 
of nations and peoples of the world rarely participate in the crea-
tion of customary rules that limit their policy choices and sover-
eignty,” and that this “democracy deficit” broadly infects the pro-
cess of CIL norm formation.292 
It is true that traditional international law doctrine has general-
ly treated states and governments as opaque “black boxes,” and 
has thus “ignore[d] their internal observance of democracy as a 
relevant factor affecting their capacity to have a voice in interna-
tional lawmaking.”293  Yet, even while most international law 
scholars may be unwilling to fully embrace Professor Kelly’s ar-
gument that the methodologies of all the major normative theories 
of customary international law eviscerate the democratic legitima-
cy of CIL norms, there is still value in recognizing and encouraging 
                                                 
290 19 DEP’T. OF STATE BULL. 751 (1948). 
291 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (“This prohibition 
[the right to be free from torture] has become part of customary international law, 
as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General 
Assembly Resolution 217 (III)(A) (Dec. 10, 1948) which states, in the plainest of 
terms, “no one shall be subjected to torture”). 
292 J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 449, 518–520 (2000) (arguing that the democratic legitimacy of customary inter-
national law (CIL) norms is undermined by both the limited number of states that 
participate in formulating those norms and by the lack of any participation by 
people represented by states: “much of CIL is determined by the academic and 
judicial elites or by the practices of a minority of states without the participation 
or direct assent of the majority of states compromising the legitimacy of CIL 
norms”).  
293  BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH 
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 156 (2010). 
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state participation in this process that also reflects the participation 
of the people that these states are presumed to represent.294  
International legal obligations which are made pursuant to 
treaties or other international agreements often involve legislative 
institutions and thus, at least in democratic states, involve the par-
ticipation of the elected representatives of the people in those 
states.  But in the case of other activities involving a state’s foreign 
affairs, including the signing of legally non-binding documents 
that may give rise to customary international law, in some coun-
tries the executive alone may speak for the government and the 
people.295  
The ongoing controversy in the United States over the possible 
signature by the President of the proposed Code implicates issues 
larger than domestic partisan politics and interesting separation of 
power issues within the U.S. constitutional framework.  Among 
other things, the Code controversy highlights the limitations of 
non-binding soft law instruments to generate legally binding 
“norms” of conduct under customary international law.  The unu-
                                                 
294 Id. (Professor Lepard argues that “[f]inally, in the case of all 
norms . . . greater weight should be given to the views of states that have some 
mechanism for taking the views of their citizens and other inhabitants into ac-
count, such as democratic elections or consultations.”  He suggests that such an 
approach enhances the “democratic legitimacy” of customary international law” 
without “reject[ing] the legitimacy of the customary lawmaking process as being 
irremediably ‘undemocratic’ by nature”). 
295 The extent of an executive’s sole powers in foreign affairs varies with 
each state’s constitutional framework.  In the United States, the standard citation 
for the president’s power in the area of foreign affairs is found in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (noting that “[i]n this vast ex-
ternal realm [of foreign affairs], with its important, complicated, delicate and 
manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a rep-
resentative of the nation . . . .  As Marshall said in his great argument of March 7, 
1800, in the House of Representatives, ‘The President is the sole organ of the na-
tion in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations’").  
Although a detailed discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this article, 
such absolute statements about presidential authority risk over-simplifying the 
complex separation of powers regime in the U.S. legal system.  Even the Curtiss-
Wright case is less than it appears, since it did not involve the question of inde-
pendent powers of the president, but “whether Congress had delegated [its] legis-
lative power too broadly when it authorized the president to declare an arms em-
bargo in South America.”  Louis Fisher, The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The 
“Sole Organ” Doctrine, PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 139, 143 (March 2007).  Rather than 
providing a clear roadmap for Congress and the President to share powers in the 
conduct of foreign affairs, one presidential scholar has suggested that the Consti-
tution is instead “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American 
foreign policy.”  EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT - OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1957 
at 171 (1957). 
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sual case of the executive and legislative branches of a major de-
mocracy explicitly taking opposite views of the suitability of a soft 
law instrument (in this case the proposed Code) to serve as a basis 
for future international legal obligations, threatens not only the fu-
ture of U.S. participation in the Code, but also the key role that the 
United States has long played in the development of the interna-
tional legal regime governing activities in space.296  If the United 
States were to approve the Code under these circumstances, it 
would also give the Code an even more uncertain status, further 
undermining its relevance as well as the underlying commitments 
of subscribing states. 
The significance for international space law of the dispute over 
the Code between the U.S. Executive and Legislative branches may 
be far-reaching.  Although partisan disputes related to internation-
al activities are hardly unusual in the United States, the formal and 
unprecedented action taken by the United States Congress to re-
strict the potential legal impact of the Code potentially sets the 
stage for a broad and unfortunate attack on the use of soft law in-
struments as a basis for forming future binding obligations in 
space under customary international law.  
The controversy over the Code in the United States highlights 
the limitations of soft instruments when they are used in place of 
legally binding international agreements and the process whereby 
which such legally binding agreements are adopted.  It also illus-
trates the dangers that such non-binding documents may pose if 
they are used by the executives of states to build norms in such a 
way that they further contribute to a “democracy deficit” in cus-
tomary international law.  This is especially true for democratic 
states in the area of arms control where important issues of nation-
al security are likely to call for processes which reflect a national 
consensus, and thus involve the participation of the people 
through their elected representatives in order to obtain broad pub-
lic support for the agreement.297  Soft law instruments may thus be 
                                                 
296 See, e.g., EDYTHE E. WEEKS, OUTER SPACE DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS AND SPACE LAW: A METHOD FOR ELUCIDATING SEEDS at 51–54, 128 (2012) 
(noting how in the early epoch of the space era, the United States played a key 
role in building the foundation of the legal framework for space—especially the 
Kennedy Administration’s contributions in facilitating the progress of interna-
tional space law and the Johnson Administration’s subsequent role in “keeping up 
the momentum of international space lawmaking”—and how the United States 
has continued to play “a key role in influencing outer space development regime 
change” through subsequent epochs of outer space development).  
297 Richard B. Bilder, Formal Treaties and Tacit Agreements: An Exchange, 41 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
  
410 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:2 
a problematic substitute for legally binding agreements on several 
levels, particularly when used to address arms control and security 
issues.   
 
5.  GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR SOLUTIONS IN SPACE 
 
Many challenges now confront states in their use of outer 
space, but none pose a greater existential threat than the possibility 
that debris generated by human activities may render space unsafe 
and unusable for hundreds or even thousands of years.  However, 
the insecure strategic environment in space means many proposed 
cooperative measures will not be able to effectively address this 
threat and may instead only increase dangerous risks.   
The international community generally addresses the dissimi-
lar problems of space debris and arms control as separate areas of 
concern.  This is because the legal and political framework which 
underlies efforts to manage the critical problem of orbital space 
debris (which also includes the domestic laws and administrative 
regulations of many states), and the framework which addresses 
arms control issues in space, relate to fundamentally different sub-
ject areas.  Nonetheless, the two subject areas may implicate paral-
lel concerns or involve interdependent problems, as evidenced by 
the Code’s emphasis on preventing an arms race and regulating 
military activities in outer space while reducing the creation of or-
bital space debris.298 
Within the context of these different subject areas and frame-
                                                                                                               
BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 51, 52 (April 1985).  In view of the importance of 
obtaining broad congressional and public support for arms control arrangements, 
is it wise for the president to bypass normal constitutional agreement-making 
procedures?  Formal arms control treaties provide the requisite degree of predict-
ability and assurance . . . .  Moreover . . . [i]f the agreement is approved, it is likely 
to reflect a national consensus and have considerable support and stability.  In the 
United States, where arms control agreements have “almost invariably been nego-
tiated as treaties,” it has further been argued that the gravity of the issues ad-
dressed in such agreements “creates a presumption in favor of treaties with full 
Senate participation in the process of ratification.  See ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, JR. & 
PAUL R. VIOTTI, ARMS CONTROL: HISTORY, THEORY, AND POLICY – VOLUME 1:  
FOUNDATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL at 45 (2012). 
298  Some authors further suggest that lethal debris represents its own “hap-
hazard and inadvertent weaponization of space.”  See Michael Krepon, Space Code 
of Conduct Mugged in New York, Aug. 4, 2015, 
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/404712/space-code-of-conduct-
mugged-in-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/7DWW-KG7X].   
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works, the search continues for the “next step” towards meaning-
ful international collaboration in addressing the most acute prob-
lems confronting the international community in space, particular-
ly the problem of orbital space debris.  The proposed Code, a 
flawed soft law variant, is not a promising step.  Soft law is not, 
however, the only available solution or basis for that next step.  In-
stead, certain alternative principles emerged from the preceding 
analysis, which may help guide states in their next attempt to de-
sign other more effective instruments, regimes, and approaches to 
advance the long-term and sustainable use of outer space.   
 
5.1.  Pursue Hard Law Solutions with the Leading Spacefaring States 
 
Meaningful initiatives to regulate weapons and military activi-
ties in space cannot succeed when their design is divorced from the 
reality of the security dilemmas and perceived threats that states 
face.  While soft law instruments may give the appearance of pro-
gress, they notoriously achieve little on their own in addressing 
critical security issues in space.299  In this realm, soft law instru-
ments unfortunately do not assist states in conveying credible 
commitments to each other, providing the necessary assurances to 
prevent defensive defections from international regimes, or creat-
ing clear obligations to serve as the basis for effective monitoring 
and verification regimes designed to prevent offensive defections.  
Instead, soft law’s shortcomings—linked to design choices that 
weaken commitments along the dimensions of precision or obliga-
tion or both—inspire uncertainty, reduce confidence, and dramati-
cally diminish the effectiveness of any arms control measure in 
space.   
The benefits of hard law regimes and the disadvantages of soft 
law instruments in the field of arms control are compelling.  This 
helps explain why, despite continuing and sometimes intense dip-
lomatic efforts to promote the adoption of the Code, a wide variety 
of experts from numerous space-faring countries agree that a hard 
law approach is ultimately needed to deal with the greatest chal-
                                                 
299 Aoki, supra note 57, at 85 (“[O]nce critical national security interest is con-
cerned, then, only legally-binding rules can govern the activities of individual na-
tion.”); Elatawy, supra note 84, at 50 (“There is a necessity for further measures to 
govern outer space activities through the negotiation and conclusion of further 
legally binding instrument(s)”). 
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lenges confronting the international community in space.300  It is 
also consistent with demands by several major space stakeholders 
(including Brazil, India, South Africa, Russia and China) that work 
on the Code “should not prejudice or delay the elaboration of le-
gally-binding instruments to strengthen the existing legal frame-
work for outer space.”301   
As previously noted, however, proponents of soft law ap-
proaches often view legally binding instruments for space activities 
as too difficult to achieve, pointing to the lack of any new hard law 
agreements since 1979.  Unfortunately, the attention, time and gov-
ernment resources dedicated to promoting the Code appear to be 
diverting efforts from more meaningful and important work on 
any new legally binding agreements.302  The lengthy, continuing 
state-sponsored deliberations related to the Code present only an 
illusion of progress, one that diminishes interest in more effective 
legally binding agreements, reduces pressure on states to pursue 
such alternatives, creates the false impression of agreement when 
there is none, and induces false expectations that may later lead to 
disagreement and increased conflict when those expectations are 
disappointed.303  
Commentators who are not optimistic about hard law ap-
proaches in space have suggested that the different and apparently 
irreconcilable interests of different states are responsible for pre-
venting the conclusion of any new legally binding multilateral 
agreement in the field of space law since 1979.304  In this environ-
ment, bottom-up soft law approaches may continue to be an option 
for progress in some areas, particularly where consensus can be 
                                                 
300  See, e.g., Juqian, supra note 159, at 43 ("Though voluntary ‘rules of the 
road’ have their advantages, ‘soft law’ is not enough for dealing with more and 
more complicated space activities.  Rules with legally binding force are better for 
the international community”);  Fermin Romero Vazquez, EU Efforts for an ICoC:  
A Mexican Perspective, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 137, 141 (“Countries 
such as Mexico have argued the need for legally binding instruments to develop 
space law”); Lele, supra note 79, at 20 (“India, being an important player in the 
Space arena, needs to lobby for a transparent and binding CoC, which would 
eventually help in realising Space security”). 
301 Meyer, supra note 227. 
302 K. R. Sridhara Murthi & Mukund Rao, ICoC: Perspective for India, in 
AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 159, 167 (“[T]here have been fears that [the 
ICoC] may slow down or divert efforts to build legally binding commitments that 
are essential for assuring the safety, security and sustainability of space activi-
ties”). 
303 BILDER, supra note 70, at 38.  
304 Juqian, supra note 159, at 43. 
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achieved on various technical and procedural issues and incorpo-
rated in non-binding standards and guidelines (which in turn may 
ultimately lead to hard rules in conventions or customary interna-
tional law).  
However, the security matters addressed by the Code are not 
conducive to resolution by soft law approaches, nor do they com-
prise an area in which soft law instruments effectively lay the 
foundation for the development of legally binding rules.  Soft law 
in this context may instead present an obstacle to the development 
of such hard rules, even more so when ambiguities in these in-
struments allow subscribing states to take competing positions and 
approaches with respect to key rules.305   
Rather than forming an agreed basis for the development of fu-
ture norms, non-binding and indeterminate instruments in these 
situations may, as noted, be nothing more than a form of a “de-
ferred confrontation” or simply reflect a profound lack of consen-
sus on issues that are necessary to conclude a legally binding 
agreement.306  Instead of creating a solid foundation on which to 
build new legally binding obligations, soft law here may instead 
make such new legally binding norms even more difficult to 
achieve. 
The design choices for the Code thus appear to reflect a large 
degree of continuing disagreement—and this lack of consensus is 
further demonstrated by the continuing unwillingness of several 
key spacefaring nations to subscribe to it.  The struggles of the 
Code do not, however, indicate a need for more soft law.  Instead, 
they indicate a need for targeted hard law initiatives (involving the 
participation of all major space stakeholders) to serve as a first step 
in addressing the most widely acknowledged threats confronting 
the safety and security of objects in space. 
 
                                                 
305 Ambiguous language used in an instrument to paper over differences be-
tween states may have a variety of negative effects on long-term efforts to develop 
binding international agreements, because such language can, among other 
things, “foster not only a false sense that an issue is no longer of concern because 
it has been resolved; it can also foster dangerous misconceptions of what has been 
gained or conceded in an agreement.”  See Kittrie, supra note 123, at 1703–1704.  
306 Chayes & Shelton, supra note 134, at 525 (noting that “recourse to non-
binding norms may reflect a lack of consensus on the issues that make it impossi-
ble to conclude a binding agreement . . . ”). 
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5.2.  Avoid Arms Control Traps in Space  
 
Any successful effort to achieve legally binding restrictions on 
military activities or weapons in space must focus on specific, de-
finable, and limited objectives, or run afoul of issues that have his-
torically ensured deadlock among suspicious and insecure adver-
saries.307  Some seemingly desirable goals, however, are likely to 
ensure failure.   
The first such problematic goal involves attempting to use arms 
control agreements or other instruments to comprehensively en-
sure peace in space.  Unfortunately, the integration of modern mili-
tary systems on earth, sea, air, and space guarantees that, at some 
point, states seeking to disrupt or deny the ability of an adversary 
(such as the United States) to project power will find space capabil-
ities to be a particularly appealing target, especially in the early 
stages of a crisis or conflict.308  The presence of so many things of 
military value in space thus makes actions by an adversary to neu-
tralize, disrupt or destroy these things likely during a major con-
flict on earth.309   
The second problematic arms control goal in space that seems 
certain to ensure stalemate involves attempting to define and pro-
hibit military technologies with a view to broadly prevent the 
weaponization of space.  Clearly defining a space weapon for pur-
poses of any legally binding arms control agreement is a daunting 
task, one that is made particularly challenging by the “essentially 
                                                 
307 BRUCE W. MACDONALD, CHINA, SPACE WEAPONS, AND U.S. SECURITY 30 
(Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 38, 2008) available at 
http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707  [https://
perma.cc/6YJ8-JYE2] (arguing that sweeping arms control proposals are unlikely 
to be verifiable and that historically such overbroad proposals “have acted more 
as a delaying tactic than serious policy”). 
308 Schulte & Schaffer, supra note 44, at 10 (“For an adversary seeking to dis-
rupt or deny the ability of the United States to project power, space capabilities 
may provide an appealing target set, especially early in a crisis or conflict”); Gor-
don G. Chang, The Space Arms Race Begins, FORBES, Nov. 6, 2009, 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/05/space-arms-race-china-united-states-
opinions-columnists-gordon-g-chang.html [https://perma.cc/8B44-K4TP] (quot-
ing the Chief of the Chinese Air Force in an article in the People’s Liberation Army 
Daily as saying “Competition between military forces is developing towards the 
sky and space, it is extending beyond the atmosphere and even into outer 
space . . . .  This development is a historical inevitability and cannot be undone”). 
309 Kueter, supra note 172, at 2 (“War will find its way to space because there 
are things of military value in space and their denial or destruction would net a 
military advantage during a conflict”). 
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military nature of space technology.”310  As noted, space technolo-
gies are routinely viewed as dual-use in nature, meaning that they 
can be readily employed for both civilian and military uses.  De-
termining the ultimate purpose of many space technologies may 
thus depend on discerning the intentions of states, a process per-
haps better suited for psychological than legal evaluation.311 
Further complicating the classification of space military tech-
nologies is the inherent difficulty in distinguishing most space 
weapons on the basis of their offensive and defensive roles or even 
their specific missions.312  For example, this problem lies at the 
heart of debates over the status and future of ballistic missile de-
fense (“BMD”) programs, since the technology underlying BMD 
systems and offensive ASAT weapons is often indistinguishable.313  
Vague and broad soft law instruments do not resolve this problem, 
but create instead their own confusion and insecurity.  Vague and 
broad provisions in legally binding agreements that do not or can-
not distinguish between these missions are similarly problematic. 
These issues, particularly difficulties in distinguishing ASAT 
and BMD systems, have figured prominently in complicating ne-
                                                 
310 Aoki, supra note 57, at 60; Frans von der Dunk, Contradictio in Terminis or 
Realpolitik? A Qualified Plea for a Role of ‘Soft Law’ in the Context of Space Activities, in 
SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 27, at 37 (noting that “military and strategic consid-
erations” are “almost always prominently present in the context of space activi-
ties”).   
311 Jane C. Hu, The Battle for Space, SLATE, Dec. 23 2014, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/space_20/2014/12/space_
weapon_law_u_s_china_and_russia_developing_dangerous_dual_use
_spacecraft.html [https://perma.cc/94XZ-GPN8] (noting that “[i]t’s difficult—if 
not impossible—to determine what counts as a space weapon. Identifying space 
weapons has become a psychological game: Experts must infer the intentions of 
the nation launching space objects”). 
312 David Holloway, The Soviet Perception for Reykjavik: Four Documents, in 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT ON ITS TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY 45–96, 45, 
60 (Sidney D. Drell & George P. Shultz eds., 2007) (“Any space-based system car-
rying strike weapons (kinetic, energy beam, nuclear) is both offensive and defen-
sive.  There is no basis for separating space-based strike systems into offensive 
and purely defensive categories.”); Peter Hays, Developments in Ballistic Missile De-
fences, in CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE, supra note 205, at 21, 22 (“Even a very lim-
ited BMD system will have significant ASAT capabilities. Thus there is significant 
overlap of BMD and space weaponization issues, which need to be seen as inter-
linked issues”).   
313 JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE, SPACE AS A STRATEGIC ASSET 7 (2007) (“A missile 
that can target another missile in flight (missile defense) can also target orbiting 
satellites . . . .  From a technical perspective, it is not difficult to conceive of a mis-
sile defense system as an offensive antisatellite (ASAT) weapon”). 
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gotiations on space weapons over previous decades.314  Similarly, 
these concerns were a significant factor in initial U.S. opposition to 
the arms control measure proposed by China and Russia (the 
“PPWT”) since it prohibits states from placing any type of weapon 
in outer space (regardless of its military mission), thus effectively 
prohibiting the deployment of space-based missile defense inter-
ceptors or other space-based missile defense weapon capabili-
ties.315  Furthermore, even if clear legal restrictions could be devel-
oped, verifying compliance with respect to technology in orbit 
around Earth would be very difficult (a point conceded even by 
China with respect to its own proposed PPWT).316  
 
  5.3.  Maintain a Focus on the Most Harmful Conduct 
 
The first steps in successfully addressing the greatest threats to 
space—which must be consciously undertaken against the back-
drop of suspicion, insecurity and fears of a space arms race—are 
not sweeping and unverifiable bans on weapons or military tech-
nologies.317  Instead, solutions lie in legally binding prohibitions on 
specific types of the most harmful conduct, restrictions that are al-
so likely to benefit from more feasible methods of verification. 
                                                 
314 Segey Oznobishchev, Codes of Conduct for Outer Space, in OUTER SPACE:  
WEAPONS, DIPLOMACY, AND SECURITY, supra note 165, at 72 (noting that this history 
“reveals the enormous complexity of trying to impose treaty-based legal re-
strictions on space systems”). 
315 Letter dated 19 August 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the United 
States of America Addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting 
Comments on the Draft "Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer 
Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT)" as Con-
tained in Document CD/1839 of 29 February 2008, at 4.  The latest draft of the PPWT 
continues to broadly define the term “weapon in outer space” as “any outer space 
object or component thereof which has been produced or converted to destroy, 
damage or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth’s 
surface or in its atmosphere . . . .”  Draft PPWT, June 12, 2014, supra note 85, art. 
I.b. 
316 MACDONALD, supra note 307, at 27 (“Notably, China itself has conceded 
the difficulty of verifying such an agreement. . . .”); Micah Zenko, supra note 407, 
at 3 (noting that “the United States and most other spacefaring nations correctly 
oppose the draft treaty on the grounds that it would be unverifiable and would 
not cover ground-based systems”). 
317 MACDONALD, supra note 307, at 30 (noting that “[s]weeping proposals are 
probably unverifiable; certainly most deployment bans on such weapons would 
be. Historically, overbroad proposals have acted more as a delaying tactic than 
serious policy”). 
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The best target for an initial multilateral agreement effort 
aimed at increasing safety and security in space is not difficult to 
find.  The widely acknowledged, dangerous and growing problem 
of debris in space is well documented, as is the very real threat that 
it poses to all future uses of space.  ASAT tests rank among the 
greatest concerns in the creation of such debris, as evidenced by 
the hugely damaging effects of the 2007 Chinese test (which in-
spired the drafting of the Code).  The destruction of one large satel-
lite alone can create as much debris as would otherwise be gener-
ated by seventy to eighty years of ordinary space activity under 
strict debris mitigation measures.318  It is thus suggested that an 
urgent and important first step in preventing the further produc-
tion of space debris is an international agreement banning the test-
ing of destructive (debris-generating) ASATs.319  
No international agreement currently bans the testing, de-
ployment or use of ASATs.  With the exception of a ban on the 
placement of weapons of mass destruction in space under the Out-
er Space Treaty, no space weapons are currently prohibited by any 
international agreement at all.320  As noted, even the IADC Guide-
lines (and the COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines that 
they inspired), fail to address the problem of ASAT testing.  Such 
gaps support the larger criticism by many states and legal experts 
that the existing legal framework governing space is not adequate 
to ensure the security of space objects or prevent an arms race in 
space.321  Yet addressing all these deficiencies at once is not a nec-
essary first step. 
Instead of attempting to prohibit broad categories of technolo-
gy and their use (or designating all ASATs as a prohibited class of 
weapons), there should be a focus on specific conduct involving 
the most damaging ASAT weapons technology—interceptor vehi-
cles or “hit-to-kill” systems employing kinetic energy (“KE”)—
which represent the greatest current threat of weapons-related de-
bris generation in space.322  Fortuitously, the testing of these weap-
                                                 
318 Wright, supra note 24, at 24. 
319 Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Hit-to-kill’ and the Threat to Space Assets, in CELEBRATING THE 
SPACE AGE, supra note 205, at 22–26. 
320 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IV. 
321 See, e.g., Tronchetti, supra note 29, at 367 (“[T]he majority of states and le-
gal experts deem [the existing international legal framework] not adequate to pre-
vent an arms race in space and to guarantee the security of space objects”). 
322 Lewis, supra note 319, at 22–23; MACDONALD, supra note 307, at 30 (noting 
that “[o]ne possible restriction that merits consideration is a ban on KE-ASAT 
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ons also presents a particular type of conduct that is within the 
competence of states to clearly define, regulate and verify under an 
appropriate international legal regime.323   
Prohibiting tests of KE, hit-to-kill, debris-generating ASATs (or 
“destructive” ASAT tests) restricts the use of a weapon that ap-
pears to be in the early stages of spreading around the world, ad-
dresses real and effective technologies (while resisting futile at-
tempts to define and regulate future exotic technologies), and 
maintains a narrow focus on banning the most threatening current 
technology—thus avoiding the difficulties inherent in achieving 
comprehensive arms control agreements.324  Because the orbital 
lifetime of fragments is shorter in low-earth orbits than in higher 
orbits (where there may be little or no natural orbital decay due to 
atmospheric drag), it is has been suggested that an explicit ban on 
ASAT testing in higher geosynchronous orbits would be especially 
compelling.325   
The growing threat of orbital space debris now threatens to 
make space unusable for all spacefaring countries, even for the 
great space powers.  Once before, when nuclear tests in space by 
the superpowers in the Cold War brought competing nations to the 
brink of ruining orbital space and causing great damage on earth, 
both sides accepted mutual restraint to avert disaster and conclud-
ed a legally binding, multilateral agreement banning nuclear tests 
in space.326  For all spacefaring countries, and especially for the ma-
                                                                                                               
tests” and that satellites destroyed by KE-ASATs “could render important orbital 
areas inhospitable for military or civilian use for decades, even centuries”). 
323  Id. at 23 (noting that an advantage of a ban on kinetic-energy ASAT test-
ing is “that it would be both easy to define and to verify, and would allow for a 
dialogue to begin without sidestepping any issues”); Wright, supra note 24, at 26 
(“One suggestion was that an advantage of a partial arms control measure, such 
as a ban on kinetic-energy ASAT testing, is that it would be both easy to define 
and to verify, and would allow for a dialogue to begin without sidestepping any 
issues”). 
324 Lewis, supra note 319, at 23. 
325 MACDONALD, supra note 307, at 30.  As previously noted, however, debris 
in low earth orbit may persist for many decades, presenting a persistent threat to 
all spacecraft passing through it.  
326 MOLTZ, supra note 95, at 28–29 (2014) (noting that a 1.4 megaton nuclear 
test in 1962 400km above earth created such large EMP emissions that it disabled 
seven satellites in low earth orbit.); Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the 
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.  
Similarly, in spite of the tension and mutual mistrust that characterized the Cold 
War, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to develop specific, legally-
binding rules and procedures governing the activities and interactions of their 
military forces in areas other than space (notably on the high seas) to better ensure 
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jor space powers, the time for similar, focused, legally-binding re-
straint with respect to the issue of ASAT testing appears to have 
arrived.    
 
5.4.  Develop Solutions in the Context of Insecurity, the Geopolitics of 
Space, and U.S. Skepticism 
 
China, Russia, and the United States have all successfully 
demonstrated ASAT capabilities in tests of various ASAT systems, 
including some which apparently involved directed energy weap-
ons (particularly lasers) designed to incapacitate or “dazzle” satel-
lites in non-destructive tests.327  However, the Russian government 
has not conducted a destructive ASAT test since 1983 and the last 
debris-generating American ASAT test took place in 1985.328  While 
the Chinese government has continued to develop new ASAT ca-
pabilities, it was clearly surprised by the widespread international 
outrage over its 2007 ASAT test and has not conducted any similar 
debris-generating tests since that time.329  Although these three 
ASAT-active countries appear to have little interest in conducting 
further destructive ASAT tests, they nonetheless have much to lose 
if other states pursue such testing. 
New destructive ASAT tests would not only threaten space 
with vast new clouds of debris, but would also bring new fears, in-
stability, and risks of weaponization.330  A new wave of destructive 
                                                                                                               
the safety of navigation and reduce the possibility of conflict by accident, miscal-
culation, or the failure of communication.  See Prevention of Incidents on and over 
the High Sea, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 25, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 1168. 
327 Laura Grego, A History of Anti-Satellite Programs, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS 5–6, (Jan. 2009) http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/
assets/documents/nwgs/a-history-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SS2D-6BTF]. 
328 Id.; see Koplow, supra note 284, at 1209 (noting that the 300 pieces of track-
able debris generated by the last U.S destructive ASAT test on September 13, 1985, 
took nineteen years to degrade out of orbit). 
329 Phillip C. Saunders, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission Hearing on “China’s Space and Counterspace Programs” 10 (Feb. 
18, 2015), http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Saunders_Testimony2.
18.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XQN-55ZG] (noting that Chinese officials appear to 
have learned from the mistakes they made in both the conduct of the 2007 ASAT 
test and how the information was presented publicly and observing that “subse-
quent 2010 and 2013 tests . . . were conducted against sub-orbital targets and did 
not create any long-lived space debris”). 
330 Lewis, supra note 319, at 23 (noting that the introduction of ASAT weap-
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ASAT weapon tests is not unimaginable, since countries other than 
China, Russia, and the United States, including India, Israel, and 
Japan; remain interested in developing hit-to-kill ASAT technolo-
gy.331  As rivalries in space expand far beyond the confines of the 
Cold War, it is important to note that even a limited conflict in 
space could be devastating, since the debris generated by such a 
conflict could result in the possible loss of near-earth orbit.332  
Beyond the potential strategic benefits for the United States of a 
legally binding multilateral ban on destructive ASAT tests, no 
country has a greater stake than the United States in minimizing 
the amount of orbital debris (since it makes the most use of 
space).333  The most serious policy concern related to such a ban, at 
least in the view of some skeptical members of the U.S. Congress, 
remains the possible negative impact on U.S. BMD programs.334  
For this reason, the United States may prefer to pursue a partial but 
nonetheless effective ban on the most destructive ASAT testing, 
one which is limited to at least prohibiting tests above a specified 
altitude (thus greatly reducing or eliminating the production of 
any long-lived debris while still permitting effective ballistic mis-
sile interception tests at lower altitudes).335   
                                                                                                               
ons raise issues of “international stability” in addition to making it “much harder 
to reach cooperative agreements on issues such as debris mitigation or space traf-
fic management”). 
331 Id.; Ross Liemer & Christopher F. Chyba, A Verifiable Limited Test Ban for 
Anti-satellite Weapons, 33 WASH. Q. 149, 154 (July 2010) (noting how India report-
edly plans to “develop the capacity to destroy satellites in low-earth and polar or-
bits” and that Japanese legislation now permits the use of “outer space for mili-
tary purposes of a defensive nature”); Lewis, supra note 319, at 147–49 (discussing 
kinetic energy ASAT development work in Israel, Japan, and European countries). 
332 MOLTZ, supra note 95, at 4 (2014). 
333 Liemer & Chyba, supra note 331, at 154. 
334 See, e.g., 160 CONG. REC. S6936 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 2015) (letter from Sen. Da-
vid Vitter and Congressman Doug Lamborn to Mr. Frank Rose, Deputy Assistant 
Sec’y of State for Space and Def. Pol’y (Nov. 12, 2014)) (stating that “we seek [to] 
understand the Administration's position on space arms control, specifically, any 
‘debris generating kinetic energy ASAT testing moratorium’” and that “we fear a 
new threat to our ability to protect U.S. outer space capabilities, and, perhaps even 
to develop our missile defenses”).  
335 Liemer & Chyba, supra note 331, at 156 (noting that “[a] test ban above 
250—300 km has evidently been the de facto, voluntary practice of the United 
States in recent years” and that the “U.S. Missile Defense Agency reports that its 
ballistic missile intercept tests were conducted at an altitude of 230 km.”  The au-
thors further note that “evidently a ban on testing above 250 or 300 km would not 
unduly interfere with missile defense tests . . . . The United States would remain 
free (as would other nations) to intercept de-orbiting satellites or to conduct ballis-
tic missile intercept tests below the specified altitude”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/2
  
2017] CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 421 
 
To be effective, a ban on ASAT testing should be incorporated 
in a legally binding international convention that includes the ma-
jor spacefaring states.  Through this mechanism, states can convey 
credible commitments to not conduct ASAT tests, provide assur-
ances of their compliance, and establish a framework with clear ob-
ligations on which arms control compliance; monitoring and verifi-
cation measures can be built.  It would also provide a solid 
foundation for making a prohibition on destructive ASAT tests a 
rule of customary international law.336  Participation by the legisla-
tures of participating states in approving or authorizing the 
agreement would further advance these goals and also strengthen 
the credibility of underlying state commitments. 
With respect to U.S. involvement in a ban on destructive ASAT 
tests, a legally binding agreement (benefitting from the authoriza-
tion or approval of the U.S. Congress in the form of a treaty, con-
gressional-executive agreement, or statutory authorization) that 
clearly prohibits such ASAT tests would more effectively contrib-
ute to the emergence of binding legal norm under customary inter-
national law and also enhance rather than diminish the leadership 
role that the United States has long played in the development of 
international space law.337 
A final, practical, strategic reality remains for the United States 
and other countries as they contemplate the conclusion of appro-
priate legally binding multilateral conventions restricting ASAT 
tests or other explicitly defined harmful conduct in space.  U.S. mil-
itary planners (as well as the military authorities of the other space 
                                                 
336 Currently, no rule of customary international law prohibits ASAT testing, 
even though an examination of state practice indicates that barely half a dozen 
ASAT testing events have occurred within the past two decades, conducted by 
only three states.  Unfortunately, the subjective element or opinio juris necessary to 
establish a rule of customary international law (that states are conforming to what 
they view is a legal obligation) is clearly lacking.  See Koplow, supra note 284, at 
1237–38 (noting that “the three ASAT-active States have certainly never indicated 
that any existing legal compulsion circumscribes their actions” and noting the 
conspicuous failure on the part of states to label the 2007 Chinese ASAT test as 
“‘illegal’ or ‘inconsistent with’ any particular legal obligations”). 
337  As noted, clearly formulated rules of a “norm-creating character” which 
are first framed in legally binding agreements may later become binding rules of 
customary international law if they subsequently enjoy the “widespread and rep-
resentative participation” of states and this state practice is carried out in such a 
way “as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the 
existence of a rule of law requiring it.”  See N. Sea Cont'l Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42–44 
(Feb. 20, 1969).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
  
422 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:2 
powers) must remain prepared to protect their assets in space in 
the event of a conflict in the strategically vital domain of space.   
In spite of the goals of peaceful cooperation in space, U.S. mili-
tary doctrine clearly requires the U.S. forces to be capable in time 
of conflict to take measures “to prevent an adversary's hostile use 
of US/third-party space capabilities,” to successfully engage in “of-
fensive operations to negate an adversary's space capabilities used 
to interfere with or attack US/allied space systems,” and to negate 
“adversary space capabilities through deception, disruption, deni-
al, degradation, or destruction actions.”338  Achieving these mission 
objectives seems highly unlikely if U.S. forces do not have the nec-
essary weapons to achieve and maintain superior military capabili-
ties.339  
Some commentators have thus suggested that while the United 
States continues to pursue appropriate multilateral security agree-
ments (such as one banning debris-generating ASAT tests) and 
continues to refrain from taking clearly provocative actions in 
space (particularly the flight testing and deployment of clearly-
dedicated space weaponry), it should maintain a “hedging strategy 
against space warfare capabilities or unpleasant surprises.”340  Such 
a hedging strategy requires, among other things, laboratory re-
search and development of basic ASAT technologies with a central 
goal of “providing assurance that the United States is not sur-
prised, and technologically outdistanced, by advances in ASAT ca-
                                                 
338 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ET AL., JOINT STAFF PUBLICATION 3 – 14: SPACE 
OPERATIONS (29 May 2013), II-8, available at http://www.dtic.mil/ doc-
trine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EY2-RHGD].  
339 Report of the Commission to Assess United States Security Space Management 
and Organization, U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, Executive Summary, x (Jan. 11, 2001), 
available at http://www.dod.gov/pubs/space20010111.html [https://perma.cc/
3724-A8W3]  
[W]e know from history that every medium—air, land and sea—has seen 
conflict.  Reality indicates that space will be no different.  Given this vir-
tual certainty, the U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to de-
fend against hostile acts in and from space.  This will require superior 
space capabilities. 
340  MICHAEL KREPON & CHRISTOPHER CLARY, SPACE ASSURANCE OR SPACE 
DOMINANCE?: THE CASE AGAINST WEAPONIZING SPACE 78 (2003) (further arguing 
that deployment of war-fighting capabilities by the United States “is likely to gen-
erate the launch of relatively cheap, low-tech, but lethal ASATs by weaker adver-
saries” and that “the flight-testing and deployment of dedicated space weaponry 
would add new instability in crisis and new impulses toward escalation.  It would 
be folly to invite these consequences unless it is absolutely necessary to do so”).   
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pabilities that another country is able to achieve.”341  
 With these goals in mind, any arms control agreement or soft 
law instrument that the United States contemplates joining which 
will regulate space activities must be sufficiently precise to ensure 
that no implicit or de facto restrictions are imposed on essential de-
fense capabilities or the ability to engage in strategic “hedging” 
(particularly military space R&D programs).342  As discussed 
above, however, the broad and imprecise terms of the Code may 
raise concerns that the scrutiny of military programs by civil socie-
ty in liberal democracies could result in de facto restrictions on im-
portant military R&D space weapon programs and related activi-
ties. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION   
 
Efforts to prevent the proliferation of space debris cannot be 
fully realized without also dealing with the threat to the sustaina-
ble use of space posed by destructive ASAT tests.  The Code’s pro-
posed application of its own variant of soft law to these very dif-
ferent but related problem areas unfortunately portends failure.  
Modest but important progress in both these areas is, however, 
feasible through limited hard law approaches which focus on de-
structive ASAT testing in the context of the reality of acute security 
concerns.   
Such tailored hard law approaches offer a genuine “next step” 
in solving the most serious problems confronting the international 
community in space.  They also complement, rather than interfere 
with, successful bottom-up soft law approaches that allowed the 
space agencies of leading spacefaring states to generate technical 
guidelines reducing the routine generation of orbital space debris.  
These hard law approaches stand in stark contrast to the flawed 
                                                 
341  Id. at 80 (noting that another central goal is “to provide assurance to po-
tential adversaries that, should they initiate the flight-testing and deployment of 
space warfare capabilities, they will prompt a most unwelcome reaction by the 
United States”). 
342 Such policies are generally consistent with the position of the current and 
previous U.S. administrations.  As previously noted, Secretary of State Clinton re-
affirmed in 2012 the central U.S. commitment to preserving its national defense 
capabilities in space by noting that the United States will not enter into any code 
of conduct “that in any way constrains our national security-related activities in 
space or our ability to protect the United States and our allies.”  See Press State-
ment, Sec’y of State Clinton, supra note 18.  
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variant of soft law embodied in the Code, one which risks confu-
sion and increased insecurity even as it distracts states from pursu-
ing more effective models.  
While the U.S. government has indicated some interest in pur-
suing a ban on destructive ASAT tests, no proposal to ban ASAT 
tests is under consideration at this time.  In spite of the merits of 
such an initiative, U.S. government officials indicated in late 2014 
that no decision has been made to propose such an agreement.343  
When asked to further explain this position during recent Congres-
sional hearings, administration officials repeated that they had no 
plans to pursue a ban on debris-generating ASAT testing, noting 
instead that “[c]urrently, our diplomatic focus is on the develop-
ment of an International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activi-
ties.”344  
The Code thus continues to consume the time and effort of the 
government of the United States and the governments of other 
states in the international community, diverting resources that 
could otherwise be dedicated to more meaningful steps to improve 
safety and security of space.  In this sense, the proposed Code is 
not just a looming failure on the horizon but, to use another helpful 
space metaphor, it is also a black hole exerting a strong gravita-
tional pull that few governments seem able to resist.  
 
 
                                                 
343 160 CONG. REC. S6936 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 2015) (Letter from Julia Frifield, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Vitter (November 17, 
2014)) (“At this time, the Administration has made no decision to propose the ne-
gotiation of a debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium . . . we have not made a 
specific proposal to allies for negotiation of a debris-generating ASAT testing 
moratorium”). 
344 Id. (Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative 
Affairs, to Sen. Vitter, (Dec. 10, 2014) (“The administration has no plans to pro-
pose the negotiation of a debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium at this 
time . . . .  Currently, our diplomatic focus is on the development of an Interna-
tional Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities”). 
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